











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
Essays on sovereign debt in federations:
bailout, default and exit
Angela Nolte
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy








List of Figures IX
List of Tables X
1 Introduction 1
2 Bailout or bankruptcy: do insolvency laws harden the subnational
budget constraint? 6
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.1 The players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 Timing of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Reference cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.1 The hard budget constraint policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2 The soft budget constraint result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 The default decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.1 High exemption level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.2 Low exemption level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 The federal transfer policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 Regional opportunistic behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.8 The optimal design of bankruptcy procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.9 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.A The soft budget constraint result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.B Proof of Lemma 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.C Proof of Lemma 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
II
2.D Proof of Lemma 2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.E Optimal design of bankruptcy procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3 A Greek tragedy with a happy ending? Orderly debt restructuring in
the EU 47
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.1 The Eurozone debt crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.2 Crisis management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.3 Orderly debt restructuring: an overview . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 The benchmark model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.1 Model set-up: public debt, liquidity, solvency and default . 60
3.3.2 The players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.3 Timing of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3.5 Debtor country moral hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Orderly debt restructuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4.1 Modification of players’ payoff functions . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4.3 Debtor country moral hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5 How effective are insolvency procedures? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.6 Policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.7 Epilogue: a happy ending? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4 To be, or not to be: can a ‘closer union’ save the Euro? 89
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2 Eurozone break-up: background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2.1 Economic impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2.2 Legal and procedural issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2.3 The political dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3 The status quo (SQ): “muddling through” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3.1 Model set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3.2 Periphery’s utility after exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3.3 Institutional set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.3.5 EU welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
III
4.4 The ESM: an orderly default mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.5 Political union (PU): economic governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.5.1 Institutional set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.6 Fiscal union (FU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.6.1 FU with exit clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.6.2 FU without exit clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.6.3 A note on Eurobonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.7 Concluding remarks: can a ‘closer union’ save the Euro? . . . . . 120
4.A Status quo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.B Proof of Proposition 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.C FU with exit clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124




I, Angela Nolte, confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material
from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged. This thesis has not





Writing this PhD thesis has been a long and challenging journey, and I would
not have been able to complete it without the help, support and encouragement
of the people around me.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my academic supervisor, Professor
Jonathan Thomas, for his advice and guidance throughout the course of this
PhD. I am also thankful to my second supervisor, Professor Stuart Sayer, for
his supportive comments and suggestions. Moreover, I would like to express
my thanks to the faculty members and staff in the School of Economics at the
University of Edinburgh who have advised and assisted me during my research.
I would also like to thank my examiners, Marcus Miller and Robert Zymek, for
their encouraging comments and constructive feedback during my viva.
I gratefully acknowledge the financial support by my sponsors, the Economic
and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the School of Economics via the
Research and Teaching Scholarship. I am also grateful to the Scottish Institute
for Research in Economics (SIRE) for providing a conference presenter grant,
enabling me to present my research at the 26th Congress of the European
Economic Association.
On a personal level, I would like to thank my family and friends for their
continuous love and support. I am especially grateful to my parents who have
always been there for me and who have encouraged me to pursue my goals, even
if they led me far away from home. It is to them, I dedicate this thesis.
Finally, I would like to thank Anthony for his love, patience and belief in me.
VI
Abstract
The thesis analyses the moral hazard problem which arises in political or fiscal
federations when member states anticipate being bailed out by the centre in
case of financial distress. In particular, I examine whether an orderly default
mechanism or deeper fiscal integration within the European Union can alleviate
the soft budget constraint phenomenon and provide a solution to the sovereign
debt crises engulfing the Eurozone and other parts of the world.
The first essay adapts the standard Stackelberg approach of the bailout
literature in order to study the effects of bankruptcy procedures on regional
opportunistic behaviour. The insolvency mechanism is shaped by two parameters:
the costs of default and the exemption level for public assets. The model lends
support to the market discipline hypothesis if all public assets are exempt from
seizure. If, by contrast, the exemption level for public assets is low, it is the central
government rather than the credit market that discourages overborrowing since
the former is incentivised to tax heavily indebted regions. The model’s major
policy insight is that an insolvency mechanism can lower the federation’s welfare
if it is not carefully designed.
The second essay sheds light on the incentive effects of the sovereign debt
restructuring mechanism which has been drafted by the Eurozone in response
to the debt crisis. Employing a global game approach, the model analyses the
impact of insolvency procedures on the size of the bailout, the level of effort
exerted by the debtor country and EU welfare. Challenging some arguments in
the policy literature, the model’s major policy implication is that a half-hearted
debt restructuring mechanism fails to mitigate the commitment and moral hazard
problems embedded in the current EMU framework.
The third essay questions the conventional wisdom that the Euro cannot survive
without closer integration, using a simple political economy framework. The
model compares the stability and welfare implications of the current “muddling
through” scenario, an orderly default mechanism as well as a fiscal and a political
union setting. Interestingly, the results suggest that the “muddling through”
scenario is not more prone to break-up than the political or the fiscal union. The
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model’s major policy recommendation is that implementing an orderly default
mechanism and inserting an explicit exit clause into the European Treaties
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1 Introduction
This depends on principles of human nature, that are as infallible as any
mathematical calculations. States will contribute or not, according to their
circumstances and interests: They will all be inclined to throw off the burthens
of government upon their neighbours.1
(Alexander Hamilton, 1788)
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, sovereign debt has emerged as one
of the major economic challenges facing countries today, as governments around
the world struggle to bring their fiscal houses in order. Central governments’
budget plans, however, are frequently undermined by debt accumulation at
subnational or local levels. In addition, regional fiscal irresponsibility can pose
a serious threat to the federation’s macroeconomic stability, with the Eurozone
crisis being a prime example of a subnational sovereign debt crisis. In the light
of the global trend towards decentralisation, either in the form of devolution of
responsibilities to regional governments or evolution to supranational institutions
such as the European Union, it is important to understand the link between
public debt and fiscal decentralisation (Rodden, 2006). Empirical evidence
suggests that regional fiscal indiscipline can be generated by a deficient design
of intergovernmental fiscal relations (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997; Vigneault,
2007). As seen in the case of Greece, for example, if subnational governments
anticipate to be bailed out by the federation, they lack incentives to tackle their
problematic finances, resulting in debtor moral hazard. The question of how to
discipline subnational borrowers is of interest to policymakers and researchers of
fiscal federalism alike.
While the first generation theory of fiscal federalism has stressed the benefits
of decentralisation (Oates, 1972), the second generation has highlighted its dark
side and started to explore the “dangers of decentralisation” (Prud’homme,
1994), motivated by a series of fiscal crises precipitated by regional opportunistic
behaviour (Oates, 2008). A basic element of the second generation approach is
the concept of the soft budget constraint, a term that was introduced by Kornai
1 Speech in the New York Ratifying Convention, 28.6.1788, see Frisch (1985).
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(1979). In the context of a federation, it refers to a situation in which subnational
governments can look to the central government to rescue them in case of financial
distress. Since regions can externalise their costs onto the national taxpayer, they
are incentivised to overborrow strategically, thereby “raiding the fiscal commons”
(Oates, 2008) and shifting their burden to other member states, as indicated by
Hamilton. Rodden et al. (2003) show that soft budget constraints are widespread
in many federations. Second generation fiscal federalism is concerned with both
the structural roots of the moral hazard problem and potential institutional
reforms which can harden the budget constraint.
My research contributes to this field of study by analysing a market-based
solution to the moral hazard problem which arises in political or fiscal federations
when member states expect a bailout. Drawing on insights from the literature
on sovereign debt restructuring, three separate models are developed in order to
examine the effects of an orderly default mechanism on the centre’s commitment
problem and regional opportunistic behaviour. Proponents of private sector
involvement have argued that bankruptcy proceedings can discipline subnational
borrowers since creditors demand higher risk premia for heavily indebted member
states, thus effectively restricting regional borrowing via the supply side. While
this idea has been debated in the policy literature, there are currently very
few papers examining the issue within an analytical framework. Moreover, the
literature on debt restructuring tends to focus on collective action problems
among creditors and thus treats bankruptcy proceedings as co-ordination rather
than commitment device. My research takes a different perspective by asking
whether an orderly default mechanism can mitigate the inefficiencies generated
by the strategic interactions between member states in a federation, thereby
potentially increasing welfare and stability within the union. While default is
the primary focus in the first two essays, the last essay broadens the analysis and
also examines the issue of secession.
The first essay adapts the standard Stackelberg approach of the soft budget
constraint literature in order to study the disciplining effects of bankruptcy
procedures. The model extends the bailout game in Breuillé et al. (2006) by
adding a stage to the game in which regions decide whether to default or not.
In order to include bankruptcy procedures into the analytical framework, the
modelling approach refers to the legal literature which suggests that subnational
insolvency resembles personal bankruptcy. The insolvency mechanism is therefore
assumed to be determined by two parameters: the costs of default and the
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exemption level for public assets. The latter effectively insures citizens against a
reduction in core public services in case of default. While the costs of default are
exogenous to the model, the exemption level can be manipulated by policymakers.
Although the model’s results support the view that bankruptcy procedures
can discourage regional overborrowing, the interactions between the central
government, subnational governments and creditors turn out to be more complex
than the market discipline hypothesis suggests. Regional borrowers can be
restricted by market forces if all public assets are exempt from seizure. If, by
contrast, the exemption level for public assets is low, it is the central government
rather than the credit market which deters overborrowing since it is incentivised
to tax heavily indebted regions. Subnational governments consequently refrain
from overborrowing in order to avoid being taxed and pushed into default by the
centre. This rather surprising effect of bankruptcy proceedings on the central
government’s incentives has not been described in the literature so far. The
model’s major policy insight is that well-designed bankruptcy procedures can
enforce hard budget constraints. An orderly default mechanism, however, can
also lower the federation’s welfare if it is not carefully designed.
By comparison, the second essay puts a stronger emphasis on the creditor
co-ordination problem while also considering the strategic interplay between the
centre and subnational governments. More precisely, the essay sheds light on
the incentive effects of the orderly default mechanism which will be implemented
by the Eurozone as part of its permanent crisis management framework. The
model builds upon the literature on global games, which treats creditors’ roll-over
decisions as a collective action problem, and analyses the impact of insolvency
procedures on the size of the bailout, the level of effort exerted by the debtor
country and EU welfare. The benchmark case adapts Morris and Shin (2006) by
dropping their key assumption that the lender of last resort only bails out solvent
countries, thus adding a potential commitment problem to the game. Bankruptcy
procedures are incorporated into the benchmark by assuming that an insolvency
mechanism benefits both debtors and creditors since bondholders do not have to
completely write off their investments and countries are granted some debt relief.
The model’s major policy implication is that a half-hearted debt restructuring
mechanism fails to mitigate the commitment and moral hazard problems plaguing
the European Union. Solely an insolvency mechanism which lowers the costs
of default significantly for both creditors and debtors can succeed in relieving
the European taxpayer, alleviating moral hazard and improving EU welfare.
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Interestingly, the model also challenges some arguments in the policy literature.
Contrary to the widespread view, the model shows that bankruptcy procedures
do not always encourage default and when they do so, debt restructuring is in
fact beneficial. Intuitively, the orderly default mechanism corrects the outcome
of the benchmark in which too few countries default due to the EU’s commitment
problem. Bankruptcy procedures consequently force insolvent member states to
restructure their debts, thereby improving EU welfare.
The last essay departs from the previous models by extending the analysis to
include both default and secession. Inspired by recent calls for “more Europe”,
the third essay questions the conventional wisdom that the Euro cannot survive
without closer integration. Referring to the theory of optimum currency areas
by Mundell (1961), Euro critics have argued that a monetary union without a
corresponding fiscal union is doomed to fail. Mundell’s theory, however, suffers
from several shortcomings, one of them being the lack of attention paid to the
political economy aspects of monetary unions. The model tries to fill this gap,
using a simple political economy framework similar to Dur and Staal (2008)
in which core countries determine policies and periphery countries are in the
minority. The model compares several institutional settings, namely the current
“muddling through” scenario, an orderly default mechanism as well as a fiscal
and a political union set-up, and contrasts their implications for the Eurozone’s
stability and welfare.
The results suggest that it might be too early to write off the Euro since the
model finds that the current “muddling through” scenario is not more prone
to break-up than the political or the fiscal union. The model’s major policy
recommendation is that implementing bankruptcy procedures and inserting an
explicit exit clause into the European Treaties which allows countries to leave the
monetary union might prove more effective in preventing a Eurozone break-up
than an institutional overhaul. An orderly default mechanism restricts the
periphery’s bargaining power and thus alleviates moral hazard as periphery
countries are no longer able to externalise their debts onto the core taxpayer.
While the finding that an explicit exit clause makes the union more stable seems
counterintuitive, this is a well-known result in the fiscal federalism literature.
Facilitating Eurozone exit renders the periphery’s secession threat credible and
gives the minority a voice in the policymaking process, leading to the socially
efficient outcome.
In conclusion, my research offers valuable new insights into the effects of
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insolvency and exit procedures on regional borrowing in federalist systems.
Most importantly, the models show that contrary to claims in the policy
literature, bankruptcy procedures are no panacea and the design of the
insolvency proceedings crucially determines their success in eradicating soft
budget constraints and improving welfare. While an orderly default mechanism
tends to discourage moral hazard, ill-designed bankruptcy procedures might
indeed lower the federation’s welfare. Against the backdrop of the current reform
efforts in the European Union and the United States, the thesis provides a closer
understanding of the relationship between bailouts, default and exit, thereby
potentially influencing policymakers to pass new legislation to prevent regional
debt accumulation in the future.
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2 Bailout or bankruptcy: do insolvency laws harden
the subnational budget constraint?
When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same
manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and
avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the
debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor.
(Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776)
2.1 Introduction
Following the defaults by Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2001, proposals were
put forward for the establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
(SDRM), with a view to facilitate debt negotiations and prevent creditor and
debtor moral hazard. Having been abandoned due to a lack of political support,
private sector involvement (PSI) has staged a comeback in the wake of the 2008
global financial crisis. In order to stem the sovereign debt crisis engulfing the
Eurozone, policymakers in the European Union have drafted rules providing
for an orderly default mechanism as part of the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). Similarly, the financial woes of several subnational governments in the
United States, such as California, Illinois and New York, have sparked debate in
Congress as to whether to extend Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which
covers municipal bankruptcy, to federal states (Skeel, 2011; Henes and Hessler,
2011; Gelpern, 2012). With subnational debt spiralling out of control in many
federations, bankruptcy procedures are intended to serve as a commitment device
for the central government not to bail out fiscally irresponsible regions, thereby
hardening the regional budget constraint. While the chances of bankruptcy
proceedings being implemented looked very promising initially, lawmakers in
the United States were quick to express their opposition to legislation allowing
states to go bankrupt and policymakers in the EU have likewise watered down
requirements for creditors to participate in bailouts (Bullock, 2011; European
Council, 9.12.2011). Insolvency proceedings for subnational entities currently
only exist in the United States, South Africa, Hungary, Albania, Romania and
6
Bulgaria (Liu and Waibel, 2008).
When setting up a regulatory framework for managing subnational borrowing,
policymakers tend to favour rule-based solutions, such as legally imposed
balanced budget rules or ‘debt brakes’ (European Council, 30.1.2012; Rodden
et al., 2003; Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997). Proponents of private sector
involvement, however, have argued that these ex-ante borrowing regulations
might prove insufficient to encourage fiscal responsibility unless complemented by
an ex-post insolvency mechanism (Liu and Waibel, 2010, 2008; Wissenschaftlicher
Beirat, 2005). Bankruptcy proceedings spell out a set of predetermined
rules to clarify the consequences of default, thus removing uncertainty and
anchoring the expectations of regions, the central government and creditors
(Liu, 2010; Blankart and Klaiber, 2006). Since the financial burden of the
debt restructuring is exclusively shared between the defaulting region and its
creditors, the central government’s no-bailout threat becomes more credible and
regions refrain from overborrowing in order to avoid a costly default (Schwarcz,
2011; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 2005). Most importantly, bankruptcy laws serve
as an incentive for creditors not to lend to high-deficit regions, an argument
known as the market discipline hypothesis. The latter postulates a non-linear
relationship between bond yields and public debt that eventually results in credit
rationing.1 Subnational borrowing is thus effectively restrained by the supply side
as investors punish heavily indebted regions by demanding higher risk premia or
by cutting off credit. Empirical evidence from both the United States and Europe
lends support to the market discipline hypothesis as an increase in public debt is
usually associated with higher interest rates.2
This chapter adapts the standard Stackelberg approach of the soft budget
constraint literature in order to study the effects of such an insolvency mechanism
on regional opportunistic behaviour. The model extends the bailout game
in Breuillé et al. (2006) by adding a stage to the game in which regions
have the option of defaulting on their debts. The modelling of the insolvency
mechanism draws on the legal literature which suggests that subnational
bankruptcy proceedings share more characteristics with personal than with
corporate insolvency (Skeel, 2011; White, 2002; McConnell and Picker, 1993).
1 For an explanation of credit rationing as an equilibrium outcome, see the seminal paper by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
2 See Bayoumi et al. (1995) for an analysis of municipal bond yields in the U.S. states and
Schuknecht et al. (2010, 2008) for interest rate premia paid by central and subnational
governments in the EMU and Canada.
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Firstly, subnational governments are sovereign entities. As such they perform
public functions and cannot be liquidated and dissolved like a firm. Similar to
personal bankruptcy, the insolvency mechanism consequently has to be based on
the reorganisation principle (Liu, 2010, 2008; Liu and Waibel, 2008; Bolton,
2003; Schwarcz, 2011, 2002). Secondly, the ability of creditors to seize a
sovereign’s assets is greatly restricted in many countries (Gelpern, 2012; Liu,
2010). Finally, the objective for any insolvency mechanism is to maintain core
public services such as police, fire service or drinking water during the debt
restructuring process (Liu, 2010, 2008; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 2005). Taking
these characteristics into account, the chapter refers to concepts from the personal
bankruptcy literature in order to incorporate insolvency procedures into the
model framework.3 Following White (2005), bankruptcy proceedings in the model
are shaped by two parameters: the costs of default and the exemption level for
public assets. The latter guarantees that citizens always receive a minimum level
of public services in case of default since creditors only have to be repaid from
regional revenues exceeding this exemption level.
The model’s results show that while bankruptcy procedures can indeed harden
the regional budget constraint, the interactions between the central government,
subnational governments and creditors are more complex than the market
discipline hypothesis suggests. Markets can restrict regional borrowing if all
public assets are exempt from seizure. If, by contrast, the exemption level for
public assets is sufficiently low so that creditors receive some repayments, it is the
central government rather than the credit market that can discipline subnational
borrowers. Depending on the model’s parameters, it can be optimal for the central
government to tax rather than to bail out heavily indebted regions. The key to
the central government’s behaviour lies in the exemption level which effectively
insures regions against a reduction in public services in case of default. Intuitively,
letting a high-deficit region default, taxing it and redistributing the proceeds
makes citizens in other regions better off while leaving public consumption in the
defaulting region, which is protected by the exemption level, unchanged. Regions
consequently refrain from overborrowing in order to avoid being taxed by the
central government. Interestingly, this rather surprising effect of bankruptcy
procedures on the central government’s incentives has not been identified in the
literature so far.
3 For an overview of theoretical and empirical work, see White (2007). For related models of
personal bankruptcy, see Fay et al. (1998), White (2005) and Wang and White (2000).
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The model’s major policy implication is that an insolvency mechanism can
lower the federation’s welfare unless carefully designed. Although bankruptcy
procedures tend to discourage regional opportunistic behaviour, their design
crucially determines their impact on the federation’s welfare. Comparing the
welfare effects of the bankruptcy regime with a low and a high exemption level,
it turns out that the former is preferable as it enables policymakers to set the
exemption level such that regions are induced to borrow the socially optimal
amount. As a result, well-designed bankruptcy procedures enforce hard budget
constraints. In contrast to that, policymakers cannot directly influence regional
borrowing in the bankruptcy regime with a high exemption level since the credit
limit is determined by the costs of default, which are exogenous to the model. If
the model’s parameters are such that it is impossible to implement the first best
solution, the optimal policy prescription is to set the exemption level equal to
zero in order to maximise regions’ access to credit. Otherwise, the regional credit
constraint might be too tight from a welfare perspective.
The term ‘soft budget constraint’ (SBC) was coined by Kornai (1979) to
describe the behaviour of state-owned enterprises in socialist economies but has
since been used in a variety of settings, including fiscal federalism. Following
Kornai et al. (2003), a budget constraint is considered to be soft if a supporting
organisation, i.e. the central government, comes to the rescue of the budget
constraint organisation, i.e. the subnational jurisdiction4, and covers the regional
deficit. The SBC phenomenon is a problem of time inconsistency as it is
optimal for the central government to bail out regions ex post even if it has
announced not to provide additional transfers ex ante. As a result, regions are
incentivised to overborrow strategically, anticipating that they can externalise
their costs onto the national taxpayer. Theoretical models usually attribute
the central government’s lack of commitment to paternalism or equity concerns,
with the central government equalising public consumption or income across the
federation. This chapter follows this approach by assuming that the central
government maximises a utilitarian welfare function when allocating transfers.
Similar to Breuillé et al. (2010) and Akai and Sato (2008), federal resources
are assumed to be fixed so that bailouts have to be funded by contributions
of other member states. The chapter departs from the existing literature by
4 The term subnational is used for all levels of government below the central government. States,
provinces, municipalities, cities, towns, public utility companies or school districts represent
subnational entities.
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explicitly considering bankruptcy procedures, thereby lifting the balanced budget
requirement which is typically imposed in these models. While the SBC literature
examines various strategic variables ranging from public expenditure to different
types of taxation, this chapter focuses on regions’ choice of borrowing and is
therefore closest to Breuillé et al. (2006) and Goodspeed (2002).
The chapter is also related to previous work on sovereign debt default5 and the
debate on the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism which was initiated by the
IMF more than a decade ago.6 In a sense, being an international lender of last
resort, the IMF finds itself in a similar dilemma as the central government vis-à-vis
its member states. Focusing on the borrower-lender relationship and creditor
co-ordination problems, proponents of bankruptcy proceedings claim that the
laissez-faire approach to debt restructuring renders the market for sovereign debt
inefficient. In a model with two types of debt contracts which differ regarding
their ease of renegotiation, Bolton and Jeanne (2007) show that in equilibrium,
sovereigns issue an excessive amount of debt which is difficult to restructure.
This inefficiency can be alleviated by an insolvency mechanism for sovereigns but
solely well-designed bankruptcy procedures are welfare-improving. In Ghosal and
Miller (2003), sovereign debt crises arise due to a combination of debtor moral
hazard and co-ordination failure by creditors. In the absence of a bankruptcy
regime, sovereign bond markets are inefficient as there is excessive disorderly
default in equilibrium. The authors therefore recommend introducing bankruptcy
procedures which make the sovereign’s payoffs seizable ex post. This chapter
takes a different perspective by asking whether an orderly default mechanism can
mitigate the inefficiencies generated by the strategic interactions between central
and subnational governments. The analysis consequently focuses on bankruptcy
procedures as a commitment rather than a co-ordination device.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews
the related soft budget constraint literature. The model set-up is described in
section 2.3. In order to facilitate comparison with the bankruptcy law regime,
section 2.4 establishes the hard budget constraint policy and the soft budget
constraint result as reference cases. Section 2.5 examines the region’s default
5 Panizza et al. (2009) provide a survey of the formal economic literature on sovereign debt and
default going back to the seminal papers by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Eaton et al. (1986)
and Bulow and Rogoff (1989).
6 For the IMF’s original proposal, see Krueger (2002). The intellectual history of the idea prior
to the IMF’s initiative is examined in Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002). For an economic analysis,
see White (2002).
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decision under a bankruptcy regime with a high and a low exemption level.
The effects of insolvency proceedings on the federal transfer policy and regional
strategic behaviour are analysed in sections 2.6 and 2.7 respectively. Section 2.8
discusses the optimal design of bankruptcy procedures and the resulting welfare
implications. Concluding remarks are offered in section 2.9.
2.2 Related literature
The theoretical literature has modelled the SBC phenomenon as a sequential
game in which regions are Stackelberg leaders and the central government is
the Stackelberg follower. In such a dynamic setting, the centre is unable
to commit to a no-bailout policy. There is also a closely related body of
literature which examines decentralised leadership. Both the SBC and the
decentralised leadership literature assume that the centre optimises its transfer
policy from an ex-post viewpoint, taking subnational governments’ decisions as
given. While the SBC literature treats bailouts as exceptional and selective
events, decentralised leadership models presuppose a more generalised and
systematic ex-post adjustment of federal transfers.
One strand of the literature analyses the relationship between financial support
and district size. Echoing the “too big to fail” argument of the banking
literature, Wildasin (1997) shows that the centre has an interest in bailing out a
subnational government as the latter provides a local public good which benefits
the rest of society. Since the breakdown of public service provision in a large
jurisdiction generates relatively stronger repercussions for the federation, the
central government is more likely to support large regions. His results suggest
that decentralisation can harden the budget constraint by reducing district size.
In an extension of his model which considers economies of scale, Crivelli and Staal
(2008) conclude that district size and the probability for bailouts are negatively
correlated. In their model, spillover effects are unrelated to district size, however,
whereas bailouts are more costly for large regions. The central government is
therefore more likely to intervene if regions are small.
Another strand of the bailout literature focuses on the disciplining effects of tax
competition. In a model with vertical and horizontal tax competition, Breuillé et
al. (2006) show that the central government always provides a bailout which is
funded by an increase in federal taxes on capital. Since the tax rise reduces the
common tax base, regions adjust local tax rates and the resulting tax interactions
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promote fiscal discipline if regions are not heavily in debt. Similarly, Qian and
Roland (1998) demonstrate that fiscal decentralisation can harden the budget
constraint of enterprises when subnational governments compete for mobile
capital. This competition results in an overinvestment in public infrastructure
and an underprovision of the local public good, thus increasing the marginal
utility of public good provision and hence the opportunity costs of bailing out
firms. Contrary to this, Breuillé and Vigneault (2010) find that regional tax
competition does not mitigate the soft budget constraint problem in a three-tier
federation comprising a central government, regions and municipalities. This
divergence in results can be explained by the fact that the federal transfer scheme
internalises the negative externalities which arise with tax competition when
regions ignore the effects of their tax policies on other regions, thus eliminating
the positive effect of capital competition described by Qian and Roland (1998).
If regions compete to attract capital, a net equalisation scheme in which ex-post
transfers have to be financed by contributions of other regions is better suited to
discouraging regional opportunistic behaviour than a gross equalisation scheme
which is funded by federal tax revenues, as shown in Breuillé et al. (2010).
Some authors link the SBC phenomenon to other lines of research. In a political
economy approach, Goodspeed (2002) assumes that the central government
maximises its re-election probability and thus allocates transfers to equalise
marginal political gains across the federation. As an increase in regional
borrowing violates this optimal transfer rule, subnational governments can induce
the centre to provide additional grants. The bailout lowers the opportunity costs
of borrowing but increases tax payments and regions are only incentivised to
overborrow if the reduction in opportunity costs outweighs the common pool
effect on taxes. Akai and Sato (2008) try to reconcile the divergent results
of the decentralised leadership and the bailout literature by showing that the
region’s choice of the policy instrument critically affects equilibrium outcomes. If
subnational governments choose public expenditure, bailouts give rise to negative
externalities and a cost-sharing mechanism, resulting in regional overspending.
Contrary to that, tax collection efforts are weakened and the public good is
underprovided if regions select their tax rates instead. Relating the inability of
the centre to make dynamic commitments to the rotten kid literature, Akai and
Silva (2009) develop a model in which regions have private information about
the costs of public good provision ex ante but the central government finds out
the true costs ex post. They demonstrate that soft budget constraints can be
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eradicated if the centre can redistribute income between regions ex ante and ex
post as regions are incentivised to report their true costs.
Finally, some papers question the widely held belief in the policy literature
that a hard budget constraint is always desirable. Besfamille and Lockwood
(2008) demonstrate that a hard budget constraint can be inefficient and that
under certain conditions, the central government prefers a bailout even if it can
precommit at zero cost. In their model, regions invest in projects and rely on
the central government to refinance investments which turn out bad. In the case
of a no-bailout policy, meaning that bad projects are always terminated, regions
are incentivised not to initiate an investment even if it is efficient to do so or to
exert excessive effort in order to lower the probability that the project is bad.
Similarly, in a model with regional tax competition, Köthenbürger (2004) finds
that the centre’s inability to precommit might prove welfare superior. While
ex-post federal intervention generates an inefficient interstate revenue-sharing
mechanism as additional tax revenues are split amongst all member states, it
also neutralises horizontal fiscal externalities arising from tax competition so
that the overall welfare effect is ambiguous. In Köthenbürger (2008), the centre
imposes a distortive tax on labour while regions engage in capital tax competition.
Compared to the Nash outcome, federal precommitment enhances welfare but
exacerbates the distortions in public good consumption. In contrast to that,
both welfare and efficiency may improve under decentralised leadership if capital
mobility is high since the central government allocates additional transfers to
regions which raise their taxes, thus offsetting regions’ incentives to lower tax rates
in a race to the bottom. Caplan et al. (2000) likewise show that decentralised
leadership leads to a Pareto efficient outcome. Their result is model-specific,
however, and depends on the assumption that the local public good is pure in
nature.
2.3 The model
The framework is a simple intertemporal model with two periods. The federation
is characterised by a two-level hierarchy and comprises a central government and
n ≥ 2 identical subnational governments which have borrowing autonomy. Each
region consists of a representative citizen who cannot relocate to other regions.
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2.3.1 The players
The consumer: The representative citizen living in region i derives utility from
the consumption of regional public goods (Gi1, Gi2) in the first and second period
respectively:
Ui(Gi1, Gi2) = v(Gi1) + z(Gi2), (2.1)
where v(·) and z(·) are strictly increasing, twice differentiable and concave.7
The subnational government (SNG): The subnational government
attempts to maximise the utility of the citizen located in its region. The SNG has
some room for budgetary manoeuvre since it is able to borrow on international
credit markets. It is, however, subject to bankruptcy procedures in case of default.
In the first period, the SNG provides a regional public good Gi1, which is financed
through an exogenous federal transfer T1 and borrowing Bi:
Gi1 = T1 +Bi. (2.2)
In the second period, the SNG’s overall revenues, denoted by Ri, consist
of federal transfers Ti2 and regional revenues Y , which result from taxing the
household’s income, so that Ri = Ti2 + Y . The SNG uses its overall revenues to
provide a local public good in the second period. In contrast to Breuillé et al.
(2006), the SNG also has the option of defaulting on its debt repayments. It can
choose to either repay the outstanding debt including interest rates in full or to
default on its loans. The budget constraint for the second period, depending on
whether the SNG defaults, is given by:
No default (ND): GNDi2 = Ti2 + Y − (1 + r)Bi (2.3a)
Default (D): GDi2 = min{max{0, Ti2 + Y − cd}, E − cd}, (2.3b)
where GNDi2 and G
D
i2 denote public consumption in the no-default and default
scenario respectively. For simplicity, regions only choose their level of borrowing,
Bi, to smooth public consumption over time and taxation is not a decision
7 In Breuillé et al. (2006), citizens also choose their level of savings and private consumption so
as to maximise their intertemporal utility. Following the set-up in Breuillé et al. (2007), which
assumes that the utility function is linear in ci2, consumption in period 1 is solely determined
by the return on savings and fixed independently of anything else. As the solution to the
consumer’s problem does not influence the outcome of the bailout game, it is neglected in the
subsequent analysis and the utility function is simplified by excluding private consumption.
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variable.8 If the SNG does not default, public good provision amounts to regional
income net of principal and interest repayments (1 + r)Bi.
The bankruptcy procedure is effectively shaped by two parameters: the costs
of default and the exemption level for public assets. Irrespective of the amount of
regional revenues, defaulting entails costs such as the costs of filing the petition,
the loss of reputation and access to future borrowing as well as lawyers’ fees.
This is captured by the parameter cd which can be thought of as a negative
utility item. As previously discussed, SNGs are sovereign entities and cannot
be liquidated so that sovereign bankruptcy differs from corporate bankruptcy
which provides for either the liquidation or the reorganisation of a company under
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code respectively. Moreover, the
objective of any sovereign insolvency mechanism must be to ensure the provision
of core public services such as police, fire service or drinking water in the case
of default. This is taken into account by introducing an exemption level for
public assets, denoted by E, and assuming that creditors are only repaid from
revenues exceeding this exemption level. This implies that for Ri < E, the SNG
only bears the costs of default and creditors receive nothing. In this case, public
consumption in the second period corresponds to Ti2 + Y − cd and it is assumed
that GDi2 cannot be negative. If revenues are larger than the exemption level
(Ri ≥ E), by contrast, SNGs have to use any income above E to repay creditors
and public good provision consequently amounts to E − cd.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the gist of equations (2.3a) and (2.3b) and shows the level
of public good consumption under both scenarios as a function of the regional
revenues Ri = Ti2 + Y . Note that the endogenous variable Bi is held fixed and
r = 0. In the left panel of Figure 2.1, it is assumed that both public debt and
the costs of default are positive and that cd > Bi. In this case, public good
consumption is always higher in the no-default scenario unless regional revenues
are extremely low. This is no longer true, however, if public debt rises and
eventually becomes larger than the costs of default, resulting in a downward shift
of the GNDi2 curve as in the right panel of Figure 2.1. This simple comparison
implies that, holding the costs of default fixed, the SNG is more likely to default
8 There has been a debate in the legal literature as to whether bankruptcy courts can issue a
writ of mandamus, thus forcing an SNG to impose new taxes for debt repayment. In practice,
regions have often successfully avoided such an enforced tax increase (Gelpern, 2012; Liu and
Waibel, 2010). Moreover, raising taxes to repay creditors might prove inefficient since residents
evade higher taxes by relocating to other regions (Skeel, 2011). In order to abstract away from



















(b) cd < Bi
Figure 2.1: Gi2 as a function of Ri
for higher levels of debt as the range of revenues for which default leads to higher
public good consumption increases.
The creditors: SNGs can issue bonds on international credit markets in order
to finance public expenditure in the first period. Creditors are assumed to be risk
neutral and competitive. They lend to SNGs as long as they make zero profits.
There are no information asymmetries and lenders have perfect knowledge.
The central government (CG): The central government is concerned about
the welfare of the entire federation and maximises a utilitarian utility function∑n
i=1 Ui. The CG levies a lump sum tax Γ on households to finance federal
transfers in the second period:
n∑
i=1
Ti2 = nΓ. (2.4)
It is assumed that Γ is fixed so that the CG cannot raise any additional tax
revenues for bailout purposes (dΓ = 0). As a result, a bailout to region i has to
be financed by a reduction in transfers to other regions j 6= i.9 Moreover, the
CG is able to tax an SNG by choosing Ti2 < 0, meaning that it can get hold of
regional revenues Y , and Ti2 must satisfy Ti2 ≥ −Y .
9 This transfer mechanism in which the overall pool of federal resources is fixed is also known as



















Figure 2.2: Sequence of Actions
2.3.2 Timing of the model
SNGs move first by choosing their level of borrowing, Bi, in order to maximise the
intertemporal utility of the representative citizen. When doing so, SNGs act as
Nash competitors with regard to each other, meaning that they take other regions’
borrowing choices as given. Once SNGs have determined their level of debt, the
CG sets regional transfers (T12, ..., Tn2) so as to maximise the overall welfare of
the federation, anticipating regions’ subsequent default decisions. Finally, the
SNGs decide whether to repay their loans, this time maximising the utility of the
representative citizen in the second period. Figure 2.2 summarises the sequence
of events. The model is solved by backward induction to identify subgame perfect
equilibria.
Similar to Breuillé et al. (2006), SNGs can perfectly foresee the CG’s transfer
policy. They consequently take the CG’s reaction function, which describes
the adjustment of the federal transfer policy following an increase in region
i’s borrowing, into account when making their initial borrowing decision in
period 1. The CG’s reaction function therefore proves crucial in that it can
either encourage or deter regional opportunistic behaviour. If the CG rewards
additional borrowing with an increase in regional transfers, SNGs are incentivised
to overborrow strategically and the budget constraint is soft. If, by contrast, the
CG punishes regions for high levels of debt by reducing transfers, overborrowing
can be restricted. Unlike in Breuillé et al. (2006), the interactions between SNGs
and CG are more complex since the federal transfer policy does not only affect




Before examining the effects of insolvency procedures on regional opportunistic
behaviour, two reference cases are established in order to facilitate comparison
with the bankruptcy law regime.
2.4.1 The hard budget constraint policy
Following the definition by Kornai et al. (2003), a budget constraint is considered
to be hard if the CG does not step in to bail out SNGs, meaning that Ti2 is
fixed. As SNGs are identical which makes it possible to abstract away from any
redistributive issues, transfers to each region amount to Γ (Ti2 = Γ ∀i). Taking
this into account, the SNG maximises Ui with respect to Bi subject to (2.2) and







= 1 + r, (2.5)
which determines the socially optimal level of borrowing BFBi . Under a hard
budget constraint policy, the opportunity costs of borrowing correspond to the
marginal costs of debt repayment (1 + r). The same result is obtained when
assuming that all policy decisions are centralised and welfare is maximised by
a benevolent social planner. In the model, the hard budget constraint policy is
therefore equivalent to the first best outcome. To simplify the analysis, r is set
equal to zero in sections 2.6 to 2.8. The SNG consequently chooses borrowing







2.4.2 The soft budget constraint result
The existing soft budget constraint literature reviewed in section 2.2 ignores the
option of default and usually assumes that regional debt is always repaid and
that regional budgets have to be balanced at the end of the second period. In the
bailout game based on Breuillé et al. (2006), the sequence of actions is identical
to the one described in Figure 2.2, except for the stage in which SNGs decide
whether to repay their loans. As the SNGs cannot default, the federal transfer
scheme is considered first. The CG maximises the utilitarian utility function∑n
i=1 Ui with respect to regional transfers (T12, ..., Tn2) subject to (2.2), (2.3a),
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(Gj2) ∀i, j ⇒ Gi2 = Gj2 ∀i, j. (2.6)
The CG’s optimal transfer policy consequently aims to equalise the marginal
utilities of public good consumption across the federation. As regions are
identical, federal transfers are set such that every SNG consumes the same amount
of the public good in period 2.
The CG’s response to a change in regional borrowing determines whether the
regional budget constraint is hard or soft. Intuitively, if Ti2 is held constant, an
increase in borrowing by region i reduces the level of the local public good in
period 2, thereby increasing the marginal utility. As this violates the optimal
transfer rule, the CG increases transfers to region i until marginal utilities are
equalised in all regions.10 For example, if region i borrows one extra pound, public
good consumption in the second period falls by (1 + r). In order to restore its
optimal transfer policy, the CG reimburses region i for these additional costs of
debt repayment. As federal revenues are fixed, however, the costs of the transfer
are split amongst all n regions, including region i.
In the absence of bankruptcy procedures, the CG thus always bails out an SNG
if the latter increases its borrowing. In period 1, the SNG maximises the utility
of the representative household with respect to Bi subject to (2.2), (2.3a), (2.4)











which determines the level of borrowing under a soft budget constraint policy,
denoted by B∗i . Compared to the first best given by (2.5), the opportunity
costs of borrowing are now lower as regions only bear a fraction of their debt
servicing costs. Since the SNG can externalise part of its debt repayments onto
the rest of the federation, it is incentivised to overborrow strategically. This is
the well-known soft budget constraint result which is derived by Breuillé et al.
(2006). As n → ∞, the common pool problem gets more severe since the SNG
can shift an ever increasing amount of its costs onto other regions.
10See Appendix for a detailed calculation of the CG’s reaction function.
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2.5 The default decision
In the following, an insolvency mechanism, as described in equation (2.3b), is
introduced into the model framework, allowing regions to default in the second
period. The SNG’s choice whether to repay its loan is considered first. SNGs
default if doing so increases their utility in the second period, i.e. if
z(GDi2) > z(G
ND
i2 ) ⇔ GDi2 > GNDi2 , (2.8)
which boils down to a comparison of the level of the public good in the second
period. In general, the default decision can be described as a yes/no decision and
can be written as a binary variable:
Di =
0 if Bi < B̃i Repay1 if Bi > B̃i Default,
where B̃i is some threshold which will be determined in the following. The
subsequent analysis distinguishes between two bankruptcy regimes, depending
on the exemption level, each of which is analysed in turn.
2.5.1 High exemption level: Ri < E
In a first step, it is assumed that the exemption level is very high so that Ri < E.
This implies that in case of default, SNGs only have to bear the costs of default
and can keep all their assets. SNGs consequently default if the costs of repayment






The federal transfer policy has no impact on the default decision which is
independent of Ti2 and based on a simple cost comparison. As a result, the
CG cannot prevent regional default by adjusting its transfer scheme. The orderly
default mechanism affects neither the CG’s optimal transfer policy nor its best
response to an increase in regional borrowing. The results of Breuillé et al. (2006)
regarding the CG’s policy therefore carry over to the case with a high exemption
level and the reasoning is the same as in section 2.4.2. The CG bails out a region
since it tries to equalise the marginal utilities of public good consumption across
the federation. If an SNG increases its borrowing, public good consumption in
20
period 2 falls, thereby raising marginal utility and violating the optimal transfer
rule given by (2.6). In order to restore equality, the borrowing region receives
additional transfers. This implies that borrowing an extra pound is relatively
cheap as the region only has to repay a fraction of the costs (1+r
n
). Regions
are consequently incentivised to overborrow strategically. Contrary to Breuillé
et al. (2006), SNGs might be disciplined by the credit market as Bi can be
interpreted as a credit constraint. This is equivalent to r →∞ at Bi and can be
understood as credit rationing. If there are no information asymmetries and cd
and r are common knowledge, creditors can perfectly foresee the default condition
and consequently never lend a larger amount than Bi to SNGs in the first place.
As a result, default does not occur in equilibrium unless creditors make a mistake.
Depending on the extent of the credit rationing, the outcome of the bailout
game therefore differs from the results in Breuillé et al. (2006) and three cases
can be distinguished. If the credit limit lies in between the first best and the SBC
equilibrium (BFBi < Bi < B
∗
i ), the credit constraint is binding. Due to the CG’s
lack of commmitment, SNGs are incentivised to borrow up to B∗i but creditors
only lend Bi. As a result, moral hazard is alleviated since overborrowing is
restricted. Here the credit constraint is welfare-improving since it brings regional
borrowing closer to its first best level. If, by contrast, the credit constraint is




i ), regions are not even
able to borrow up to the socially optimal level BFBi . In the extreme case in which
the costs of default are zero, SNGs always choose default. Creditors are therefore
unwilling to lend to SNGs and the latter have no intertemporal flexibility at all.
Although credit rationing mitigates the SBC problem, it also implies a welfare
loss. If the credit constraint is very loose (BFBi < B
∗
i < Bi), the typical SBC
result holds as in Breuillé et al. (2006). SNGs’ optimal choice of borrowing is
given by B∗i since regions are bailed out by the CG and overborrow strategically.
As regions have no interest in borrowing up to Bi, the credit limit is not binding.
The model thus lends support to the market discipline hypothesis. This result
is summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1. Bankruptcy laws with a high exemption level for public assets
do not serve as a commitment device for the CG. Nevertheless, regional borrowing
is reduced if the credit constraint imposed by the market is binding (Bi < B
∗
i ).
Otherwise, regions overborrow strategically as in Breuillé et al. (2006). The
market restrictions on regional debt do not necessarily improve the federation’s
welfare.
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Proof. This follows directly from (2.9) and the previous discussion.
2.5.2 Low exemption level: Ri ≥ E
In practice, the exemption level E is likely to be more moderate, trying to balance
debtors’ and creditors’ interests. If E is sufficiently low so that Ri ≥ E, SNGs
can keep some but not all of their public assets. Again, SNGs default if doing so
is economically advantageous by increasing second period utility, leading to the
following default condition:
Bi >
Ti2 + Y − E + cd
1 + r
≡ Bi. (2.10)
Similar to the previous case with a high exemption level, Bi can be interpreted as
a credit constraint imposed by the market. Unlike in the regime with a high E,
the critical level of debt above which the SNG defaults depends on an endogenous
variable, Ti2. As a result, the CG’s transfer policy has an impact on the SNG’s
repayment choice, as stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1. For sufficiently low exemption levels (Ri ≥ E), the CG is able to







extending federal transfers can prevent regional default by increasing the critical
level of debt.
If, by mistake, creditors lend one pound too much so that SNGs decide not to
repay their loans, the CG can prevent regional default by increasing transfers by
dTi2 = (1 + r). Whether the CG actually makes use of this strategic advantage
and is interested in preventing default is examined in the subsequent section.
For very low exemption levels (E → cd), almost all public assets can be seized





if E → cd. (2.12)
In this case, SNGs borrow against their revenues and default if revenues fall short
of outstanding debt obligations.
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Comparing the credit constraints for high and low exemption levels, it turns
out that the critical level of debt is more restrictive for a high exemption level:
Bi =
Ti2 + Y − E
1 + r
+Bi, (2.13)
with the first term being positive since Ri > E. This seems intuitive because
creditors have no collateral and cannot seize any assets in the regime with a high
exemption level. As creditors are likely to incur larger losses in this case, they
are not willing to lend a huge amount. Note that the critical level of debt, Bi,
decreases in the exemption level E. The more assets SNGs are able to keep in
case of default, the more careful creditors become when lending to regions as
they anticipate larger losses. Equation (2.13) is therefore consistent with the
market discipline hypothesis and offers an important insight for policymakers.
Implementing insolvency proceedings with a high exemption level might lower
welfare as regions face stricter borrowing constraints, thus limiting their ability
to smooth public consumption over time.
2.6 The federal transfer policy (Ri ≥ E)
Anticipating the default condition, the CG chooses transfers (T12, ..., Tn2) so as to
maximise the welfare of the federation
∑n
i=1 Ui subject to (2.2), (2.3a), (2.3b) and
(2.4). Compared to the bailout game without default by Breuillé et al. (2006),
an additional condition appears in the CG’s maximisation problem in the form of
equation (2.3b), thereby widening the range of available policy options. Firstly,
the CG can correctly foresee whether, given the level of federal transfers, the
SNG will choose to repay its debt in the subsequent period. As shown in Lemma
2.1, the CG can prevent default by adjusting its transfer scheme. Secondly,
the CG also has an interest in ‘punishing’ regions which do not comply with
their debt obligations. The key to the CG’s behaviour lies in the exemption
level E. The latter effectively constitutes an insurance mechanism, enabling
citizens to consume a minimum amount of public services in case of default. For
example, if an SNG defaults in the second period, the CG’s best reply is to reduce
the revenues of the defaulting SNG down to the exemption level E. While the
representative citizen in the defaulting region is not worse off, taxpayers’ money
no longer accrues to creditors and can be redistributed to non-defaulting regions,
thereby increasing the welfare of the federation. Interestingly, even if none of the
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regions default, the sheer existence of bankruptcy procedures affects the CG’s
strategic behaviour as it can credibly threaten to punish heavily indebted SNGs
by reducing their transfers.
For certain parameters of the model, the CG’s best reply to an increase in
regional borrowing thus differs from the bailout game without default since the
CG might be incentivised to reduce transfers rather than to provide bailouts.
This idea is summarised in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2. The CG’s reaction function: For a sufficiently low level of
debt, the CG bails out region i if the latter increases its borrowing in the first
period. This bailout is financed by reductions in transfers of other regions. If the
SNG raises its debt above a critical level B̂i(B−i), the CG lets it default, reduces
region i’s overall revenues down to the exemption level E and redistributes the
proceeds to the rest of the federation:11
Ti2 =









+Bi if Bi ≤ B̂i
E − Y if Bi > B̂i.
(2.14)
Proof. See Appendix.
For a sufficiently low level of debt (Bi ≤ B̂i), the result by Breuillé et al. (2006)
extends to the bailout game with default. The slope of the CG’s best response






which is identical to the reaction function in Breuillé et al. (2006). The intuition
is the same as in section 2.4.2. If region i borrows an extra pound, its public
good consumption in period 2 is lowered, thereby increasing marginal utility. As
the CG’s optimal transfer rule is no longer satisfied, the CG bails out region i to
restore the equality of marginal utilities across the federation. Since the CG has
no additional tax raising power, the costs of the bailout are split amongst all n
regions so that region i has to bear a fraction of the costs ( 1
n
). The transfers to
11Where B−i is given by B−i ≡ (B1, ..., Bi−1, Bi+1, ..., Bn) and r and cd are set equal to zero in
the following. (2.14) is only valid if no other regions are left to default. Otherwise, the debt of
a defaulting region can be removed from the summation and the denominator will be reduced
by the number of defaulting regions.
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This line of reasoning no longer applies for a sufficiently high level of debt
(Bi > B̂i). For simplicity, assume E = 0 and Γ = 0. Given everyone else’s Bj,
suppose region i borrows a large amount in the first period, leading to a very
low consumption of the public good in period 2. In Breuillé et al. (2006), this
effect is offset since the CG spreads the debt across all the regions. If the level of
borrowing is sufficiently high, however, bailing out region i will eventually become
so costly for the CG that it is better to let region i default and completely tax
away its revenues. Otherwise, region i’s bailout would tie up the entire resources
of the federation (nY ) so that the other regions also get zero consumption in the
second period. If the CG lets region i default, public consumption in that region
is given by E = 0 as citizens are protected by the exemption level. Although
marginal utility at this point is very large, region i’s utility loss amounts to a
finite number which gets closer to zero the closer is the bailout consumption to
zero. Redistributing region i’s revenues Y to the other n − 1 regions more than
compensates this utility loss, thereby increasing the welfare of the federation.
The argument that reducing transfers to region i makes the federation as a
whole better off certainly holds for Bi > Bi. As the SNG defaults in this
case, region i’s revenues would partly accrue to creditors and thus be lost for
the federation. The fact that the CG is also incentivised to lower transfers to
heavily indebted regions which do not default can be explained by the implicit
insurance provided by the exemption of certain public assets. Suppose that E is
positive and that region i borrows up to its credit limit Bi. Public consumption
is then given by GNDi2 = G
D
i2 = E, meaning that region i is indifferent between
defaulting or not defaulting. If the CG lets such an SNG default and reduces
its overall revenues down to E, the SNG is not worse off due to the indifference
property. The proceeds can be spread across the other regions, thereby increasing
the welfare of the federation. The exemption level consequently represents a
form of insurance and prevents region i’s citizens from suffering a utility loss.
This insurance mechanism, however, comes at the expense of the creditors. As
region i’s revenues are now equal to E, creditors receive nothing and have to bear
the costs of region i’s default. Due to the insolvency mechanism, the CG can







Figure 2.3: The Critical Level of Debt B̂i
i unaffected, thus limiting the resulting inequality between regions. A similar
argument can be established if regional borrowing is below the credit limit but
sufficiently high. The mechanics of this model therefore differ from the bailout
game without default where a reduction in transfers to region i always lowers Gi2
by the exact same amount. Since the insurance effect disappears for Ri < E, the
maximum possible reduction which the CG can impose is given by E − Y .
To sum up the CG’s best response, region i receives additional transfers, i.e.
a bailout, if Bi ≤ B̂i while it experiences a reduction in transfers for Bi > B̂i.
More precisely, if regional revenues are above the exemption level (Y > E), the
federal transfer is negative (Ti2 < 0) so that the CG effectively taxes region i.
Finally, the critical threshold B̂i is determined as follows:
Remark 2.1. The critical level of debt B̂i(B−i) is such that it is just worth taxing
region i, i.e. reducing region i’s public consumption to E, and redistributing the
proceeds to the other n − 1 regions. In this case, the CG is indifferent between
bailing out or taxing region i.
Figure 2.3 illustrates this point for n = 2, E = 0, cd = 0, r = 0 and Γ = 0. The
CG redistributes A ≡ Y + 1
2
(B̂i − Bj) to region j. Ĝi2 = Y − B̂i+Bj2 denotes the
level of public consumption corresponding to B̂i(Bj). Ĝi2 consequently represents
the common public good consumption if neither region defaults. If Gi2 is such
that redistributing does not increase the utility of the federation (−∆Ui ≥ ∆Uj),
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Assuming that only one region defaults and generalising the example in Figure



























The concrete level of B̂i consequently hinges on the parameters of the model,
in particular on the concrete form of z(·), the amount of revenues available for
redistribution and the number of regions n. The higher region i’s revenues relative
to the exemption level, the more the CG can redistribute to other SNGs which
makes the reallocation of resources more profitable. As n increases, each SNG
gets a smaller fraction of region i’s revenues. At the same time, these revenues
are spread across more regions, thereby implying a larger overall utility gain for
the federation since the force of diminishing marginal utility is lower when n is
large.
In the following, attention is confined to symmetric equilibria, meaning that
all regions borrow the same amount B. For expositional ease, let R be the level
of regional revenues if the CG allocated the same amount of federal resources to
each region, that is R = Γ + Y . In the symmetric case, the critical threshold
of debt above which it is desirable for the CG to tax some regions turns out to
be positive but strictly lower than the credit limit B, leading to the following
lemma:
Lemma 2.3. The CG’s reaction function in the symmetric case: If all
regions borrow the same amount B, the critical threshold B̂(B, ..., B) at which
the CG is indifferent between taxing and bailing out regions must lie between zero
and the credit limit B = R− E.
Proof. See Appendix.
The implications of the CG’s behaviour for regions’ choice of borrowing are
analysed in the subsequent section.
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2.7 Regional opportunistic behaviour (R ≥ E)
In the first period, the SNG maximises the intertemporal utility of the citizen
located in its region, Ui, with respect to Bi subject to (2.2), (2.3a), (2.3b),
(2.4) and the CG’s reaction function (2.14). In comparison to the bailout game
by Breuillé et al. (2006), the SNG now faces two additional restrictions when
choosing its level of borrowing. Firstly, the CG’s best reply to an increase in
regional borrowing has changed as a result of the bankruptcy procedures. As
shown in the previous section, the CG either bails out or taxes region i if the latter
increases its borrowing, depending on the parameters of the model. Secondly, as
regional debt is issued on international bond markets, the bankruptcy proceedings
as captured by condition (2.3b) might restrict the region’s access to borrowing.
Since creditors can perfectly foresee the region’s default condition (2.10), they
never lend more than B = R − E to SNGs in the first place. Similar to the
scenario with a high exemption level, credit rationing might therefore occur if the
region’s preferred level of borrowing is above this credit limit.
Since the analysis is restricted to symmetric equilibria, all SNGs choose the
same level of debt and no region has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. For
simplicity, it is assumed that r = 0 and cd = 0. In this case, SNGs can borrow
against the surplus of R over E. For E = 0, no public assets are exempt from
seizure and regions can borrow against their revenues.
Suppose first that the parameters are such that similar to the model without
default, the CG bails out region i. The resulting putative overborrowing
equilibrium can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. Overborrowing equilibrium (OE): Assuming an interior
solution, the following conditions must be satisfied in the overborrowing









Ti2 = Γ ∀i. (2.15b)
Recalling Lemma 2.2, regional opportunistic behaviour is rewarded with a
bailout for certain parameters of the model. If the CG’s best reply is described
by the first line of (2.14), each SNG has an incentive to increase borrowing above
the first best since it can externalise its costs onto other regions. In equilibrium,
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all regions thus overborrow strategically in order to receive additional transfers.
In this case, deviating and borrowing less would not be profitable for a single
SNG since it would have to fund other regions’ excessive debts. As the CG does
not have the means to bail out all regions in equilibrium, however, SNGs do
not get any additional transfers. The attempt to increase public consumption in
period 1 at a low opportunity cost of period 2 consumption is therefore ultimately
self-defeating. The region’s budget constraint is soft but the CG still allocates
Ti2 = Γ to all SNGs in equilibrium.
As shown in Proposition 2.1, bankruptcy laws with a high exemption level can
compensate for the CG’s lack of commitment and curb regional overborrowing as
creditors impose a credit constraint on SNGs, thus lending support to the market
discipline hypothesis. Although investors anticipate the default condition (2.10)
and could similarly ration credit in the bankruptcy regime with a low exemption
level, it turns out that the credit limit does not determine equilibrium borrowing
in this case, leading to the following lemma:
Lemma 2.4. If the exemption level is low (R ≥ E), the credit limit B is not
binding and public consumption is strictly larger than E.
Proof. If all SNGs borrowed the maximum amount available B, taxation of some
regions is desirable for the CG, as shown in Lemma 2.3. Since creditors anticipate
that the CG would let some SNGs default if they borrowed up to their credit
limit, they never lend B in the first place. The credit limit B can therefore not
constitute an equilibrium.
Unlike in the bankruptcy regime with a high exemption level, the maximum
amount which regions can borrow in equilibrium when R ≥ E is not determined
by the default condition and the resulting credit limit B. Strictly speaking, the
market discipline hypothesis therefore does not hold for low exemption levels.
Rather than being restricted by market forces, SNGs’ choice of borrowing hinges
on the CG’s strategic behaviour, as captured by the reaction function. For certain
ranges of parameters, regions consequently overborrow in equilibrium, expecting
to receive a bailout by the CG, and B∗ < B. This implies that regions do not
default in the overborrowing equilibrium.
In this case, the outcome of the bailout game is the same as in the model
without default by Breuillé et al. (2006) as regions overborrow strategically and
regional budget constraints are soft. It is important to note, however, that their
model only offers a partial solution as it focuses on the interaction of the CG and
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one single SNG. If one region is incentivised to trigger a federal bailout, other
SNGs might follow suit. The characterisation of the Nash equilibrium would then
require the simultaneous determination of regional best replies in the presence of
soft budget constraints. In contrast to Breuillé et al. (2006), this chapter shows
that while each SNG has an incentive to overborrow, this strategy results in a
higher level of regional debt but leaves federal transfers unchanged.
Under certain conditions, the overborrowing solution does not represent the
Nash equilibrium of the game, however, as stated by the following lemma:
Lemma 2.5. If the putative overborrowing equilibrium has B∗ > B̂i(B
∗, ..., B∗),
then
(a) B∗ is not an equilibrium.
(b) B∗∗ is the unique equilibrium where B∗∗ = B̂i(B
∗∗, ..., B∗∗).
Proof. (a) directly follows from Lemma 2.2. (b) see Appendix.
If B∗ > B̂i(B
∗, ..., B∗), the equilibrium can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.2. Bankruptcy law equilibrium (BLE): In the bankruptcy law
equilibrium, denoted by B̂ and Ĝi2 = T2 + Y − B̂, consumption Ĝi2 and transfers
Ti2 must satisfy the following conditions:
z(Γ+Y −B̂i)−z(E) = (n−1)
[
z








Ti2 = Γ ∀i. (2.16b)
In the bankruptcy law equilibrium, SNGs therefore only borrow up to B̂ in
order to avoid being taxed by the CG. As a result, regions effectively face a
borrowing constraint which is imposed by the CG itself rather than by the credit
market. While SNGs might still incur levels of debt which are higher than the first
best amount, the extent of the overborrowing can be reduced and the regional
budget constraint is hardened. Interestingly, bankruptcy laws can thus mitigate
the SBC phenomenon for certain parameters but for reasons other than those
highlighted by the proponents of the market discipline hypothesis. In contrast to
the regime with a high exemption level, the credit limit B is irrelevant when E
is low, as shown in Lemma 2.4. The disciplining effect of bankruptcy procedures
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with a low exemption level consequently stems from the CG’s taxing threat which
discourages SNGs from overborrowing. Bankruptcy procedures therefore serve as
a commitment device or, more precisely, as a deterrent since they directly affect
the CG’s incentives and its reaction to an increase in regional borrowing. In
equilibrium, no region is effectively taxed but each SNG receives a federal transfer
of Ti2 = Γ.
Anticipating the CG’s behaviour, B̂ is also the maximum amount that creditors
would be prepared to lend as any additional lending would lead to taxation and
hence default. Note, however, that even if, by mistake, investors extended lending
beyond B̂, the SNGs would have no incentive to increase borrowing due to the
CG’s taxing threat. In a sense, B̂ can be interpreted as a self-imposed constraint
which does not depend on any market restrictions. Surprisingly, this borrowing
constraint is even stricter than the one derived from the default condition (2.10),
as stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.6. The maximum amount which regions can borrow in the bankruptcy
law equilibrium, B̂, is lower than the credit limit B.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 2.4 and the previous discussion.
This implies that SNGs do not default in the bankruptcy law equilibrium,
leading to the following result:
Result 2.1. Default never occurs in equilibrium. Given the parameters, a unique
symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists.
The main insights of this section are summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2. Bankruptcy procedures with a low exemption level for public
assets (R ≥ E) can harden the subnational budget constraint and serve as a
commitment device for the CG. For a certain range of parameters, the CG taxes
an SNG if the latter increases its debt, thereby effectively imposing a borrowing
constraint on regions. Otherwise, the overborrowing result derived by Breuillé et
al. (2006) holds. The credit limit B is never binding so that the credit market
does not directly discipline regional borrowers.
Comparing Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, it turns out that the exemption level
E is crucial in determining how bankruptcy procedures translate into enhanced
fiscal responsibility. Whereas creditors might restrict access to regional borrowing
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in the regime with a high exemption level, the CG itself can encourage fiscal
discipline via its taxing threat in the bankruptcy scenario with a low E. The
following section therefore looks at the optimal design of bankruptcy procedures
and examines whether a high or a low exemption level is better suited to
improving the welfare of the federation.
2.8 The optimal design of bankruptcy procedures
In the model, the bankruptcy proceedings are essentially shaped by two
parameters: the costs of default cd and the exemption level E. While the costs of
default are assumed to be exogenous, the exemption level E can be understood as
a policy parameter which can be chosen by policymakers prior to the first stage
of the game, as described in Figure 2.2. This section therefore examines whether
bankruptcy procedures can be designed in such a way that the regional budget
constraint is hard and borrowing is at its socially optimal level BFB.
If policymakers choose a very high exemption level (E > R), a region’s access
to credit can be restricted by the market, as shown in Proposition 2.1. While
regional overborrowing might be curbed as creditors are unwilling to extend
lending beyond the credit limit B, the welfare effects of this regime are ambiguous.
If the costs of default are very low, for example, the credit constraint might be
too tight and welfare is lowered. Moreover, policymakers cannot directly control
regional borrowing in this regime as a region’s access to credit is solely determined
by the costs of default, which policymakers cannot influence. As a result,
policymakers are in general unable to directly implement the socially optimal
amount of borrowing. The regional budget constraint is hard and public debt
coincides with the first best if the costs of default are such that B = cd = B
FB.
As the credit limit B is increasing in the costs of default, insolvency proceedings
with a high exemption level can improve or lower welfare, depending on the exact
size of the costs and the level of BFB. For B > B∗ > BFB, the overborrowing
equilibrium prevails so that bankruptcy procedures leave welfare unchanged.
If the exemption level is set such that E < R, by contrast, regions face
a self-imposed borrowing constraint since they will be taxed if they borrow
more than B̂. Interestingly, this borrowing constraint depends on the policy
parameter E. Policymakers might consequently be able to manipulate E, thereby
discouraging regions from borrowing above the first best. In order to assess
















(b) E increases by ∆
Figure 2.4: Comparative Statics Analysis for E
a heuristic approach is used.12 The left panel of Figure 2.4 illustrates the
bankruptcy law equilibrium for n = 2 and a given exemption level E. If the
CG taxes region j and redistributes the proceeds R − E to the other region,
consumption in region j will fall to E whereas region i will consume at Gi2
which equals R − B̂ + R − E. Since the vertical distances ∆zi and ∆zj are
equal, the federation’s welfare remains unchanged and the CG is hence indifferent
between taxing and bailing out regions. In the bankruptcy law equilibrium, public
consumption therefore amounts to Ĝ in each region and the corresponding critical
level of debt B̂(B̂) is given by the difference between R and Ĝ, as indicated in
the graph.
Now assume that the exemption level rises by ∆ to Ẽ while Ĝ and B̂ are held
fixed. The effects of an increase in E are depicted in the right panel of Figure
2.4. If region j is taxed, its consumption will be given by Ẽ whereas region i will
consume at G′i2. The costs of taxing region j are now lower since the resulting
utility loss in region j decreases by MU1 ×∆, where MU1 denotes the marginal
utility evaluated at E. At the same time, there are fewer resources available
for redistribution so that the transfer to region i drops by ∆. Region i’s utility
gain consequently decreases by the small amount of MU2 × ∆, where MU2 is
the marginal utility evaluated at G′i2. Since MU1 > MU2 due to diminishing
marginal utility, taxing region j now increases the federation’s welfare since the
loss to region j is smaller than the gain to region i. Ceteris paribus, the CG is
therefore more likely to tax if the exemption level increases.
12This would also follow from analysing equations (2.16a) or (2.17) directly.
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So far B̂ has been held fixed. In order to restore the bankruptcy law equilibrium
where ∆zi = ∆zj, public consumption needs to be adjusted: as Ĝ increases and B̂
falls, the cost to the taxed rises relatively more than the benefit to the non-taxed
region, thus weakening the CG’s incentive to tax and offsetting the effect of the
change in E.13 The comparative statics analysis for E therefore suggests an
inverse relationship between B̂ and E. Regions are consequently less restrained
in their borrowing choice for lower levels of E and the amount of credit available
to regions under this regime is maximised for E = 0. Depending on consumers’
preferences for public consumption, however, even the maximum possible amount
which regions can borrow in the bankruptcy law equilibrium might be too small
from a welfare perspective. This seems to be the case if citizens value public
consumption in period 1 relatively highly, i.e. BFB is large, and there is only a
small number of regions. Moreover, subnational governments have no access to
credit in the limit case where the exemption level is equal to regional income and
creditors hence cannot seize any assets. These arguments all generalise for the
case with n ≥ 2 regions. The major points of the comparative statics analysis for
E are summarised in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.7. The relationship between the critical level of debt and the exemption
level can be characterised as follows:
(a) The borrowing constraint B̂ is a decreasing function of E, i.e. dB̂
dE
< 0.
(b) The maximum possible amount of borrowing in the bankruptcy law




(c) In the limit case where the exemption level is equal to total revenues, regions




Proof. (a) follows directly from the previous discussion and Figure 2.4. (b)
Example 2 in the Appendix illustrates a case where B̂
∣∣
E=0
< BFB, using a
specific utility function. (c) Set R = E in equation (2.17).14
Lemma 2.7 implies that the welfare effects of a bankruptcy regime with a
low exemption level are ambiguous and depend on E. Note that bankruptcy
13A similar point has been made in the proof for Lemma 2.5.
14For cd > 0, the borrowing constraint B̂ converges to cd in this case. To see this, set R = E in




if cd is positive.
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procedures have no impact on welfare if B̂ > B∗. Under certain conditions,
however, it might be possible to establish a hard budget constraint policy. Recall
that in the symmetric equilibrium, equation (2.16a), which implicitly determines
the borrowing constraint B̂, becomes:
nz(R− B̂)− z(E) = (n− 1)z
(




If policymakers aim to implement a hard budget constraint, they can choose
the exemption level such that the critical threshold B̂ is identical to the first
best amount of borrowing. Formally, this means setting B̂ equal to BFB and
solving equation (2.17) for the optimal exemption level, denoted by Eopt. If a
solution exists and 0 ≤ Eopt ≤ R, there is an optimal exemption level for which
bankruptcy procedures result in the first best level of regional debt and therefore
eradicate the SBC phenomenon.15
For those parameters of the model for which the first best solution cannot
be implemented since B̂
∣∣
E=0
< BFB, the optimal policy consists in setting the
exemption level equal to zero in order to maximise regions’ access to credit.
Alternatively, as E = 0 seems somewhat extreme since no regional assets are
exempt from seizure, some minimum politically feasible exemption level should be
chosen. When doing so, the federation’s welfare can be increased compared to the
overborrowing equilibrium. This might not be true, however, if the bankruptcy
mechanism is ill-designed. If policymakers choose an exemption level which is
too high in order to accommodate voters, for example, the federation can even be
worse off than under a soft budget constraint policy.16 Bankruptcy procedures
can also be welfare-lowering if policymakers are unable to commit to the optimal
E for reasons such as political lobbying. Setting a very low exemption level
appears unproblematic in the current deterministic set-up in which default does
not actually occur in equilibrium. In a richer model with a stochastic element,
however, bankruptcy would sometimes be triggered. In this case, a very low
exemption level could generate a political backlash as it can be perceived as
protecting creditors at the expense of citizens.
In conclusion, bankruptcy proceedings do not always improve welfare in
comparison to the SBC equilibrium as their welfare effects depend on their
15Example 1 in the Appendix illustrates such a case for a specific utility function.
16Example 2 in the Appendix presents a case in which bankruptcy procedures with an
inappropriate exemption level lower welfare compared to the overborrowing equilibrium.
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concrete design, as captured by the exemption level. This result is in line with
previous research which has highlighted the importance of the exemption level as
a policy variable (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 2005).
2.9 Concluding remarks
With national and subnational debt spiralling out of control in the aftermath of
the 2008 global financial crisis, proposals have been put forward for an orderly
default mechanism in order to mitigate moral hazard and harden regional budget
constraints. Drawing on the market discipline hypothesis, proponents of private
sector involvement have argued that insolvency laws incentivise creditors to price
public debt and default risk efficiently, thus restraining fiscally irresponsible
sovereigns who have to pay higher risk premia on their loans. While this chapter
supports the view that bankruptcy procedures can restrict overborrowing in
a federation, it turns out that the interactions between central government,
subnational governments and creditors are more complex than the market
discipline hypothesis suggests. Moreover, the design of the insolvency mechanism,
which is determined by the costs of default and the exemption level for public
assets, is crucial in shaping fiscal policy.
If the exemption level for public assets is very high so that regions are too poor
to repay their creditors, credit markets can indeed discipline regional borrowers.
The regional budget constraint is hardened if the credit limit imposed by the
market is binding. If, by contrast, the exemption level is sufficiently low, which
means that creditors receive some repayments in case of default, it is the central
government rather than the credit market that restricts regional borrowing. In
this case, regions might refrain from overborrowing since they risk being taxed
and pushed into default by the central government otherwise. The key to the
central government’s behaviour lies in the exemption level which effectively serves
as an insurance mechanism. Intuitively, if a region borrows up to its credit limit,
public good consumption is the same as in the default scenario. By letting this
region default, taxing it and redistributing the proceeds, the central government
can make the rest of the federation better off while leaving the utility of the
citizen in the defaulting region, who is protected by the exemption level and can
still consume essential public services, unchanged. Bankruptcy procedures can
therefore serve as a commitment device for the central government as the latter
is incentivised to tax rather than to bail out high-deficit regions. Interestingly,
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this effect of bankruptcy proceedings on the central government’s behaviour has
not been identified in the literature so far.
The model also offers some important insights into the optimal design of
bankruptcy procedures. The model’s major policy implication is that bankruptcy
proceedings can be welfare-lowering if they are not carefully designed. Comparing
the bankruptcy regime with a low and a high exemption level, it turns out that
the former is preferable as it enables policymakers to manipulate the exemption
level in a desirable way. For a certain range of parameters, policymakers can
set the exemption level such that the borrowing constraint coincides with the
first best level of debt, thus eradicating the SBC phenomenon and leading to
the socially optimal outcome. Well-designed bankruptcy laws thus result in
hard budget constraints. For those parameters of the model for which it is
impossible to implement the first best solution, the optimal policy prescription is
to choose some minimum politically feasible exemption level. Setting a very low
exemption level maximises the amount of credit available to regions, thus allowing
subnational governments greater intertemporal flexibility. If policymakers choose
an exemption level which is too high from a welfare perspective, by contrast, the
federation can even be worse off than under a soft budget constraint policy.
The model’s key findings have been derived under the assumption that while
being unable to stick to a pre-announced transfer policy, the central government
can commit to a legal insolvency procedure and its associated exemption level.
The argument underlying this assumption is that a bankruptcy mechanism, which
is enshrined in law, is not subject to the ad hoc political pressures which often
characterise bailout decisions. This would certainly be true in the case where the
bankruptcy procedures were formulated within a supranational legal framework
and overseen by an independent international bankruptcy court. If the insolvency
mechanism is implemented at national level, however, it might be more prone
to commitment issues, unless amendments to the bankruptcy law required a
supermajority. The assumption of full commitment to a bankruptcy regime
seems therefore appropriate for federations with strong legal institutions. If the
central government is unable to commit to bankruptcy laws, by contrast, the
disciplining effects of insolvency procedures will disappear and the model will
yield the standard soft budget constraint result.
A common concern raised by critics of sovereign bankruptcy procedures is that
the default of a subnational entity has repercussions on other member states since
the latter are likely to see their bond yields increase and/or their credit ratings
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drop (White, 2002). In other words, default, even if it is orderly, might lead to
financial contagion or so-called creditworthiness spillover effects. For example,
opponents of the Greek debt restructuring deal have warned of negative effects
on other heavily indebted periphery countries such as Portugal. Rather than
serving as a commitment device, bankruptcy procedures might therefore provide
the central government with an additional bailout motive, thereby softening the
regional budget constraint further. While the model currently does not take
this into account, it can be extended to incorporate the contagion argument by
including negative spillover effects into the federation’s welfare function. When
doing so, the central government’s taxing threat is weakened since the benefits
of letting a region default and redistributing its revenues are now smaller due to
the additional welfare costs. As default becomes more costly for the federation,
the borrowing constraint B̂ is less restrictive. As a result, overborrowing is more
likely to occur in this set-up than in the model without contagion.
It is important to note, however, that empirical evidence on financial contagion
is mixed. Using Canadian provincial data, Landon and Smith (2000) find that
an increase in the debt of regions other than Ontario negatively affects the
creditworthiness of the other provinces but the size of this negative effect is
relatively small. Kaminski et al. (2003) examine recent financial events such
as devaluations and defaults and conclude that immediate financial contagion
only occurs in some cases. They argue that for contagion to be triggered, three
key elements have to be present, which they dub the ‘unholy trinity’. Contagion
episodes tend to be associated with a large influx of capital, a high degree of
surprise and a leveraged common creditor. For example, Argentina’s default in
2001 had only limited immediate consequences as it was widely anticipated due
to a string of five credit downgrades in the preceding year. It could be argued
that Greece found itself in a similar situation since a Greek default had been on
the cards for almost two years and hardly came as a surprise to investors. As
the relevance and the size of potential spillover effects are debatable, the model
therefore provides a good starting point for analysing the incentive effects of
bankruptcy procedures, especially if creditworthiness spillovers are expected to
be relatively subdued.
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2.A The soft budget constraint result (without default)






s.t. (2.2), (2.3a), and (2.4).







∀i, j ⇒ Gi2 = Gj2 ∀i, j.
In order to derive the CG’s reaction function, the FOC, Gi2 − Gj2 = 0, is




























dBi = 0 ∀j 6= i,
which simplifies to
dTi2 − dTj2 − (1 + r)dBi = 0 ∀j 6= i.




dTj2 − (n− 1)(1 + r)dBi = 0






Differentiation of the CG’s budget constraint
∑n
i=1 Ti2 = 0 yields:
n∑
i=1




17The proof follows Breuillé et al. (2007). Note that the model has been slightly modified.
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The CG’s reaction function is obtained by inserting this relation into the equation
above:









(1 + r) = (1 + r)− 1
n
(1 + r).
In the first stage of the game, the SNG maximises the utility of the household
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2.B Proof of Lemma 2.2: The CG’s reaction function
Recall that the reaction function Ti2 is a function of (B1, ..., Bn). All other
variables are fixed. Recall that r = 0 and for simplicity assume that cd = 0.
In a first step, it is established that the CG’s best response consists in either
bailing out or taxing region i. Suppose that federal transfers are such that neither
region i nor region j defaults which implies that Bi ≤ Ri − E = Bi. Public
consumption consequently amounts to Gi2 = Ri −Bi ≥ E and likewise Gj2 ≥ E.
If Gi2 6= Gj2, say Gi2 < Gj2, the CG can increase
∑n
i=1 Ui by transferring one
pound from j to i which contradicts optimality. This means that the CG equalises
public good consumption for any i, j which do not default so that Gi2 = Gj2.
Next suppose that transfers are such that region i defaults but some other
region j repays its debt. Then it must be that Ti2 = E−Y so that the CG reduces
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overall regional revenues down to the exemption level E. If this lump sum tax
imposed on region i is smaller than the maximum possible amount (Ti2 < E−Y ),
then increasing the lump sum tax and transferring the proceeds to j must increase∑n
i=1 Ui since citizens in region i are not worse off but utility in regions j 6= i
is increased. If an SNG defaults, the CG hence taxes the maximum possible
amount.
In a second step, it is shown that there is a critical threshold B̂i(B−i) at which
the CG is indifferent between taxing and bailing out region i. Assume that the
other regions j 6= i each borrow an arbitrary amount Bj.
i. Holding every other region’s Bj fixed, suppose that transfers are such that
region i defaults (i.e. Ti2 = E−Y ) at B′i. Then consider B′′i > B′i. Suppose
that it is optimal not to let region i default in this case. The utility
∑n
i=1 Ui
which can be reached by doing this must be lower than what could be
achieved by not letting region i default with B′i. Since region i’s creditors
receive less with B′i, more resources are available to everyone else so that
each region has an additional amount of
B′′i −B′i
n
for public consumption. By
contrast, the utility which can be reached by letting i default for B′′i is the






in both cases. Thus, given that it is optimal to let region i default with
B′i, it is impossible that it is optimal to not let i default with B
′′
i . This
argument establishes a contradiction.





Suppose that it is optimal to let region i default in this case. As previously
shown, the utility which can be achieved by letting region i default with B′i
is identical to the utility which is reached when letting region i default with
B′′′i . The utility, however, which can be reached by letting i not default
with B′′′i is higher than what can be achieved by not letting region i default
with B′i. Since there are relatively more resources available with B
′′′
i , public
good consumption is increased by
B′i−B′′′i
n
. Thus, as it is optimal to not let
region i default with B′i, it is impossible that it is optimal to let i default
with B′′′i . This argument establishes a contradiction.
Finally, assume that all other regions do not default and borrow B. If region
i borrows less than the other regions (Bi < B), the CG has no incentive to tax







Figure 2.5: A Small Level of Borrowing (B = ε)
more than the other SNGs, it will be taxed by the CG at some point. In this
case, B̂i(B, ..., B) is greater than or equal to B.
2.C Proof of Lemma 2.3: The CG’s reaction function in the
symmetric case
Suppose that all SNGs borrow the same amount. In order to show that the
critical threshold B̂(B, ..., B) in the symmetric case must lie between zero and
the credit limit B = R−E, suppose first that each region borrows the same very
small amount ε. This situation is depicted in Figure 2.5. If the CG taxed region i
down to the exemption level E, region i’s utility would fall from z(R−ε) to z(E),
as shown in Figure 2.5. The proceeds A are redistributed to the other (n − 1)
regions so that each of them receives an additional transfer of C ≡ R−E
n−1 . Regions
j 6= i consequently end up with a public good consumption of Gj2 = R+ R−En−1 − ε
instead of R− ε and the utility gain of such an SNG is illustrated in Figure 2.5.
Note that the gain in total resources available to the CG is just ε, i.e. the amount
that region i defaults on. Due to the concavity of the utility function, there is a
discrete drop in
∑n
i=1 Ui at ε ≈ 0 as the gain in total resources ε is insufficient to
compensate for the resulting inequality of public good provision. Thus, provided
ε is small enough, there is a drop in
∑n
i=1 Ui so that the CG prefers to keep all
SNGs equal instead of taxing them, and the first line of (2.14) applies. It follows
that B̂(ε, ..., ε) > ε.
Suppose now that each region borrows up to the credit limit B = R − E,
meaning that regions are indifferent between defaulting and not defaulting. If
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the CG taxed region i down to the exemption level E, the latter would not
be worse off due to the indifference property. The additional resources can be
transferred to the other (n − 1) regions, thus increasing
∑n
i=1 Ui. In this case,
taxation of some SNGs must be desirable. A similar argument can be established
for any B which is sufficiently close to the credit limit B since the discrete drop in
Ui is limited while the CG’s total resources increase by the amount of borrowing
that region i defaults on.
By continuity, there must be an intermediate value of borrowing strictly
between zero and B = R − E for which the CG is indifferent between taxing
and bailing out regions. This value is defined as B̂(B, ..., B).
2.D Proof of Lemma 2.5
Claim (b) is true since an SNG has no incentive to deviate, holding the strategies
of the other regions constant. If region i borrows more than B̂i, it will be taxed
and ends up with public consumption of Gi2 = E which is worse, thus making
an upwards deviation unprofitable. A downwards deviation by region i could
be profitable if it triggered the taxation of some other region. It turns out,
however, that a downwards deviation by i weakens the CG’s incentive to tax
regions j 6= i. Region i would consequently have no incentive to undercut other
regions’ borrowing in order to get hold of their revenues.
In order to show that this is true, a heuristic approach is used. Assume that
n = 2 and both regions initially borrow the same amount B and consume G2, as
shown in the left panel of Figure 2.6. If the CG taxes region j and redistributes
the proceeds to region i, consumption in region j will fall to E while consumption
in region i will increase to Gi2. The fall in utility in region j exceeds the utility
gain in region i (∆zj > ∆zi) so that the CG has no incentive to tax any of the
regions if both borrow the same amount B.
Now consider a downwards deviation and assume that region i reduces its debt
by ∆. This situation is depicted in the right panel of Figure 2.6. If the CG
refrains from taxing anyone, the reduction in the federation’s total debt benefits
all regions, with public consumption for each region rising by ∆
2
to G′2. If the CG
taxes region j and reallocates its revenues, by contrast, region j will consume E
whereas region i’s consumption will be given by G′i2. Since region i no longer
has to share the benefit of lowering its debt with region j if the latter is taxed,

















(b) Region i reduces borrowing by ∆
Figure 2.6: A Downwards Deviation by Region i
is more or less likely to tax than in the initial scenario, solely the changes in
region i’s utility gain and region j’s utility loss need to be compared. As shown
in the right panel of Figure 2.6, the change in region i’s utility gain is given
by X = MU2 × ∆ − MU1 × ∆2 , where MU1 and MU2 denote the marginal
utilities evaluated at G2 and Gi2 respectively. Region j’s utility loss increases by









which is smaller than 0 as MU2 < MU1, due to diminishing marginal utilities.
This argument can easily be generalised for n regions.
It follows that if region i borrows less, the CG taxes neither region i nor regions
j 6= i but instead equalises marginal utilities and the reaction function is given by
the first line in equation (2.14). Since in this case G∗, as given in definition 2.1,
is optimal, going above Ĝi2 = R− B̂ is even further away from G∗ and therefore
not a profitable deviation. By the same argument, any B < B∗∗ cannot be an
equilibrium.
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2.E Optimal design of bankruptcy procedures








E = (n− 1)
√
nR− (n− 1)B − E
n− 1
. (2.18)




B2n3 −B2n4 −Bn3R +Bn4R
n2
.
Example 1: Assume that v(Gi1) =
√
Gi1 so that citizens would like to
consume equal amounts of Gi1 and Gi2 in the first best equilibrium. Moreover,
assume that n = 5, T1 = 10 and R = 40 which implies that B
FB = 15. Plugging
these values into the equation above, the optimal exemption level E amounts to:
E1 = 37− 20
√
3 = 2.36 and E2 = 37 + 20
√
3 = 71.74.
E2 is not a solution since it is larger than the regional revenues R. Recall that in
the bankruptcy regime with a high exemption level (R < E), solely the market
can restrict regional borrowing and the borrowing constraint depends on the cost
of default cd. If policymakers choose E1 as exemption level, by contrast, the
regional budget constraint is hard and regional borrowing amounts to the first
best level BFB = 15 = B̂.
Example 2: Assume that v(Gi1) = 2
√
Gi1 which implies that citizens put a
relatively higher value on public consumption in period 1. Moreover, assume that
n = 2, T1 = 10 and R = 40 which implies that B
FB = 30. Plugging these values








This equation has no real solution so that E = { }. In this case, it is impossible
to implement the first best level of borrowing by choosing an adequate exemption
level.
Even if the exemption level is set to its lowest possible value, SNGs are not able








Solving for B, the critical level of debt amounts to B̂ = 26.67 which is
smaller than BFB. In order to examine whether bankruptcy procedures are
still welfare-improving in this case, the federation’s welfare is compared for the
first best equilibrium, the overborrowing equilibrium and the bankruptcy law














In the first best equilibrium, the opportunity costs of borrowing are given by
equation (2.5). Using the specific functions, (2.5) becomes Gi1 = 4Gi2 so
that GFBi1 = 40 and G
FB
i2 = 10. Welfare amounts to W
FB = 31.62. In the
overborrowing equilibrium, opportunity costs amount to 1
2
and equation (2.7)
is given by Gi1 = 16Gi2 so that G
OE
i1 = 47.06 and G
OE
i2 = 2.94. Welfare is
lower than in the first best equilibrium and amounts to WOE = 30.87. Finally,
consider the bankruptcy law equilibrium. For B̂
∣∣
E=0
= 26.67, public good




= 31.53. While the first best cannot be implemented, bankruptcy
procedures with E = 0 enhance welfare compared to the SBC equilibrium. Note




for example, welfare is given by W
∣∣
E=10
= 28.95. Since welfare is even lower than
in the overborrowing equilibrium, the federation is worse off under bankruptcy
procedures.
46
3 A Greek tragedy with a happy ending? Orderly
debt restructuring in the EU
Scheitert der Euro, dann scheitert nicht nur das Geld. Dann scheitert mehr.
Dann scheitert Europa, dann scheitert die Idee der europäischen Einigung.1
(Angela Merkel, 13.5.2010)
3.1 Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, which has so far culminated in the
bailouts of Greece, Ireland and Portugal and the creation of a temporary ¤750bn
rescue fund, has revealed that the monetary and fiscal policy framework of
the European Monetary Union (EMU) is insufficient for disciplining profligate
governments. During the height of market turmoil, European policymakers
reacted to the crisis in an ad hoc way by circumventing the so-called no-bailout
clause2 and by setting up the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).
Negating the EU’s no-bailout policy, the rescue package has exacerbated moral
hazard by providing an implicit insurance to both creditors and debtors at the
expense of the European taxpayer. As a result, bondholders are encouraged to
take on too much risk and countries lack incentives to tackle their problematic
finances. In order to mitigate the commitment problem inherent in the current
framework and to ensure orderly crisis management in the future, Eurozone
leaders have recently signed the treaty establishing a permanent crisis mechanism,
dubbed the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Among other things, the ESM
envisages the possibility of orderly debt restructuring, or, more precisely, “a case
by case participation of private sector creditors” (Eurogroup, 28.11.2010).
The proposal has sparked debate amongst economists and policymakers as to
whether the ESM and in particular private sector involvement will resolve the
1 If the Euro fails, [...] so will Europe, so will the idea of European integration (my translation).
Speech at the Charlemagne Prize ceremony in Aachen.
2 Article 125 of the TFEU: “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments
of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by
public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial
guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.”
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debt crisis. Those in favour of an orderly debt restructuring mechanism, such
as Otmar Issing, argue that “default must be a credible threat” (Issing, 2010) so
that bondholders take into account default risks. As a result, markets will restrict
overborrowing since creditors demand higher risk premia for heavily indebted
countries. Opponents, however, are less optimistic and claim that insolvency
procedures simply encourage default. The former ECB president Jean-Claude
Trichet has predicted that the mechanism will drive up the borrowing costs of
debt-laden nations, thereby making them insolvent. Finally, De Grauwe (2010b)
asserts that the “sovereign debt default mechanism will destabilise the eurozone
and ensure its demise.”
This chapter contributes to the policy discussion by providing a formal model
which sheds light on the incentive effects of the orderly debt restructuring
mechanism which is bound to be implemented in the EMU. Employing a global
game approach, the model analyses the impact of insolvency procedures on the
size of the bailout, the level of effort exerted by the debtor country and EU
welfare. The benchmark case extends Morris and Shin (2006), who examine the
moral hazard implications of IMF bailouts, in order to model the EU-specific
setting. Consequently, their assumption that the IMF only provides financial
assistance to solvent countries is dropped. Instead, it is assumed that the EU
has to reconcile the interests of all member states and thus maximises the welfare
of the federation. In this set-up, it is possible for insolvent countries to receive
financial assistance if this benefits the EU as a whole. Moreover, during the height
of the crisis, policymakers justified the bailouts by creating the impression that
the stability of the entire Eurozone was at stake. This argument is taken into
account by assuming that averting default entails an additional benefit which
can be thought of as macroeconomic stability. Finally, the model by Morris
and Shin (2006), which is primarily concerned with the effect of bailouts on
the country’s adjustment effort in the absence of any conditionality or private
sector involvement (‘bail-in’), is adapted to study the impact of an orderly
default mechanism. Insolvency procedures are incorporated into the benchmark
by assuming that both debtors and creditors are better off in the case of default
since orderly debt restructuring lowers the costs of default on both sides (Gianviti
et al., 2010). While creditors suffer haircuts, they can also retrieve a fixed fraction
of their investment even if the country defaults; at the same time, debtor countries
receive debt relief in the case of default.
Interestingly, the results challenge some claims made in the policy literature.
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Firstly, contrary to the widespread view as stated by Sinn and Carstensen
(2010), for example, orderly debt restructuring does not necessarily discourage
debtor moral hazard since the model shows that countries exert more or less
adjustment effort, depending on the economic fundamentals. Secondly, insolvency
laws do not always encourage default as some commentators have suggested
(Münchau, 2010) and if they do so, there are no detrimental effects. Focusing
on the particular range of extremely weak fundamentals for which default is
encouraged in comparison to the benchmark, it turns out that EU welfare in
fact increases under the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism even though the
country defaults. Intuitively, encouraging default for very weak fundamentals,
which means that the country is potentially insolvent, may prevent the debtor
from exerting ultimately wasteful effort and the EU from providing an expensive
bailout. The sovereign debt restructuring mechanism thus corrects the outcome of
the benchmark where the EU might support insolvent member states and too few
countries default as a result. Thirdly, although being described as a panacea by
some authors such as Gianviti et al. (2010), insolvency procedures are not always
welfare-improving for all ranges of fundamentals. Depending on the model’s
parameters, EU welfare can be lower in the insolvency law regime if the country’s
economy is characterised by weak or intermediate fundamentals. Finally, the
claim made by policymakers that orderly default relieves the European taxpayer
by restricting the size of the bailout holds for all but one range of economic
fundamentals.
The results do not imply, however, that the EU’s approach to include private
creditors in future bailouts should be rejected. The model suggests, rather, that
insolvency procedures need to be carefully designed to bring about the positive
effects ascribed to them. The choice of the parameters which determine the
mechanism is thus crucial to the success of insolvency laws. The model’s major
policy implication is that a half-hearted orderly debt restructuring mechanism
fails to alleviate the commitment and moral hazard problems inherent in the
current EMU framework. Only a ‘strong’ mechanism which lowers the costs
of default significantly for both creditors and debtors, meaning that haircuts
are relatively subdued and the amount of debt forgiven is sufficiently large,
simultaneously mitigates the EU’s commitment problem, discourages moral
hazard and enhances EU welfare. From a political economy perspective, an
insolvency law regime which provides for a relatively small amount of debt relief
might also appear sensible. Depending on the model’s parameters, insolvency
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procedures are welfare-improving in this case but the effort exerted by the country
is lower. Still, policymakers might endorse this design as the public in the
respective debtor country is more likely to support austerity measures if the
latter are less painful.
The model builds upon the literature on global games3 which treats creditors’
roll-over decisions as a collective action problem. In these models, rational
behaviour does not only depend on creditors’ beliefs about the country’s economic
fundamentals but also on their higher-order beliefs, i.e. the creditors’ beliefs about
other creditors’ beliefs, creditors’ beliefs about other creditors’ beliefs about other
creditors’ beliefs, and so on (Morris and Shin, 2003). As a result, bondholders
might decline to roll over their claims, fearing premature foreclosure by other
creditors, although the debtor country is in fact solvent. In the model, default is
consequently triggered by co-ordination failure or a liquidity crunch. Moreover,
from a game theoretic perspective, global games offer certain advantages since
they remedy the multiplicity of equilibria which characterises the traditional bank
run literature. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), for example, two equilibria exist:
a ‘good’ one in which confidence is maintained and risk is shared optimally and
a ‘bad one’ in which all agents panic and rush to the bank to withdraw their
deposits. By assuming that payoffs are not common knowledge but observed
with a small amount of noise, global games reduce or eliminate multiple equilibria
so that policy recommendations become possible. Global games have therefore
been used in applied work on creditor co-ordination failures, speculative attacks
or financial crises.4 By adding noise to the Diamond and Dybvig framework,
for example, Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) show that the model has a unique
equilibrium, in which a run occurs if the economic fundamentals are below some
critical threshold, and compute the probability of panic-based bank runs.
The global game methodology offers an alternative to the common view
that sovereign debt crises are self-fulfilling, caused by an unexplained shift in
creditors’ beliefs which is unrelated to economic fundamentals. Global games
relax the assumption that fundamentals are common knowledge, thus preventing
creditors’ actions and beliefs to be perfectly co-ordinated in a way that generates
3 In their seminal paper, Carlsson and van Damme (1993) define a global game as “an incomplete
information game where the actual payoff structure is determined by a random draw from a
given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected game”.
4 This chapter is closest in spirit to the framework first developed by Morris and Shin (2004),
which was taken up by Carlson and Hale (2005) and Dreisbach and Kindermann (2009), for
example. Morris and Shin (2003) and Heinemann (2005) provide an overview of both the global
game methodology and applications.
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multiple equilibria (Morris and Shin, 2001). For a unique equilibrium to exist,
however, private signals must be sufficiently accurate as compared to public
signals, and public information tends to be destabilising. This feature of the
model has attracted most criticism since market prices are thought to serve as
a co-ordination device and represent strong public signals, thus undermining the
logic of the global game approach (Atkeson in Morris and Shin, 2001). This
is why some authors favour a multiple equilibria explanation of the Eurozone
crisis. De Grauwe and Ji (2012) argue that monetary unions are more vulnerable
to self-fulfilling crises as they cannot revert to the money printing press like
stand-alone countries. In order to test their theory, they attempt to identify
periods during which movements in bond spreads are unrelated to their underlying
fundamentals. Their evidence is mixed, however, showing that bond spreads
in Spain were mostly driven by market sentiments whereas the surge in Greek
yields is mainly due to deteriorating fundamentals.5 While their interpretation
might prove to be correct, there are also good reasons for applying a global game
approach. With ‘prices’ or bond yields being identical for all Eurozone member
states prior to 2008 and interest rates becoming increasingly volatile during the
course of the crisis, it can be argued that prices have not accurately revealed the
Eurozone’s true state and that “mispricing of risks” (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012) has
been widespread in Eurozone bond markets. If prices fail to provide consistent
signals, global games might offer a better way to model the Eurozone crisis since
they, unlike other models, reconcile fundamental and panic-driven views.
The chapter is closely related to the global game literature on the lender of
last resort (LOLR). Both Morris and Shin (2006) and Corsetti et al. (2006)
assume that the IMF seeks to lend to illiquid, but solvent, countries. Despite
using different modelling strategies, i.e. Morris and Shin (2006) have players
move sequentially, while Corsetti et al. (2006) model a simultaneous game with
the IMF as a large player, both papers find that IMF bailouts do not always
induce moral hazard. Similarly, Rochet and Vives (2004), who focus on the
role of a domestic LOLR in solving banking crises, assume that assistance is
provided to solvent banks facing a liquidity crunch. They show that LOLR
policy in addition to liquidity and solvency regulation can alleviate the creditor
co-ordination problem. Applying their model to an international context, they
5 It would be interesting to see whether their results on Portugal and Ireland, where half of the
variation in spreads is due to market sentiments and half due to fundamentals, still hold when
including more recent data which points towards a recovery of these spreads.
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argue in favour of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism which complements
international financial aid and which helps insolvent countries which are not too
far away from the solvency threshold. This model departs from these approaches
by dropping the key assumption that the lender of last resort can credibly commit
to bail out solvent countries in order to better fit the European setting. Since
the EU might support countries which are potentially insolvent, a commitment
problem is added to the Morris and Shin framework. As a result, bailouts occur
more often and the moral hazard problem is more severe since the range of
fundamentals for which the EU intervenes increases in comparison to their model.
Countries are consequently less likely to default compared to their set-up.
Several proposals regarding the design of the European sovereign debt
restructuring mechanism have been put forward. Gros and Mayer (2010) suggest
creating a European Monetary Fund which can organise an orderly default as
a measure of last resort. Gianviti et al. (2010) propose the creation of a
European Crisis Resolution Mechanism (ECRM) which makes the provision of
financial aid conditional on a restructuring agreement between creditors and
debtors. Similarly, Sinn and Carstensen (2010) argue that haircuts must precede
any financial assistance by the EU to ensure bond spreads are maintained and
serve as a disciplining device. The European Economic Advisory Group (EEAG)
recommends a three-stage procedure based on different degrees of financial
distress, namely illiquidity, pending insolvency and actual insolvency. While
liquidity problems are remedied by providing short-term financial aid without
private sector involvement, pending insolvency envisages haircuts to the amount
of 20 to 50 per cent of the bond’s nominal value as well as issuance of replacement
bonds which are partly guaranteed by the ESM. In the case of actual insolvency,
the country has to declare a debt moratorium for its total outstanding debt
(EEAG, 2011). While the chapter follows this growing literature to some extent
by assuming that bailouts presuppose an orderly debt restructuring mechanism,
the modelling approach is quite general and thus robust to different specifications
of the mechanism. The disciplining effect of bond spreads is not considered in
the model, however, since the initial debt situation is taken as given, in common
with Morris and Shin (2006) and the related global game literature. For the
same reason, creditor moral hazard is not an issue in the model. The chapter
also draws on previous debates on sovereign insolvency procedures.6
6 See for example Krueger (2002), White (2002), Roubini (2002), Thomas (2004) and Rogoff and
Zettelmeyer (2002).
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a
brief overview of the Eurozone debt crisis and orderly debt restructuring. Section
3.3 presents the model set-up and the results for the benchmark scenario. Section
3.4 modifies the benchmark model to incorporate the proposed debt restructuring
mechanism. In section 3.5, the results of the benchmark are compared to the
insolvency law regime. The resulting policy implications and concluding remarks
are presented in sections 3.6 and 3.7.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 The Eurozone debt crisis
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, sovereign debt has
taken centre stage in the Eurozone, especially in the bloc’s periphery. This
evolution is not surprising since, historically, financial crises have often been
succeeded by a higher occurrence of sovereign default (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
As shown in Figure 3.1, some countries such as Italy and Greece have exhibited
public debt levels of more than 90 per cent of GDP even before the financial crisis
hit, despite the provisions in the Stability and Growth Pact which restrict the
debt-to-GDP ratio to 60 per cent. By contrast, formerly fiscally sound countries
such as Ireland or Spain have experienced a deterioration of their public finances
as a result of the financial crisis.
Concerns about the sustainability of public finances in the Eurozone’s periphery
have been reflected in the widening of bond yields since mid-2008, as illustrated
in Figure 3.2. European governments initially benefitted from the introduction
of the single currency since exchange rate risks were eliminated and countries
subsequently paid similar interest rates, albeit differing in their fundamentals
(Sinn, 2010; Buiter and Rahbari, 2010). Some authors have suggested that this
initial convergence of Eurozone bond yields might have been driven by creditors
believing in an implicit bailout guarantee, despite the existence of the no-bailout
clause. Rejecting this argument, Buiter and Sibert (2005) claim that interest rates
did not adequately reflect default risks as a result of the operational practices of
the European Central Bank. By treating all sovereign debt instruments issued by
member states equally in its collateralised open market operations, the ECB
signalled that all Eurozone debt was equivalent, thus potentially suppressing
interest rate differentials. Since the use of low-quality sovereign debt as collateral
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Figure 3.1: General Government Gross Debt (Source: IMF, WEO)
was effectively subsidised thereby boosting demand for this type of debt and
driving down bond yields, the ECB’s rules on collateral might have created an
implicit transfer mechanism which has resulted in moral hazard.
With pressures on public finances increasing due to bank bailouts and fiscal
stimulus packages, bondholders, however, started to fear the potential default of
governments in the Eurozone’s periphery, thus demanding higher risk premia. As
a result, the three bailout candidates, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, suffered a
steep rise in bond yields between 2010 and mid-2011. While the creation of the
bailout fund in May 2010 provided short relief for the fiscally distressed countries
by lowering interest rates significantly, bond yields started to rise again soon
after, even reaching higher levels than in May 2010. Remarkably, the increase
in Greek, Irish and Portuguese interest rates in October 2010 coincided with
the EU’s announcement that private bondholders would have to shoulder losses
in the future. Starting from mid-2011, Irish bond yields have decoupled from
those of the other bailout recipients, however, reflecting the country’s progress in
implementing austerity measures. By comparison, Greek interest rates spiked to
40 per cent in early 2012 but are now trading just above 20 per cent following
Greece’s debt restructuring in March 2012. Attention has recently turned to Spain
and Italy whose bond spreads over German bunds have widened since summer
2011, causing concerns that these countries might be next in line for a bailout.
While the fiscal troubles experienced in Greece, Ireland and Portugal are rooted
in the financial crisis, the economic problems are largely country-specific. The
Greek economy has long been suffering from a competitiveness problem which has
aggravated its budgetary problems arising from high age-related spending, poor
tax administration and a large public sector (Buiter and Rahbari, 2010). Its fiscal
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(a) Yields since 2007 (b) Yields since 2010
Figure 3.2: 10 Year Government Bond Yields (Source: Thomson Reuters)
position turned out to be more severe than previously thought when, following
the general election in October 2009, the general government deficit was revised
upwards from initially 6 to 12.5 per cent of GDP (Buiter et al., 2011).7 Unable
to refinance itself on the capital markets, Greece received a bailout of ¤110bn
on 9 May 2010, with ¤80bn provided by the EU and ¤30bn by the IMF. Being
caught in a downward spiral of lower growth and higher debt, and struggling
to implement the conditions imposed by its lenders, Greece had to seek further
assistance from the EU in 2011. This time, however, European leaders made
private sector participation a prerequisite for extending financial aid. Following
the agreement between Greece and its creditors on the debt exchange, Greece
was officially granted a second bailout amounting to ¤172.7bn on 21 February
2012 (European Commission, 2012; Eurogroup, 21.2.2012).
By contrast, the former ‘Celtic tiger’ has been under financial strain because
of the support extended by the Irish government to its ailing banking sector,
both through guarantees of bank debt and large bank bailouts. Ireland was the
first country to tap the bailout fund and was granted ¤85bn on 28 November
2010. While largely avoiding the real estate boom and the turbulences in the
banking sector, Portugal’s economy has been facing structural problems such
as labour market rigidities and low levels of human capital, leading to a sharp
loss of competitiveness and persistently sluggish growth.8 Following a political
crisis which was triggered by the government’s failure to pass further austerity
7 The most recent revision published by Eurostat estimates a figure of 15.8 per cent.
8 Portugal’s high-school dropout rate is amongst the highest in the OECD (Forelle, 2011).
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Ireland Portugal Greece
Total 85 78 172.7
Composition of package
EFSF 17.7 26 144.7
EFSM 22.5 26 -
IMF 22.5 26 28
Bilateral 4.8 - -
Own contribution 17.5 - -
Table 3.1: EFSF-based Bailout Packages (in EUR billions)
measures and which resulted in the prime minister’s resignation, Lisbon reached
an agreement with the IMF and the EU on a ¤78bn bailout on 17 May 2011.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the rescue packages to date.9
3.2.2 Crisis management
In response to the market turmoil in early May 2010, EU countries agreed a
comprehensive rescue package on 9/10 May which is based on Article 122(2) of
the TFEU and consists of three parts: the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF), the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and financial
assistance provided by the IMF (European Council, 9.5.2010). The EFSF is
a special-purpose vehicle which was created as a limited liability company under
Luxembourg law. The facility has been intended as a temporary solution and
is thus able to set up new programmes until 30 June 2013 (EFSF Framework
Agreement). Initially, the EFSF was only meant to issue bonds, notes or
other debt instruments on the market backed by intergovernmental guarantees
of ¤440bn provided by Euro Area member states. Its scope of activity was
significantly expanded in March and July 2011, however, allowing for intervention
in primary and secondary bond markets, assistance on the basis of a precautionary
programme and recapitalisation of financial institutions (European Council,
21.7.2011). In order to provide the bailout fund with an effective lending capacity
of ¤440bn, the guarantee ceiling was later increased to ¤780bn (European
Council, 11.3.2011, 24.6.2011). In November 2011, Eurozone leaders decided
to boost the EFSF’s firepower even further using leverage.
The creation of the bailout fund was complemented by the ECB’s decision on
9 The table excludes the first Greek bailout, the Greek Loan Facility, which was not provided
within the EFSF framework. Note that the figures for Greece’s second bailout include ¤37bn
remaining from the first package.
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10 May 2010 to purchase government securities in the secondary market for the
first time in its history. The ECB created the Securities Markets Programme
(SMP) in order “to address the malfunctioning of securities markets and restore
an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism” (ECB, 10.5.2010). As
purchases under the SMP are sterilised, the monetary base remains unchanged
so that no inflationary pressures arise. As of 13.4.2012, the ECB’s holdings of
periphery sovereign debt amount to ¤214bn. Purchases under the SMP have
fallen significantly in 2012, however, as the ECB now uses long-term refinancing
operations (LTROs) instead in order to provide banks with cheap loans, thereby
encouraging them to invest in high-yield peripheral bonds.
In order to prevent future sovereign debt crises, Eurozone leaders signed the
ESM Treaty on 2 February 2012, thus establishing a permanent crisis resolution
mechanism. To this end, the European Council decided to amend Article 136 of
the TFEU in March 2011. The paragraph to be added reads as follows (European
Council, 17.12.2010, 25.3.2011):
The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability
mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro
area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the
mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.
The ESM will take the form of an international financial institution and assume
the tasks of the EFSF and the EFSM in 2012 (European Council, 9.12.2011).
Its overall lending capacity of ¤500bn will require ¤80bn in paid-in capital and
¤620bn in callable capital and guarantees to ensure the highest credit rating.
Being activated a year earlier than previously planned, the ESM will run parallel
with the EFSF for 12 months. In March 2012, Eurozone finance ministers agreed
to temporarily boost the combined EFSF/ESM lending capacity to ¤700bn
(Eurogroup, 30.3.2012). The ESM will be linked to the Fiscal Compact since
member states will be required to have ratified the latter in order to benefit from
the mechanism as of March 2013. Loans provided by the ESM will be senior to
those of private bondholders but junior to IMF credits.
The ESM is designed to relieve the European taxpayer by forcing private
bondholders to shoulder some of the losses of future bailouts. From 1.1.2013,
all new bonds issued within the Euro Area will therefore carry standardised
and identical collective action clauses (CACs) which enable a qualified majority
of bondholders to bind all bondholders of the same issuance to the terms of a
restructuring agreement. The requirements regarding private sector involvement
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(PSI) have been watered down, however, compared to the initial proposal dated
October 2010 and the first draft text of the treaty. Policymakers have repeatedly
stressed that the Greek case is unique and exceptional, potentially signalling
that other member states would not be forced to restructure their debts. This
is also reflected by the fact that the provision regarding PSI has been moved
from an operative article in the first version of the treaty to a recital in the
recently signed treaty (European Council, Factsheet, 2.2.2012). The passage now
states that in “accordance with IMF practice, in exceptional cases an adequate
and proportionate form of private sector involvement shall be considered”, which
suggests less automaticity than originally envisioned.
3.2.3 Orderly debt restructuring: an overview
History has shown that sovereign defaults are not extraordinary events (Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2009). Among the Eurozone members, for example, Austria, Greece,
Germany, Portugal, Italy and Spain have defaulted at least once since 1824
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2007). In the model, the term ‘default’ refers
to “every form of non-compliance with the original terms of the debt contract,
including repudiation, standstill, moratorium, restructuring, rescheduling of
interest or principal repayment” (Buiter and Rahbari, 2010). Remarkably, default
becomes an even more pressing issue in the context of a monetary union since
countries can no longer revert to inflation, leaving default as an attractive option
to substantially reduce their burden of debt (Gianviti et al., 2010). While the
Paris Club and the London Club negotiate debt restructuring agreements for
official bilateral debt and syndicated bank loans respectively, there are currently
no provisions for the case where debt is held by bondholders. Due to the ever
increasing role of sovereign debt bond markets, the IMF tried to close this
loophole almost a decade ago with its proposal of a sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism.
The purpose of such a mechanism is to “facilitate the orderly, predictable, and
rapid restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt, while protecting assets values
and creditors’ rights” (Krueger, 2002). Orderly and promptly debt restructuring
lowers the costs of defaulting significantly, thus leaving “more on the table for
creditors and debtors” (Gianviti et al., 2010). The mechanism attempts to solve
two classic co-ordination problems which have been identified in the context
of sovereign defaults, namely the creditor grab race and the holdout problem
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(Gianviti et al., 2010; Thomas, 2004). Even before default occurs, a grab race
might arise when creditors rush to the exit by selling off their bonds, thereby
driving down bond prices and causing other creditors to follow suit. The holdout
problem refers to a situation where, ex post, a minority of creditors refuses to
accept the restructuring agreement, hoping to be bought out in full by the other
bondholders. Moreover, as seen in the case of Argentina which defaulted in 2001,
lengthy and disorderly debt restructuring can take a high toll on the country’s
economy. Insolvency procedures, by contrast, can minimise the costs of disruption
to the economy (Thomas, 2004). From the creditors’ perspective, orderly debt
restructuring is also less harmful than a lengthy process since bondholders can at
least retrieve some of their investment without costly litigation or delays. Finally,
insolvency procedures stabilise expectations of financial market participants,
thereby preventing costly speculation (Hüther, 2010; Sinn and Carstensen, 2010).
The sovereign debt literature distinguishes between the contractual approach
which embodies procedures to deal with insolvency in debt contracts, and the
statutory approach which spells out procedures in domestic or international law,
thus binding the parties (Gianviti et al., 2010). Both approaches, however, suffer
from shortcomings. While the contractual solution in the form of collective action
clauses, for example, is seen to be more market-friendly and easier to implement
than its counterpart, it only applies to individual bond classes. The statutory
regime, by contrast, enables aggregation across all creditors’ claims and prevents
the transition problem which occurs when some bonds carry CACs and others do
not (Roubini, 2002; Gianviti et al., 2010). Roubini (2010), however, points out
that there might be an easier way to solve the underlying co-ordination problem
in debt restructuring, namely using unilateral bond exchange offers which allow
investors to swap their bonds for new ones with different payment features.
While the IMF proposal failed to gain support, the implementation of a
European debt restructuring mechanism looks more promising since the EU
already has a common legal framework which interferes with national sovereignty
(Gianviti et al., 2010). By including CACs in bonds from 2013, the current
proposal takes a less statutory and more contractual approach. Following the
literature, the model assumes that orderly default reduces the costs of default
for both sides. This assumption is very general so that it does not matter which
mechanism will finally be adopted by the Eurozone.
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3.3 The benchmark model
3.3.1 Model set-up: public debt, liquidity, solvency and default
Creditors’ roll-over decisions are modelled as a collective action problem, using a
global game framework. In the model, default is triggered by short-term creditors
failing to co-ordinate and is thus precipitated by a liquidity crunch. As a result,
a bondholder might decline to roll over her claim, fearing premature foreclosure
by other creditors, although the debtor country is effectively solvent. The
relationship between liquidity, solvency and default is discussed in the following.
Public debt: The debtor country issues both long-term and short-term
sovereign debt. It has to pay interest L on its outstanding long-term loans.
Moreover, the amount S of the country’s short-term debt, which matures
instantly, has to be refinanced. If short-term creditors decline to roll over their
claims, the country must fund this gap and repay these maturing loans. As a
result, the immediate funding requirement of the country is given by:
L+ `S, (3.1)
where ` denotes the proportion of short-term creditors who decline to roll over.
It is assumed that the government debt S is held by a continuum of short-term
creditors.
Liquidity: The country’s liquid assets, denoted by θ, reflect its ability to
service its debt, where θ is the realisation of a normally distributed random
variable with mean y and precision α:
θ ∼ N
(




The mean of the distribution is determined by the underlying strength of the
economy as well as by the country’s economic policies which aim at increasing
its ability to repay its creditors. Whereas φ represents the soundness of the
underlying economic fundamentals regardless of any measures taken by the
country’s government, e can be interpreted as political adjustment effort. The
latter can take the form of austerity measures comparable to those which have
been implemented by countries across Europe to tackle their problematic public
finances. Austerity, however, is painful for the countries so that effort is costly.
Solvency: A country is considered to be solvent, or fundamentally sound in
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the terminology of Morris and Shin (2006), if the available cash θ suffices to cover
the interest payment L on outstanding long-term debt:
L ≤ θ. (3.2)
Countries with high amounts of cash, i.e. θ > L + S, are not in danger of
defaulting. For intermediate levels of θ, namely L < θ < L+S, the co-ordination
problem of short-term creditors might trigger default. If all creditors roll over
(` = 0), the country has to repay interest on long-term debt L only. For positive
`, by contrast, the country also has to fund maturing short-term debt S. If
the amount of creditors who foreclose is sufficiently high, the country might not
be able to fund the gap and consequently defaults. In the following, the debt
payments L and S are normalised so that
L = 0 and L+ S = 1.
φ, e and θ are normalised accordingly. Note that this implies that a country is
considered to be solvent if θ ≥ 0.
Bailouts and default: If a supranational institution such as the European
Union can credibly commit to its no-bailout policy, the debtor country defaults
if θ is too small to repay the fraction ` of creditors who foreclose. If the EU bails
out a member country in case of financial distress, by contrast, the latter defaults
if its overall resources consisting of domestic funds θ and the bailout, denoted by
m, do not suffice to meet the funding gap which arises as a result of short-term
creditors refusing to roll over their claims. Consequently, using the normalisation
above, the country defaults if, and only if
θ +m < `. (3.3)
In the model, default is thus linked to a potential liquidity crunch, with long-term
creditors playing no active role. As solvency problems do not trigger default,




Creditors can choose between rolling over their claims or investing in a safe asset
whose gross return is equal to 1. The payoff of a creditor who decides to roll over,
however, is uncertain. If the country does not default on its debt, the creditor
receives a return of R > 1. The difference R− 1 can therefore be interpreted as a
risk premium. In case of default, creditors have to write off their debt completely
and thus receive a payoff of zero. To summarise, the payoff to rolling over is given
by:
w(θ,m, `) ≡
R if θ +m ≥ ` No default0 if θ +m < ` Default. (3.4)
Note that the a priori probability of default is Prob(θ+m < `) and that creditors
consider rolling over their claims if Prob(θ +m > `)R ≥ 1.
In the global game framework of the model, creditors also observe private noisy
signals about θ. Creditor i’s signal is given by:







where εi is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and precision β.
For i 6= j, the noise terms εi and εj are independent.
3.3.2.2 The debtor country
The debtor country chooses e so as to maximise its payoff. The decision whether
to implement austerity measures involves a trade-off. On the one hand, exerting
effort to tackle the country’s public finances might stave off default so that the
country’s output, given by Yd, is positive. Defaulting, by contrast, entails an
output loss and the country’s output is normalised to zero in this case. In a
sense, this output loss reflects the costs of defaulting. On the other hand, austerity
measures are associated with painful economic adjustment and thus come with a
cost, denoted by c(e). The latter is an increasing convex function which means
that the marginal costs are increasing in e. For simplicity, c(e) = e2 will be
assumed throughout the chapter. In the model, effort can be understood as a
costly way of shifting resources to the government. Public sector spending cuts,
for example, free up resources, thereby making it easier for the government to
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service its debt. While austerity measures improve the country’s ability to repay
its creditors and might thus avert a debt crisis, exerting effort does not boost
overall output in the no-default state.10 To sum up, the country’s payoff is given
by:
ud(θ,m, `) =
Yd − c(e) No default−c(e) Default. (3.6)
3.3.2.3 The European Union (EU)
The modelling of the EU’s payoff function differs from the approach taken in
Morris and Shin (2006). In their framework, the IMF can credibly commit to
providing assistance if the country is fundamentally sound, i.e. if θ ≥ 0. This
policy is credible as the IMF is ultimately interested in being repaid in the long
run. The EU, by contrast, is a federation and has to reconcile the interests of
all member states. As a result, the assumption that the EU only intervenes at
intermediate levels of θ is dropped. Instead, drawing on the literature of fiscal
federalism, the EU maximises the welfare of the entire federation and thus takes
into account both the welfare of the debtor country (ud) and the welfare of the rest
of the federation (Yf ). Throughout the crisis, policymakers have been concerned
about the risk of contagion triggered by a country’s default as European banks
are still heavily exposed to peripheral debt. While the model does not explicitly
distinguish between debt held by creditors abroad and within the EU, the idea
that the default of a member state generates negative spillover effects on other
countries is taken into account by assuming that averting a crisis benefits the
federation. This benefit, denoted by us, enters the EU’s payoff function and
can be thought of as macroeconomic stability. In a sense, us thus reflects the
extent to which the country’s debt is held by EU nationals, banks or insurance
companies. Since the EU budget is relatively small compared to the size of the
union11, the bailout has to be funded by the other member countries, i.e. the
European taxpayers, in effect implementing a horizontal reallocation mechanism.
As a result, the welfare of the rest of the federation (Yf ) is lowered by the amount
of the bailout m.
Following Morris and Shin (2006), it is assumed that m is not recovered by
10Morris and Shin (2006) show that the qualitative results do not change if exerting effort improves
the country’s fundamentals and generates additional benefits irrespective of crisis prevention.
11 In 2012, the EU budget amounts to ¤147.2 billion or 1.12 per cent of the EU’s GNI. See also
Oates (2002) on the EU’s budgetary powers.
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the EU even in the case of no default which implies that m represents a cash
payment from the EU to the debtor country rather than a loan or a guarantee.
While the assumption that the cash transfer m is never recovered drives the
results of the model, it can be justified on economic and modelling grounds. If
the bailout was completely repaid and hence costless in the case of no default,
i.e. m = 0 in the first line of (3.7), the EU would always bail out member
states as EU welfare would always be higher in the no-default scenario. In such
a set-up, bailouts would be potentially infinite and the bailout decision would be
unrelated to the country’s economic fundamentals. In reality, however, taxpayers
are unlikely to support unlimited bailouts so that the size of the financial support
is restricted. Assuming that bailouts generate a positive cost in the no-default
case puts an upper bound on the size of the bailout.12 There is also a purely
economic argument for this assumption as loans to debtors under the EFSF/ESM
have been repeatedly amended, either by extending maturities or by lowering
interest rates, suggesting that bailouts are costly even if they are officially ‘repaid’.
Finally, as pointed out by Buiter and Sibert (2005), the ECB’s treatment of
collateral used in its open market operations represents an empirical example of
a transfer to a non-defaulting debtor country.
If the debtor country does not default, EU welfare amounts to the sum of
the benefit from preserving macroeconomic stability and the welfare of both the
debtor country and the rest of the federation. In case of default, us is normalised
to zero. The EU’s welfare function is thus given by:
W (θ,m, `) =
Yd − c(e) + Yf −m+ us No default−c(e) + Yf −m Default. (3.7)
In the following, the welfare of the federation in the case of no default and default
are denoted by WND and WD respectively.
3.3.3 Timing of the model
The sequence of moves and the information available at each point of the game
can be summarised as follows:
12For simplicity, it is assumed here that the costs of the bailout are the same no matter whether
the country defaults or not. The main results of the analysis would also go through if the costs
differed under the default and no-default scenarios, e.g. if the cost in the no-default case were
a fraction of the cost in the default scenario (mn compared to m).
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1. Nature draws the fundamentals φ capturing the economic strength of the
debtor country. The fundamentals are common knowledge among all
players.13
2. Based on its knowledge of the fundamentals, the debtor country chooses
its effort e. Once chosen, the expected ability of the country to service its
debt, y = φ+ e, is common knowledge among all.
3. Based on the country’s expected ability to service its debt, the EU chooses
whether and to what extent to provide financial assistance to the debtor
country. The size of the bailout m is common knowledge among all.
4. Nature draws θ from a normal density with mean y and precision α. None
of the players observes the true realisation of θ.
5. In addition to the publicly known variables φ, e and m, each short-term
creditor i receives a noisy signal xi. Based on this information, each
short-term creditor decides whether to roll over her claim or not.
6. Default occurs if, and only if, the country does not have sufficient funds to
pay the proportion ` of short-term creditors who decline to roll over, i.e. if
θ +m < `.
3.3.4 Results
3.3.4.1 Roll-over decision and θ∗
The creditors’ subgame, which begins with Nature’s draw of θ, is solved employing
the global game methodology developed by Morris and Shin (2006, 2004).
Switching strategies: A strategy is a function specifying an action, i.e.
rolling over or not, for each possible private signal xi. Attention is confined
to equilibria in switching strategies, meaning that a short-term creditor rolls over
her claim whenever her estimate of the country’s liquid assets θ exceeds some
given threshold level. Assuming that only creditor i observes her signal while β
is common knowledge, the posterior distribution of θ is normal with mean ξi and











13Note that in the model with insolvency procedures presented in section 3.4, the orderly debt
restructuring mechanism is chosen prior to stage 1.
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Creditors who use switching strategies have a switching point ξ for their switching
strategies and roll over their claim if, and only if, the private signal x exceeds the
following threshold:





Critical value θ∗:14 The equilibrium can be described by the critical threshold
level θ∗ above which the country avoids default since a sufficient number of
creditors decide to roll over their claims. The country is on the brink of
default when its overall resources just suffice to meet the funding gap, i.e. when
θ + m = `. The proportion of creditors who foreclose (`) is tantamount to the
mass of creditors who have observed a signal below the marginal signal x. As the
creditors’ signals are independent, ` equals the probability that a single player
receives a signal below x so that ` = Φ(
√
β(x − θ∗)), where Φ(·) represents the
cumulative distribution function for the standard normal. The first equation
which determines θ∗ is thus given by:
θ∗ +m = `
θ∗ +m = Φ(
√
β(x− θ∗))










The fact that a creditor is indifferent between investing in a safe asset and
rolling over at the switching point ξ is used in order to derive the second equation
that determines θ∗. The country does not default whenever θ ≥ θ∗. Recall that
the conditional density over θ is normal with mean ξ and precision α+ β so that
the probability that the country avoids default is given by 1−Φ(
√
α + β(θ∗−ξ)).


















14This proof follows Morris and Shin (2006).
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Equations (3.9) and (3.10) are used in order to solve for the two unknowns θ∗
and ξ. Solving for θ∗ gives:














This expression which implicitly defines the critical θ∗ is the intersection of a
straight line of slope 1 with intercept m and a cumulative normal distribution










Uniqueness: The equilibrium described by θ∗ is unique if the slope of the right
hand side of equation (3.11), which is given by ϕ α√
β
, is less than 1 everywhere,
where ϕ denotes the density of the standard normal evaluated at the appropriate
point. As ϕ ≤ 1√
2π







This condition, which is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a
unique dominance-solvable equilibrium, holds whenever the private signals are
sufficiently accurate as compared to the underlying uncertainty captured by α.15
Limiting case: In order to maintain tractability, the analysis focuses on the
limiting case when private signals of the short-term creditors become very precise
(β → ∞). Even though the private signals now almost perfectly reveal the true
state of the country’s ability to service its debt, strategic uncertainty persists
since each creditor is still uncertain about the actions of the other short-term





Consequently, the EU can prevent default by providing assistance if θ < 1
R
. Let
r∗ be the critical amount of overall resources necessary to stave off default, that
is r∗ = θ∗ +m. The country thus defaults if r < 1
R
.
3.3.4.2 The EU’s commitment problem
The EU chooses the size of the bailout m so as to maximise the expected welfare
of the entire federation. When determining m, the EU knows that θ is normally
15According to Morris and Shin (2006), this condition is also sufficient for the existence of a
unique equilibrium in any class of strategies.
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distributed with mean y = φ + e and precision α, where φ and e are common
knowledge. Moreover, the EU anticipates the critical value θ∗ at which the
country is on the brink of default. Recalling equation (3.7), the federation’s
expected welfare becomes:




























where θ∗ = 1
R
−m, the solution of the creditors’ subgame, is substituted in the
last line.
Limiting case: In order to obtain an explicit solution for the EU’s subgame,
the model is simplified by taking the limit as α → ∞. With the ex ante
distribution of θ becoming a degenerate spike around its mean y, the EU’s
information serves as a good indicator for the true state of the country’s ability
to service its debt. As a result, the EU’s expected welfare boils down to:
W (θ,m, `) =
Yd − c(e) + Yf −m+ us if y > 1R −m−c(e) + Yf −m if y ≤ 1R −m.
For y > 1
R
, the country is sufficiently liquid and not in danger of defaulting.
There is consequently no need for EU intervention and m is equal to zero. More
interestingly, for y < 1
R
, which implies that the country might be facing a
liquidity crunch, the EU can stave off default by providing financial assistance.
The European Union intervenes if the benefits to the entire federation of doing
so outweigh the costs of the bailout. The EU thus bails out the country if
∆W = WND−WD ≥ 0. This is true if the benefit from preserving macroeconomic
stability, us, is sufficiently large or if m and hence the cost to the European
taxpayer is relatively small. In this case, the EU chooses m so as to just avert
default, i.e. m is set to satisfy y = 1
R
−m. If the costs surpass the benefits, by
contrast, m is set equal to zero. As a result, the bailout function amounts to:
m(e) '




Using (3.15) to determine ∆W and taking e as given at this stage of the game,
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the EU provides assistance if:
∆W = Yd − e2 + Yf −m+ us − Yf + e2 ≥ 0
Yd + us −
1
R
+ φ+ e ≥ 0




The size of the bailout ( 1
R
−φ− e) is thus restricted by the gains from preventing
a sovereign debt crisis (Yd + us). The latter can also be interpreted as the EU’s
maximum willingness to pay.
To summarise, the optimal size of m is similar to the bailout function derived
in Morris and Shin (2006) and is given by:
m∗ '
 1R − φ− e if Yd + us ≥ 1R − φ− e0 if Yd + us < 1R − φ− e or y ≥ 1R . (3.16)
Note that the conditions under which the EU provides assistance to the debtor
country differ from Morris and Shin (2006), reflecting the potential commitment
problem of the EU. Whereas the IMF can credibly commit not to bail out a
country which is fundamentally unsound (y < 0), the EU intervenes if it is
beneficial for the entire federation, irrespective of any solvency issues (∆W ≥ 0).
As a result, bailouts occur more often since the range of fundamentals for which
the EU provides financial assistance increases compared to Morris and Shin
(2006). Moreover, the EU’s willingness to pay is relatively higher, implying that
the maximum bailout available to countries is larger in the current set-up.
3.3.5 Debtor country moral hazard
The debtor country chooses effort so as to maximise its expected payoff. The
assumption that α is large is maintained throughout this section. The country
anticipates European intervention whenever Yd + us ≥ 1R − φ − e. The country
also knows that default occurs for y < 1
R
if the EU does not provide assistance.
The payoff function of the debtor country consequently becomes:
ud(θ,m, `) =
Yd − e2 if Yd + us ≥ 1R − φ− e or y ≥ 1R−e2 if Yd + us < 1R − φ− e or y < 1R . (3.17)
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When deciding on the optimal e, the country faces a trade-off. On the one hand,
effort is costly and the country is therefore incentivised to minimise e. If the
country anticipates default, it will put in no effort, generating a payoff of zero. In
the case of no default, the country is willing to adopt painful austerity measures
if the resulting net gain is sufficiently high, or, more precisely, if
Yd − e2 ≥ 0.





On the other hand, painful austerity policies can stave off default by triggering
a European bailout. Similar to Morris and Shin (2006), the choice of effort
is determined relative to the soundness of the economic fundamentals φ. The
relationship between e, φ and m is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
For φ ≥ 1
R
, the country’s economy is sufficiently sound to rule out a sovereign
default. In this interval, it is neither necessary for the country to put in any effort
nor for the EU to intervene. For φ < 1
R
, however, the EU bails out the debtor
country if the benefits to the federation outweigh the costs. If the economy
is relatively strong, the country can completely externalise its costs onto the
European taxpayer and exert no effort, knowing that the stakes are too high for
the federation. Recalling the EU’s maximum willingness to pay, the maximum
available bailout equals the gains of staving off default. The critical threshold φ
below which a bailout becomes too costly for the EU, assuming that the country




− us − Yd. (3.18)
For φ < φ < 1
R
, the bailout is chosen according to (3.16) and e = 0 which is the
typical moral hazard result.
If the fundamentals are too weak, by contrast, meaning that φ < φ, the country
is incentivised to contribute to the bailout. Otherwise, the EU would not provide
financial assistance since the size of the bailout exceeds its maximum willingness
to pay. By exerting effort, the country can lower the costs of a bailout for a given









e = 0e = 0e > 0e = 0
m = 0m = m∗m = Yd + usm = 0
default no default
Figure 3.3: Relationship between e, m and φ in the benchmark
chooses e to solve Yd + us =
1
R
− φ − e subject to the condition that e ≤ emax.
The threshold φ below which it is too costly for the country to adopt austerity




− us − Yd −
√
Yd. (3.19)
For φ < φ < φ, effort is consequently positive and European financial assistance
is at its maximum. The country’s optimal effort as a function of the fundamentals
can now be summarised as:
e∗ =
 1R − us − Yd − φ if φ < φ < φ0 otherwise. (3.20)
Effort is thus maximised when φ = φ and is linearly decreasing in φ. Note
that default only occurs for φ < φ. If the EU can credibly commit to its
no-bailout policy (m = 0), by contrast, the critical value of φ below which the
country defaults is given by 1
R
− emax. Compared to a world without European
intervention, default is consequently prevented for a larger range of fundamentals,
thereby making default less likely. If countries face a liquidity crunch, a bailout
might indeed be efficient. The EU, however, is also more likely to support a
country whose fundamentals are so weak that it is considered insolvent. In
comparison to Morris and Shin (2006), moral hazard is more severe since the
range of φ for which the country exerts no effort is larger than in their model.
Moreover, countries are less likely to default in the current set-up, suggesting that
too few countries restructure their debts due to the EU’s lack of commitment.
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3.4 Orderly debt restructuring
In the benchmark model, the EU cannot credibly commit to its no-bailout policy
as stated in Article 125 of the TFEU if the financial distress of one member
country threatens the macroeconomic stability of the entire Eurozone, i.e. when
us is large. As a result, sovereign default does not occur in equilibrium unless the
country’s fundamentals are extremely weak. In order to mitigate this commitment
problem, Eurozone leaders have recently signed the ESM Treaty which establishes
a permanent mechanism to resolve future sovereign debt crises. The ESM also
provides for orderly debt restructuring to ensure that private creditors bear a
part of the burden of future bailouts. This section incorporates the proposed
insolvency mechanism into the benchmark model.
3.4.1 Modification of players’ payoff functions
In the following, the players’ payoff functions are modified in order to model the
impact of an orderly debt restructuring mechanism. The latter is determined
before the value of the fundamentals is known so that it cannot be tailored to a
particular φ. All other assumptions remain unchanged.
In the benchmark model, EU intervention staves off default, thereby benefitting
both creditors and debtors at the expense of the European taxpayer. As sovereign
default does not occur in equilibrium unless fundamentals are extremely weak,
default risk is eliminated for a large range of fundamentals so that creditors in
effect receive R. These adverse incentives resulted in countries such as Germany
and Greece paying similar interest rates on their long-term debt, albeit differing in
their fundamentals. Introducing insolvency procedures renders sovereign default
possible and might overcome the inconsistency of the European framework which
previously ruled out default, exit and bailout (Münchau, 2010). As a result,
creditors have to shoulder some of the costs of future bailouts. Bondholders,
however, also benefit from an orderly debt restructuring mechanism. In case
of disorderly sovereign default, creditors often have to write off their claim
completely. Under the proposed insolvency procedures, bondholders can retrieve
a fixed fraction z of their investment even if the country defaults. Off the
equilibrium path, the payoff function to rolling over thus becomes more profitable
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compared to the benchmark scenario since the costs of default are lowered:
wI(θ,m, `) ≡
R if θ +m ≥ ` No defaultzR if θ +m < ` Default, (3.21)
where 0 < z < 1 and zR < 1.
The debtor country is also better off under insolvency procedures, taking
into account that there is “money on the table for both creditors and debtors”
(Gianviti et al., 2010). If the country defaults, a fraction of its debt will be
forgiven, and output, denoted by E, is positive. The country’s modified payoff
function is given by:
ud(θ,m, `) =
Yd − c(e) No defaultE − c(e) Default, (3.22)
where Yd > E > 0. Note that z and E are partially interdependent and thus
determine, at least to some extent, how costs are split between debtor and
creditors. Similar to the benchmark, the difference Yd − E captures the costs
of defaulting. The parameter E consequently reflects the amount of debt relief
granted to the country, which depends on z, as well as indirect costs unrelated to
z, such as the loss of access to capital markets and lawyers’ fees. For analytical
purposes, z and E are treated as independent parameters.
The fact that the debtor country receives debt relief in the case of default is
taken into account in the EU’s welfare function which is modified as follows:
WI(θ,m, `) =
Yd − c(e) + Yf −m+ us No defaultE − c(e) + Yf −m Default. (3.23)
Note that the modelling of insolvency procedures entails more automaticity than
suggested in the ESM Treaty. Whereas the treaty envisages dealing with debtor
countries on a case-by-case basis, the model assumes a generic debt restructuring
mechanism for all debtor countries.
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3.4.2 Results
3.4.2.1 Roll-over decision and θ∗








in the limit β → ∞. This implies that the critical amount of overall resources




1−z . Compared to the benchmark,
this critical amount decreases since r∗I < r
∗. Intuitively, as rolling over becomes
more profitable for creditors, due to the positive payoff in case of default,
bondholders are more likely to roll over their claims under insolvency procedures.
More generally, the higher the return to rolling over in case of default, the lower
will be the critical amount of overall resources needed to stave off default, as
stated by the following lemma:









This effect, dubbed the critical threshold effect, also impacts the
decision-making by both the EU and the debtor country.
3.4.2.2 The EU’s commitment problem
Solving for the EU’s bailout function in the limiting case proceeds similarly to
the benchmark scenario. Anticipating θ∗I and taking the limit as α → ∞, the
EU’s payoff function boils down to:
WI(θ,m, `) =














1−z but the EU bails out the
country if ∆WI ≥ 0 in which case m is chosen such that default is just averted.
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Taking e as given and using the solution for mI to determine ∆WI , the EU
intervenes if
∆WI = Yd − e2 + Yf −mI + us − E − Yf + e2 ≥ 0,
which simplifies to





+ φ+ e ≥ 0










1−z − φ − e
)
is
limited by the benefits from staving off default (Yd+us−E). Comparing the EU’s
maximum willingness to pay with the benchmark, it turns out that insolvency
laws have an ambiguous effect on the EU’s incentives. On the one hand, the
debt relief granted to the debtor country, captured by E, reduces the net gain of
the bailout, thereby lowering the benefits from preventing default. As a result,
it becomes more difficult for a country to trigger a bailout. On the other hand,
recalling Lemma 3.1, r∗I is decreasing in z so that the size of the bailout which
is required to stave off default falls. A smaller bailout, however, is less costly,
thereby making EU intervention more likely. Whether the EU’s commitment
problem is mitigated by introducing insolvency procedures thus depends on the
relative sizes of these opposing effects. The net effect on the EU’s ability to
commit will be discussed in more detail once the country’s optimal choice of
effort has been determined.
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3.4.3 Debtor country moral hazard
Following the approach of the benchmark analysis, the country foresees a




1−z − φ − e. The modified payoff
function of the debtor country is given by:
ud(θ,m, `) =



















Interestingly, granting debt relief in case of default limits the country’s output
loss, thereby lowering its maximum willingness to exert effort. When anticipating
default, the country does not put in any effort and receives a payoff of E.
Consequently, the country adopts austerity measures if
Yd − e2 ≥ E.




Note that emaxI < e
max since the country is now better off in the case of default.
Using a similar diagram as in the benchmark, Figure 3.4 depicts effort and




1−z , default can
be ruled out due to the strength of the country’s economy so that both m and
e are equal to zero. As stated in Lemma 3.1, introducing insolvency procedures
lowers the critical amount of overall resources necessary to avoid default. The
critical threshold effect is illustrated in Figure 3.4. The range of fundamentals for
which φ is so strong that there is no danger of default increases compared to the













where the lower bound is determined by the EU’s maximum willingness to pay






− us − Yd + E. (3.28)
In this interval, the benefits of the bailout to the federation surpass the costs
even if the country does not exert any effort. The EU thus chooses m according














e = 0e = 0e > 0e = 0
m = 0m = m∗m = Yd + us − Em = 0
default no default
Figure 3.4: Relationship between e, m and φ in the insolvency law regime
than in the benchmark due to the reduction in net gains and the lower critical
threshold of overall resources.
For sufficiently low φ, the country is incentivised to exert effort in order to
lower the costs of the bailout and make intervention profitable for the EU. As




1−z −φ− e subject
to the condition e ≤ emaxI . The threshold below which effort becomes too costly






− us − Yd + E −
√
Yd − E. (3.29)
For φI < φ < φI , the debtor country puts in effort and financial assistance







1−z − us − Yd + E − φ if φI < φ < φI
0 otherwise.
(3.30)
Focusing on the level of effort only, the impact of insolvency procedures is
ambiguous. On the one hand, a lower critical threshold r∗I requires less effort to
stave off default for a given φ so that effort is lower compared to the benchmark.
On the other hand, externalising the costs onto the European taxpayer becomes
more difficult since the net benefit to the federation is reduced by E. In order to
offset this effect and to trigger a bailout, the country consequently needs to exert
more effort for a given φ. Again, the net effect of the insolvency mechanism is
determined by the relative sizes of these opposing effects.
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3.5 How effective are insolvency procedures?
Proponents of orderly sovereign debt restructuring argue that insolvency
proceedings can relieve the European taxpayer and mitigate the moral hazard
problems which are embedded in the current European framework. In order to
assess these arguments and to examine the impact on EU welfare, the effects of
insolvency procedures on m, e and W are examined by comparing the benchmark
with the insolvency law scenario. When doing this, the size of the bailout, the
level of effort and the effect on welfare have to be analysed in relation to the
fundamentals φ.
Assume first that the effect resulting from E, termed the credit relief effect, is
sufficiently large so that the following condition holds:














In the following, three cases are distinguished, depending on the size of
the credit relief effect and the default threshold under insolvency laws, φI .
Anticipating some of the results, Table 3.2 provides a brief overview of the welfare
effects of orderly debt restructuring. Irrespective of the parameter configuration,
insolvency laws improve EU welfare if the fundamentals are so weak that the
country defaults (φ < φI) or if the country’s economy is sufficiently strong
(φ > φI). If fundamentals fall into the intermediate range [φI , φI ], however,
the welfare effects hinge on the model’s parameters as insolvency laws are
welfare-improving in case C but yield ambiguous welfare results in the other cases.
This is due to the differing impact of the bankruptcy regime on the country’s effort
decision: while insolvency procedures lower incentives to put in effort in case C,
the country might be incentivised to exert ‘too much’ effort in the other cases.16
For insolvency laws to be welfare-enhancing in those cases, a ‘strong’ bankruptcy
regime should be implemented, meaning that the amount of debt relief granted
to the debtor country has to be sufficiently large. Such a bankruptcy regime
would restrict the size of the bailout and encourage insolvent countries to default
rather than to exert ultimately wasteful effort, thus improving EU welfare for
16 In case B, the country is only incentivised to exert more effort compared to the benchmark for
fundamentals relatively close to the default threshold φI . Otherwise, effort tends to be lower







φ ∈ [φI , φI ]
‘Strong’
φ > φI
A: Condition 3.1 holds WI > W WI ≷W WI ≥W
B: Condition 3.1 violated
and φI < φ
WI > W WI ≷W WI ≥W
C: Condition 3.1 violated
and φI > φ
WI > W WI > W WI ≥W
Table 3.2: Welfare Effects of Insolvency Procedures
intermediate fundamentals.
Having outlined the main welfare results, each of the three cases is now analysed
in more detail, starting with case A. If condition 3.1 is satisfied, it follows that
φI > φ. Recall that e
max
I < e
max which implies that φI > φ. Figure 3.5 contrasts
the two regimes and depicts the effects of insolvency laws on financial assistance,
effort and welfare in relation to the strength of the economy.17 The upper line in
Figure 3.5 illustrates the benchmark case whereas the lower line shows the effects
of insolvency laws.
Comparing m under the two different regimes, it turns out that insolvency
proceedings can indeed mitigate the EU’s commitment problem by limiting
the size of the bailout. The European taxpayer, who has to fund the bailout
through taxation, will consequently be better off under the insolvency mechanism,








m is positive and determined by equation (3.16) whereas mI is equal to zero
due to the positive effect of insolvency procedures on the critical threshold of





Moreover, the credit relief effect restricts the EU’s maximum willingness to pay
under insolvency proceedings, resulting in lower bailouts for φI ≤ φ ≤ φI . Note
that mI = 0 for φ < φI since default is not averted. As has been pointed out
by critics of the mechanism, insolvency procedures therefore encourage default as
the range of fundamentals for which the country restructures its debt increases
in comparison to the benchmark.
The impact of insolvency procedures on effort is less obvious since moral hazard
is both encouraged and discouraged, depending on the country’s fundamentals.





















e = eI = 0e = eIe = eIe < eIe < eIe > eI
m = mI = 0m > mIm > mIm > mIm > mIm > mI
W = WIW < WIW < WIW ≶WIW ≶WIW < WI
default no default
default no default
Figure 3.5: Comparison of the two regimes if condition 3.1 holds
For φI ≤ φ ≤ φI , the country exerts more effort in the insolvency law regime
than in the benchmark so that moral hazard is reduced. Intuitively, as the net
gain to the federation is substantially lowered due to the relatively large E, the
country has to put in more effort for a given φ in order to trigger a bailout. At
the same time, if fundamentals are extremely weak (φ ≤ φ ≤ φI), the country
exerts no effort and defaults under insolvency laws, whereas it puts in effort in
the benchmark. Since the country is more likely to be insolvent if φ is very low,
this negative effect on effort is beneficial as insolvent countries are encouraged to
restructure their debts.
If the country’s economy is so strong that it does not require any financial
assistance (φ > 1
R
), EU welfare is the same under both regimes. Due to the




By encouraging default, insolvency procedures are also welfare-improving for
extremely low fundamentals. In the interval [φ, φI ], mI = 0 and the country exerts
no effort and defaults in the insolvency law regime so that welfare amounts to
WDI = Yf +E. In contrast to that, both m and e are positive in the benchmark,
with the EU providing maximal financial assistance. Exerting painful effort,
however, reduces welfare, and the benefits from staving off default are exactly
offset by the costs of the bailout. EU welfare is thus given by WND = Yf − e2
so that W < WI despite the fact that the country does not default in the
benchmark. Surprisingly, encouraging default thus improves EU welfare for this
range of fundamentals by preventing the country from exerting wasteful effort.
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For φI < φ < φI , by contrast, the effect on welfare is ambiguous since the
bailout is smaller but effort is higher under orderly debt restructuring. In this
interval, the welfare function under insolvency procedures is given by:
WNDI = Yd + Yf + us −mI − e2I









where the results for mI and eI were substituted in the second line. Comparing
this expression with the welfare function in the benchmark case does not yield
clear analytical results. In the interval [φ, φI ], benchmark welfare amounts to
WND = Yd + Yf + us − ( 1R − φ) whereas for φI < φ < φ, EU welfare is given by
WND = Yf−( 1R−us−Yd−φ)
2. Intuitively, for fundamentals close to the threshold
φI , welfare is likely to be higher under insolvency laws since eI is relatively small.
Compared to the costs of a large bailout m, a low level of effort eI is hence
relatively cheaper. As the country’s fundamentals get weaker and approach φI ,
however, exerting effort becomes more costly due to the increasing marginal costs,
thereby possibly surpassing the expenses of a large bailout m. This implies that
welfare might indeed be lower under insolvency laws, depending on the model’s
parameters. Numerical examples support this intuition, suggesting that in a
‘weak’ insolvency regime, in which z → 0 and E is sufficiently small18, insolvency
proceedings lower EU welfare for fundamentals close to the threshold φI .
The effects of insolvency procedures are not as straightforward, however, if
condition 3.1 is not met. This implies that φI < φ but the relation between the
other thresholds (φI , φ, φI) hinges on the parameters of the model. Assume first
that the latter are such that φI < φ. The impact on m, e and W depending on
φ is illustrated in Figure 3.6. As before, B stands for benchmark whereas I refers





1−z , the same reasoning applies as above. Similar to the case in which
condition 3.1 holds, the EU’s commitment problem is alleviated for a large range
of fundamentals. As the critical threshold r∗I is lower than in the benchmark,
the bailout which is required to stave off default is smaller so that m > mI for




1−z . Due to the credit relief effect which restricts the size of the bailout,
the EU also provides a smaller amount of financial assistance under insolvency
laws for φ ≤ φ ≤ φ, thereby relieving the European taxpayer. Interestingly, the




















e = eI = 0e = eIe = eIe > eIe > eIe < eI
m = mI = 0m > mIm > mIm > mIm > mIm < mI
W = WIW < WIW < WIW < WIW < WIW ≶WI
default no default
default no default
Figure 3.6: Comparison of the two regimes if condition 3.1 is violated and φI < φ
EU commits less under insolvency procedures if fundamentals are relatively low
(φI ≤ φ ≤ φ). Moreover, default is discouraged compared to the benchmark so
that the country receives maximal assistance under the insolvency mechanism
whereas m = 0.19
Again, the effects of insolvency proceedings on the country’s incentives are more
ambiguous. For φ ≤ φ ≤ φ, moral hazard is indeed aggravated. In the interval
[φI , φ], eI is equal to zero whereas the country exerts effort in the benchmark.
For φ ≤ φ ≤ φI , effort is positive in both regimes but less effort is required
under insolvency laws since r∗I is substantially lowered if condition 3.1 does not
hold. Since less effort and a smaller bailout are needed in the insolvency law
regime, EU welfare is enhanced for φ < φ < φ. Only for a very weak economy
do insolvency laws encourage effort in comparison to the benchmark. This might
not necessarily be beneficial, however, since the country is likely to be insolvent
rather than illiquid.
The welfare implications for extremely low fundamentals (φI < φ < φ) are
indeed ambiguous. As in the previous case, welfare in the insolvency law regime
is given by equation (3.31). Since the country defaults in the benchmark, welfare
amounts to WD = Yf . Intuitively, if the credit relief effect, which limits the size
of the bailout and boosts welfare, outweighs the costs associated with exerting
effort, insolvency proceedings are welfare-improving in this interval. In particular,
19Note that it is possible that φ > φI . In this case, the EU commits less under insolvency laws




















e = eI = 0e = eIe = eIe > eIe > eIe > eI
m = mI = 0m > mIm > mIm > mIm > mIm > mI
W = WIW < WIW < WIW < WIW < WIW < WI
default no default
default no default
Figure 3.7: Comparison of the two regimes if condition 3.1 is violated and φI > φ
if φ → φI , which implies that eI → emaxI , welfare in the insolvency law regime
approaches WNDI = Yf + 2E − Yd. Consequently, welfare under insolvency laws
would be higher than in the benchmark if 2E > Yd. This intuition is supported
by numerical examples.
The results look slightly different, however, if condition 3.1 is not met and
the model’s parameters imply that φI > φ. The effects on the bailout, the
country’s effort and EU welfare in relation to φ are shown in Figure 3.7. In
comparison to Figure 3.6, the results only change for φ < φ. Similar to Figure
3.5, the size of the bailout is restricted for φ ≤ φ ≤ φ due to both the credit
relief effect and the lower critical threshold of overall resources, thereby making
the European taxpayer better off. Interestingly, moral hazard is exacerbated in
this range (e > eI) since less effort is needed to stave off default but insolvency
procedures are still welfare-improving. Also, in the interval [φ, φI ], default is
encouraged compared to the benchmark, thereby forcing potentially insolvent
countries to restructure their debts.20
The following propositions summarise the main results of this section.
Proposition 3.1. If condition 3.1 is satisfied, insolvency procedures mitigate the
EU’s commitment problem but their effect on moral hazard is ambiguous. Effort is
encouraged for intermediate φ. If fundamentals are extremely weak, however, the
country exerts no effort and defaults while it does put in effort in the benchmark.












1−z ≤ φ ≤ φ, the results are given by e > eI , m > mI and W < WI .
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If condition 3.1 is violated, results hinge on the model’s parameters. If the latter
imply that φI < φ, insolvency laws discourage default and the EU’s commitment
problem is exacerbated for low fundamentals. If the parameters are such that
φI > φ, the debtor country exerts less effort for intermediate and low φ and
orderly debt restructuring encourages default.
Contrary to policymakers’ beliefs, insolvency procedures do not necessarily
discourage moral hazard. Instead, the debtor country exerts more or less effort
than in the benchmark, depending on the strength of the economy. The claim
that insolvency laws succeed in relieving the European taxpayer holds for all but
one range of fundamentals. Finally, an orderly debt restructuring mechanism
does not always encourage default, challenging another assertion made in the
policy literature. Rather, this statement is only true if condition 3.1 is satisfied.
Otherwise, default is either encouraged or discouraged, depending on the model’s
parameters. While a higher occurrence of debt restructuring is indeed beneficial,
the welfare implications of a lower frequency of sovereign defaults are not obvious.
Proposition 3.2. Focusing on the particular range of extremely weak
fundamentals for which default is encouraged in comparison to the benchmark,
EU welfare increases in the insolvency law regime although the country defaults.
Similarly, considering the interval for which default is averted compared to the
benchmark, EU welfare is either higher or lower under insolvency laws even
though default is averted.
Despite the negative effects associated with default such as output loss (Yd−E)
and loss of macroeconomic stability (us), it turns out that orderly default
enhances EU welfare for very weak fundamentals. Intuitively, this positive welfare
effect results from the fact that the EU provides a bailout in the benchmark
even though the country is potentially insolvent. This suggests that avoiding or
postponing restructuring is even more costly than an outright orderly default if
the country’s level of public debt is ultimately unsustainable. Since fundamentals
are extremely weak in this case, the benefits from staving off default are exactly
offset by the costs of the bailout so that there is no net benefit to the federation.
Also, adopting austerity measures is very costly to the point of being wasteful
due to the weakness of the economy. By comparison, both eI and mI are zero
for this interval under insolvency laws. Since the costs of providing financial
aid and exerting effort outweigh the costs of defaulting for extremely low φ,
the country is in fact better off restructuring its debt. Encouraging default
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via the implementation of insolvency procedures is consequently beneficial in
this particular range of fundamentals as it prevents the country from exerting
wasteful effort and the EU from providing an expensive bailout. In a sense, the
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism corrects the outcome of the benchmark
where too few countries default due to the EU’s commitment problem. For
intermediate levels of fundamentals, however, for which the country does not
default under either regime, an orderly debt restructuring mechanism does not
necessarily increase EU welfare.
Proposition 3.3. Compared to the benchmark, an orderly debt restructuring
mechanism is not always welfare-improving for all ranges of economic
fundamentals.
Disproving some arguments in the policy literature which describe orderly debt
restructuring as a panacea, insolvency procedures can lower EU welfare for some
ranges of fundamentals, depending on the model’s parameters.
3.6 Policy implications
The previous section has shown that an orderly debt restructuring mechanism
is not always beneficial in the sense that it simultaneously mitigates the EU’s
commitment problem, discourages moral hazard and enhances EU welfare. This
does not imply, however, that the EU’s approach to include private creditors in
future bailouts is flawed. The results suggest, rather, that insolvency procedures
need to be carefully designed to make sure that they bring about the positive
effects ascribed to them by the policy literature. The choice of the parameters
which determine the mechanism, namely E and z in the model, is thus crucial to
the success of an orderly default mechanism.
The major policy implication which can be derived from the model is that
a half-hearted debt restructuring mechanism fails to mitigate the commitment
and moral hazard problems embedded in the current EMU framework. Only a
‘strong’ insolvency mechanism which substantially lowers the costs of default for
both sides succeeds in accomplishing policymakers’ objectives, namely relieving
the European taxpayer, alleviating moral hazard and improving EU welfare. The
consequences for the design of the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism are as
follows. Firstly, insolvency procedures need to ensure that the amount of debt
relief granted to the debtor country is sufficiently large. Intuitively, if the credit
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relief effect is sufficiently strong, the net benefit to the federation of averting
default is significantly lowered. As a result, the EU’s maximum willingness to
pay drops, thereby reducing the size of the bailout and incentivising the country to
exert more effort for a given state of the economy. Secondly, the haircuts imposed
on creditors should be relatively subdued, i.e. z must be sufficiently large, in order
to guarantee that the positive effects on commitment and effort also translate into
higher welfare. Thirdly, taking into account the partial interdependence of the
size of the haircut and the extent of the debt relief, the mechanism needs to
provide for a fair distribution between debtors and creditors, trying to balance
the interests of both groups. This proposed design of a ‘strong’ mechanism is
not without problems. Distributional concerns aside, a very high level of debt
relief as captured by a large E lowers the maximum amount of effort that the
country is willing to exert. As a result, the range of fundamentals for which the
country puts in effort becomes very small, thereby notably raising the occurrence
of sovereign default. The higher frequency of defaults nevertheless enhances EU
welfare since it remedies the outcome of the benchmark where too few countries
restructure their debts as a result of the EU’s commitment problem.
If the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism only allows for a small amount
of debt relief as reflected by a low E, by contrast, countries might exert less effort
than in the benchmark, depending on the economic fundamentals. Here, two cases
need to be distinguished. In the first case, the model’s parameters imply that
default is discouraged under insolvency procedures. While the amount of debt
relief can still be chosen such that insolvency procedures are welfare-improving,
the EU’s commitment problem is exacerbated if fundamentals are extremely weak.
This design is consequently not beneficial to the European taxpayer, who has to
fund an even larger bailout under the insolvency mechanism, and should therefore
be rejected. An orderly debt restructuring mechanism with a small amount of
debt relief only seems sensible when the model’s parameters are such that default
is encouraged. In this case, the mechanism reduces the size of the bailout and
improves EU welfare. Effort, however, will be lower in this regime, thereby
aggravating the moral hazard problem. Policymakers might still endorse this
design for political economy reasons. If austerity measures are less painful, they
are more likely to be supported by the public in the respective debtor country.
Taking Greece as an example, this issue is very important as the government’s
announcements of austerity measures have regularly been followed by strikes and
public action. Furthermore, ‘too much’ austerity might impede economic growth
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so that the pressure on public finances will increase in the long run.
The chapter offers a stylised model which analyses the incentive effects of
orderly debt restructuring in the context of the EMU and suggests a way of
framing the policy debate. As with every model, the limitations of the modelling
strategy should be kept in mind. Firstly, for the sake of analytical tractability,
results are only discussed for the limiting case, thereby possibly ignoring insights
from the general solution away from the limit. Secondly, the model abstracts
from any effects of insolvency laws on interest rates since R, the creditors’ return
on their investment, is exogenous and the initial debt situation is taken as given.
The model therefore does not provide an answer to the point of criticism raised
by Trichet that the planned mechanism would potentially drive up interest rates
for heavily indebted countries. Finally, being a one shot game, the model misses
some of the dynamics characterising the situation in the Eurozone where all
players interact repeatedly and actions might have potential knock-on effects on
other countries in the bloc’s periphery. The chapter nevertheless represents a
good starting point for exploring the incentive effects of the planned insolvency
mechanism. In particular, it casts some doubts on the predominantly positive
attitude towards insolvency procedures in the policy literature which considers
them a panacea.
3.7 Epilogue: a happy ending?
Greece’s debt exchange offer closed on 8 March 2012. Investors holding 85.8 per
cent of bonds governed by Greek law agreed to participate in the swap. After the
Greek government invoked CACs, which had been inserted into the Greek-law
bonds retroactively, participation was increased to 95.7 per cent. Bondholders
accepted a 53.5 per cent reduction in the nominal face value of their bonds,
effectively writing off ¤106bn of Greek debt. With a total of ¤206bn owed to the
private sector, the Greek debt swap is the largest sovereign debt restructuring in
history and the first non-war related debt restructuring of an advanced economy.21
Nevertheless, the odds seem to be against a happy ending to the two-year long
Greek tragedy. The exchanged bonds are currently trading at distressed levels
comparable to those in autumn 2011. Even in the best case scenario, Greece’s
debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast to reach 117 per cent in 2020, a level which can
21The settlement for bonds governed by foreign law has not been completed yet. The total amount
of foreign-law bonds held by private investors is estimated at ¤18bn.
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still be considered unsustainable. The extent of the debt relief, despite being
substantial, is consequently likely to prove insufficient. El-Erian (2012) therefore
concludes that “the Greek debt drama has merely paused for an interval.” If
Greece has to restructure its debt again, which looks increasingly likely, it will be
more difficult to engineer a default, however. As the exchanged bonds are issued
under English law, the Greek government can no longer pass legislation to adjust
their terms, thus making them harder to restructure (El-Erian, 2012). Moreover,
official creditors will hold 75 per cent of Greek debt by 2014 so that a second Greek
default will be costly to the European taxpayer. Since the bailout programmes
effectively bought private creditors time to sell off their claims, Roubini (2012)
argues that “PSI came too little too late.” In a sense, the model supports this view
since a ‘weak’ insolvency mechanism, either in the form of delays or insufficient
debt relief, may result in less commitment and lower EU welfare.
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4 To be, or not to be: can a ‘closer union’ save the
Euro?
To be, or not to be, that is the question.
(Shakespeare, 1600)
4.1 Introduction
Two years into the Eurozone debt crisis, the Euro project seems to have reached
a critical juncture, with one path leading to enhanced political co-operation and
integration and the other leading to the potential dissolution of the Euro Area.
Although Eurozone membership is considered to be irreversible, the eventuality
of a break-up has been contemplated even before the single currency came into
existence in 1999. With French and German leaders breaking a taboo by openly
questioning Greece’s status in the monetary union following its announcement of
a referendum on the EU bailout, the threat of a Eurozone break-up has become
so real that businesses are reported to be drawing up contingency plans for
the collapse of the single currency. In order to restore confidence in the Euro
and to put an end to the sovereign debt crisis, European policymakers have
been looking into a comprehensive overhaul of the EU’s institutional structure
(European Council, 9.12.2011) and have recently signed the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, also known
as Fiscal Compact, which has been hailed as a major step towards enhanced fiscal
integration (European Council, 30.1.2012).
By putting institutional reform at the top of the political agenda, policymakers
have apparently subscribed to the conventional wisdom that solely a ‘closer union’
can save the Euro. This view is shared by many Euro critics who, drawing on the
theory of optimum currency areas developed by Mundell (1961), have repeatedly
argued that a monetary union is doomed to fail unless it is complemented by a
fiscal or a political union. There seems to be a growing consensus that confidence
in the single currency can only be restored by correcting the flaws inherent
in the EU’s institutional structure. Roubini (2011), for example, calls for the
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implementation of a fiscal union which includes larger central federal revenues
and the issuance of Eurobonds. De Grauwe (2010a) favours a political union with
a system of automatic solidarity or transfers between member states. The former
ECB president Trichet supports the creation of a European Treasury headed by
a European finance minister (Trichet, 2011). Some commentators, however, have
questioned the widespread belief that the answer to the crisis is “more Europe”
(Kay, 2011) and have drawn attention to the political aspects of the Eurozone’s
troubles. Against the backdrop of rising nationalism across Europe, Rachman
(2011) argues that instead of increasing solidarity, a political union is likely to
drive citizens further apart. Buiter and Rahbari (2011) believe that the Euro
Area’s electorate has no interest in political integration or the implementation of
a fiscal transfer system. Finally, Issing (2011) considers the attempt to save the
Euro via transferring national sovereignty to European institutions which are not
elected according to democratic principles as illogical, concluding that “it will
only further alienate the people from Europe itself”.
This chapter attempts to analyse the claim that closer integration can save
the Euro, using a simple political economy framework. The model compares
several institutional settings, namely the current “muddling through” scenario,
an orderly default mechanism as well as a fiscal and a political union set-up,
and contrasts their implications for the Eurozone’s stability and welfare. The
“muddling through” scenario serves as the benchmark for comparison so that
the model differs from the policy literature, which uses the no-bailout scenario
as the reference case against which to judge institutional reforms. The chapter
extends the framework by Dur and Staal (2008), who examine the incentives
of unequally sized districts to consolidate, in order to study European member
states’ incentives to secede. Building on the secession literature, the benefits
and costs of exiting the Euro Area are modelled, taking into account the
specifics of the current debt crisis. Since the economic impact of Eurozone
exit depends on the characteristics of the seceding state, the model distinguishes
between two types of countries, the core and the periphery. The core is made
up of creditor countries whose economies are based on exports. Secession is
likely to lead to an appreciation of the core’s new currency, thus depressing
income. Core countries are assumed to be in the majority, reflecting the fact
that they can dictate policies in return for cash. Periphery countries, by
contrast, are characterised by unsustainable levels of public debt and a lack of
competitiveness. For them, Eurozone exit can prove beneficial since the new
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currency is likely to depreciate, thereby boosting competitiveness and income.
The modelling approach thus departs from the secession literature which often
assumes symmetrical proportional income effects for all regions in case of exit
(see for example Bolton and Roland (1997)). Since the periphery might be better
off in autarky, it can credibly threaten to abandon the single currency and thus
extract transfers from the core. Finally, the chapter introduces peripheral debt
into the Dur and Staal (2008) framework in order to examine the effects of debt
accumulation on the Eurozone’s stability.
Interestingly, the model’s results cast some doubts on the conventional wisdom
that the Euro cannot survive without closer integration. In particular, the model
shows that the current “muddling through” scenario is not more prone to break-up
than the political or the fiscal union set-up. The political union is in fact less
stable than the status quo if countries are heterogeneous in their preferences for
public good provision, thus confirming the claims made by Rachman (2011) and
Issing (2011). Intuitively, in the political union, the core has to compensate
the periphery countries for imposing ‘German-style’ policies on them, making
bailouts potentially more expensive and rendering Eurozone exit attractive for
the core. By comparison, the stability implications of a fiscal union hinge on its
institutional design. A fiscal union with an explicit exit clause is as sustainable
as the status quo and yields the same welfare results. If the fiscal union is
irreversible, by contrast, the Eurozone tends to be more stable but EU welfare
is lower and voters in the periphery are unlikely to support the institutional
reform. Finally, Eurobonds, despite being advocated as a potential solution in
the policy literature, improve neither EU welfare nor the Eurozone’s stability.
This result can be explained by the fact that the current “muddling through”
scenario constitutes already, albeit implicitly, a debt or transfer union.
The model suggests that implementing an orderly default mechanism and
inserting an explicit exit clause into the European Treaties might prove more
effective in stabilising the Eurozone than far-reaching institutional reforms which
transfer more powers to Brussels. Allowing countries to default on their
debt within the monetary union weakens the periphery’s bargaining power and
prevents periphery countries from externalising their debts onto the core taxpayer,
thus alleviating moral hazard. Policymakers should therefore not water down
the requirements for private creditors of peripheral countries to suffer haircuts,
as initially envisaged by the European Stability Mechanism (European Council,
9.12.2011). While it seems counterintuitive that an exit clause increases the
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stability of the monetary union, this is a well-known result in the fiscal federalism
literature, going back to the seminal paper by Buchanan and Faith (1987).
Intuitively, granting countries the right to secede protects the minority and gives
the periphery a voice in the policymaking process, thereby re-establishing the
exit-voice mechanism (Meyer, 2010). A credible secession threat induces the
core to internalise the periphery’s interests, thus leading to the socially efficient
outcome. Interestingly, both policy recommendations only require minor treaty
changes, making them relatively easy to implement.
The chapter is closely related to the literature on the integration and separation
of states and regions adopting a political economy framework.1 In these types
of models, sovereign entities face a critical trade-off between the benefits of size
and the costs of reverting to autarky. While separation is usually associated with
policies that are closer to the preferences of the people, the benefits arising from
membership in a union or a nation state have been modelled in different ways.
First, membership in a union can prove beneficial since it provides insurance
against economic shocks (Fidrmuc, 2011). Second, being part of a union increases
the size of the local market as transaction costs between states are lowered
(Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). Third, union membership can generate efficiency
gains as regions benefit from economies of scale and a larger tax base which
reduces the per capita costs of public goods (Bolton and Roland, 1997; Dur and
Staal, 2008; Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). Finally, the centralisation of policies
on the union level can improve welfare as cross-country spillovers are internalised
(Alesina et al., 2005). Following the latter approach, this chapter models the
Euro Area as an economic union in which the core benefits from positive spillovers
induced by public good provision in the periphery.
While the policy literature on solutions to the Eurozone crisis is expanding
rapidly, there are currently very few papers that model the issues at hand in a
more formal and rigorous way. Luque et al. (2011) provide a formal framework
in order to examine how the allocation of voting weights influences member
states’ decisions to deepen the union. In their model, a fiscal union insures
member states against economic shocks. Similar to this chapter, they assume
that autarky proves beneficial since it gives countries the opportunity to devalue
their currency, thus limiting the volatility of shocks. Their approach differs from
this chapter in that transfers between countries do not occur in the status quo
1 For a survey of the literature, see for example Alesina et al. (1995), Bolton et al. (1996), or
Ruta (2005).
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and in that it is not clear ex ante which countries need a bailout. Fidrmuc
(2011) pursues a similar modelling strategy by introducing economic shocks into
the Bolton and Roland (1997) framework. Focusing both on the correlation
and persistence of shocks, he finds that a fiscal union is prone to dissolution
if shocks are asymmetric and permanent. Since his analysis applies to a fiscal
federalism setting, his results suggest that a union which is characterised by
unidirectional and permanent transfer flows is unstable, thus further weakening
the case for a fiscal union as a solution to the current crisis. Finally, Fahrholz
and Wójcik (2011) analyse bailouts in a brinkmanship game between the core
and the periphery. Since a default imposes negative externalities on the rest of
the union, the periphery might be able to credibly threaten to default and thus
elicit a bailout, depending on the core’s willingness to pay and the attitude of the
domestic electorate. Contrary to this chapter, the authors recommend policies
that limit the periphery’s bargaining power. Since they assume that membership
in the union is always advantageous for the periphery, their analysis focuses on
how to prevent bailouts rather than on how to preserve the Euro Area.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides
a brief overview of the main economic, legal and political issues regarding a
Eurozone break-up. Section 4.3 presents the current “muddling through” scenario
which serves as the benchmark for comparison with other institutional settings.
Section 4.4 modifies the benchmark to incorporate an orderly default mechanism.
The results for the political union and the fiscal union settings are presented in
sections 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. Section 4.7 discusses the policy implications
and concludes.
4.2 Eurozone break-up: background
While the literature on optimal currency areas and the resulting implications
for the Eurozone is vast2, starting with the seminal model by Mundell (1961),
research on monetary disintegration is surprisingly scarce (Meyer, 2010). Recent
economic history also provides little guidance, with Argentina’s abandonment
of its currency board in 2002 being the closest available precedent (Blejer and
Levy-Yeyati, 2010). The debate on Eurozone exit is consequently afflicted with
uncertainty. While Eichengreen (2010, 2007) considers Euro membership to be
permanent due to the high economic, political and procedural costs of exit, other
2 See Jonung and Drea (2009) for an overview.
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economists have suggested that periphery countries might be better off returning
to their old currencies (Roubini, 2011). This section provides a brief overview of
the main economic, legal and political issues shaping the debate and forms the
basis for the subsequent modelling framework.
4.2.1 Economic impact
The economic consequences of Eurozone exit are effectively determined by the
economic fundamentals of the seceding member state. For simplicity, the analysis
and the subsequent model distinguish between two types of countries, the core
and the periphery. Core countries can be thought of as creditor countries whose
economies rely heavily on exports, e.g. Germany. The periphery consists of
debtor countries which are characterised by unsustainable levels of public debt
and feeble economic growth, e.g. Greece.
The lack of competitiveness of periphery countries relative to the core has
been described as one of the major imbalances within the Euro Area (Mattich,
2011). This view is substantiated by Figure 4.1 which shows that relative unit
labour costs, a measure of competitiveness, have increased in the periphery
since 2006, most notably in Ireland, Greece and Italy. In order to restore
competitiveness, the periphery has the choice between two options. If it remains
in the Eurozone, regaining competitiveness requires cutting wages and prices.
Such an internal devaluation is likely to lead to a sharp contraction in economic
output, thus aggravating the current recession. Leaving the monetary union, by
contrast, might offer a quicker and less painful solution (EEAG, 2011; Roubini,
2011). A newly introduced Drachma is likely to depreciate immediately, thereby
making peripheral exports cheaper and re-igniting export-led growth. Buiter and
Rahbari (2012), for example, estimate that a Greek exit will result in a nominal
depreciation of the new Drachma of 50 to 70 per cent relative to the Euro. Some
economists, however, consider this benefit of a more competitive exchange rate
to be short-lived if the effects of the currency depreciation are counteracted by
wage inflation or if necessary structural reforms in the periphery are postponed
(Buiter and Rahbari, 2011; Eichengreen, 2010).
A rapid depreciation of the new Drachma will further increase the pressure
on the periphery’s public finances as the existing external liabilities are still
denominated in Euro. Leaving the single currency is therefore likely to involve
an outright default in order to reduce public debt to more sustainable levels
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Figure 4.1: Relative Unit Labour Costs, Base Year 2000 (Source: AMECO)
(Blejer and Levy-Yeyati, 2010; EEAG, 2011). Having regained its monetary
independence, the peripheral government can also easily monetise its debt, thus
imposing further losses on creditors and fuelling inflation. While some authors
have argued that Eurozone exit entails higher refinancing costs due to lower credit
ratings and higher risk premia (Eichengreen, 2007), this argument is no longer
relevant as many periphery countries have already lost access to capital markets.
It is important to note that default will not be limited to sovereign debt as
the private sector might also find itself unable to repay Euro-denominated debt
(Blejer and Levy-Yeyati, 2010; Jenkins, 2011). In particular, if debt contracts
are in Euro, firms and households will face unchanged liabilities while their
income, which is paid in devalued Drachmas, has shrunk (Fidler, 2011b). These
asymmetric balance sheet effects are likely to spur widespread bankruptcies.
Unlike agreements with external creditors, domestic debt contracts can easily
be converted into Drachma. Whilst net debtors will benefit from lower debt
repayments, net deposit holders will see the value of their savings decrease (Blejer
and Levy-Yeyati, 2010). The redenomination will hence result in a redistribution
of wealth in the country, potentially causing social unrest.
Moreover, the mere prospect of a Eurozone break-up will trigger bank runs
in the periphery as citizens rush to the banks to withdraw deposits before the
latter are converted into a less valuable currency (Blejer and Levy-Yeyati, 2010;
Eichengreen, 2010). Deposit holders will either transfer their savings to banks in
the core countries or hold the Euros as cash. As Greek banks become illiquid, the
entire banking system in the periphery is likely to collapse (Buiter, 2011; EEAG,
2011). As shown in Figure 4.2, household deposits in Greek banks have steadily
95
Figure 4.2: Greek Household Deposits in EUR Millions (Source: Bank of Greece)
declined over the last 18 months, reflecting both depositors’ dwindling confidence
in the Euro and the erosion of savings due to the recession. In Argentina, the
bank run began approximately nine months before the country abandoned the
currency board (Blejer and Levy-Yeyati, 2010).
Taking into account all these factors, the economic cost-benefit analysis of
Eurozone exit for the periphery is ambiguous (Eichengreen, 2007). Economists
at UBS estimate that periphery countries would incur a cost of 50 per cent
of their GDP in the first year (Deo et al., 2011). Monetary independence
might prove beneficial in the long run, however, especially if the alternative
is a prolonged period of austerity and economic hardship (Roubini, 2011). In
the subsequent model, it is therefore assumed that abandoning the Euro boosts
peripheral income.
If a core country is to leave the single currency area, by contrast, the
economic impact will be diametrically opposed to that experienced by the
periphery. Similar to the Swiss Franc’s recent rise, the newly introduced currency
will appreciate quickly, thus eroding any competitive advantage and making
core exports more expensive. Unless its economy rebalances towards domestic
demand, exit will result in a significant slowdown of economic activity in the
export-based core (Bremmer, 2011b; Hannon, 2011). Moreover, core investors,
i.e. banks, pension funds or insurance companies, which hold peripheral assets
denominated in Euro will suffer capital losses as these holdings, measured in
Deutschmarks, are now worth less (Buiter, 2011; Wolf, 2011; Fidler, 2011a). To
some extent, the core might also benefit from a stronger currency. Being perceived
as a safe haven for investments, core countries are likely to see capital flooding
into the country. Likewise, demand for government bonds will increase, thereby
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driving down bond yields (Hannon, 2011; Economist, 2010; Fidler, 2011a). This
positive effect on debt servicing costs will be amplified if public debt is not
converted into new Deutschmarks (Economist, 2010). On balance, however, the
costs of exiting the Euro seem to outweigh the benefits in the export-oriented core.
UBS estimates the output loss of a seceding core country at 20 to 25 per cent
of GDP, which is significantly higher than the cost of bailing out the periphery
(Deo et al., 2011).3
4.2.2 Legal and procedural issues
Since Eurozone exit might look enticing for some countries, the question arises
whether abandoning the Euro is legally possible. While some authors insist that
“nothing is truly irreversible for a sovereign nation” (Economist, 2010), it is worth
looking at the legal provisions regarding Euro membership.
Interestingly, the European Treaties are silent on unilateral withdrawal from
the Euro Area. This absence of an explicit legal provision is possibly due to the
fact that the founders of the single currency wanted to avoid any speculation as
to the longevity of the Euro by emphasising the irreversibility of the monetary
union (Athanassiou, 2009; Chaffin, 2011b). With the ratification of the Lisbon
Treaty in 2009, however, an exit clause providing for voluntary secession from the
EU was introduced into the treaty. Article 50.1 states that “Any Member State
may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional
requirements.” If a country wants to discontinue EU membership, it must inform
the Council of its intention. The Council then sets out guidelines which form the
basis for the subsequent negotiations of a withdrawal agreement with the Union.
If the European Parliament consents to the agreement, it is concluded on behalf
of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority.
Surprisingly, the exit clause does not spell out any specific procedures for
member states which use the Euro as their legal tender. Since the Eurozone
is a sub-set of the European Union, the consensus view is that a member state
which decided to leave the EU would automatically have to exit the Euro Area
(Athanassiou, 2009; Proctor, 2011). Similarly, under the current legal framework,
a country which considered abandoning the Euro would consequently also have to
discontinue EU membership (Athanassiou, 2009). A member state which wanted
to leave the Euro Area while remaining in the EU would thus have to exit under
3 UBS estimates the cost of secession at ¤6000 per capita in the first year compared to ¤1000
per capita if the core has to bail out Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
97
Article 50 and immediately apply for re-admission to the EU (Proctor, 2011).
Alternatively, the seceding country could negotiate a withdrawal through treaty
amendment (Scott, 2012). Despite being advocated by some policymakers and
economists, the expulsion of a member state from the Eurozone or the EU is
legally impossible under the current framework (Athanassiou, 2009; Proctor,
2011).
Moreover, the seceding country faces notable procedural difficulties, making a
potential exit expensive (Eichengreen, 2010, 2007). Firstly, a legal framework
is required which establishes the new currency as the sole legal tender and unit
of account in the seceding country (Blejer and Levy-Yeyati, 2010). Secondly,
all contracts have to be redenominated into the new currency at a prescribed
substitution rate, which poses a major legal challenge (Proctor, 2011). Costly
legal lawsuits are likely to ensue as the contracting parties question the validity
of existing contracts and try to determine the currency in which monetary
obligations are to be performed, leading to a period of pronounced uncertainty
(Eichengreen, 2007). As a rule of thumb, contracts with a significant international
dimension would be payable in Euro whereas contracts which are domestic to the
seceding country would be converted into the new currency (Proctor, 2011).
In order to stem the bank run and the resulting outflow of Euros, the seceding
country would have to impose capital controls as well as caps on bank withdrawals
and possibly even prohibit cross-border travel to prevent people from leaving with
cash, thereby suspending EU rules (Scott, 2012; Wolf, 2011; Chaffin, 2011a;
Jenkins, 2011). Drawing on lessons from Argentina, Blejer and Levy-Yeyati
(2010) advocate a selective deposit freeze which excludes sights and savings
deposits used for day-to-day transactions. Argentina’s corralito in 2001, by
contrast, imposed a cap on all withdrawals, thus leading to a liquidity crunch
and exacerbating the economic slump. In order to limit the ensuing financial
chaos, the changeover would have to be rapid and unanticipated (Fidler, 2011b;
Economist, 2010). A swift exit and introduction of a new currency, however,
is incompatible with Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty which requires extensive
negotiations.
4.2.3 The political dimension
History has shown that monetary disintegration is predominantly driven by
political rather than economic factors (Meyer, 2010). While voters across the
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(a) Germany (b) Greece
Figure 4.3: Eurobarometer (Source: European Commission)
Eurozone still support the Euro, opinion polls show that confidence in the single
currency is waning and European solidarity is eroding. The Eurobarometer, for
example, gauges popular sentiment towards the EU by asking people whether
they think that on balance their country has benefitted from EU membership.
Figure 4.3 shows the results of the survey for Germany and Greece since 2001.
Whilst the majority of Germans considered EU membership to be beneficial in
the period between May 2007 and November 2009, the percentage of Germans
thinking that the EU benefitted their country has fallen since and now stands at
48 per cent. In Greece, by contrast, a large number of people initially believed
in the benefits of EU membership. Sentiment in Greece, however, has turned
around since January 2010. As of May 2011, there are now more Greeks thinking
that the EU had adverse effects on their country than those who consider EU
membership to be beneficial.
Evidence also suggests that nationalism is on the rise across Europe, thus
generating a rift between the Eurozone’s core and periphery (Spiegel and Peel,
2011; Persson, 2011). Having suffered a period of economic slowdown and
rising unemployment, periphery countries are rattled by strikes and peripheral
governments face the wrath of their voters, with most incumbent governments
losing the election following the country’s bailout. Moreover, core countries seem
to have caught the “British disease” (Stephens, 2011) since voters increasingly
dislike bailing out periphery countries and thus turn towards Eurosceptic parties.
In April 2011, the True Finns became the third largest party in the Finnish
parliament and recent opinion polls show that Marine Le Pen, who advocates
France’s gradual departure from the Euro, is a real contender in the 2012 French
presidential race (Persson, 2011; Carnegy, 2011). Some authors have therefore
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concluded that the Eurozone’s problem is not so much an economic as a political
one, with policymakers lacking the will to implement a comprehensive solution
to the debt crisis (Stiglitz, 2011; Stephens, 2011). The lack of attention paid to
the political economy aspects of monetary unions has been described as one of
the major shortcomings of the optimum currency area approach (Goodhart in
Jonung and Drea, 2009). The subsequent model tries to fill this gap by focusing
on the political dimension of the Eurozone crisis.
4.3 The status quo (SQ): “muddling through”
4.3.1 Model set-up
The monetary union consists of n ≥ 2 countries which differ in terms of income
and preferences for public goods. There are two types of countries indexed by
i ∈ {c, p} which can be thought of as the Eurozone’s core and periphery. Citizens
are assumed to be homogeneous and immobile. The number of core and periphery
countries is given by nc and np respectively, with n = nc+np. Following Alesina et
al. (2005), EU policy is determined by a one-country-one-vote-rule and majority
voting. It is assumed that the core countries are in the majority (nc > np) so
that policies reflect the wishes of the core. This additional assumption seems
reasonable in the given context as creditor countries are able to dictate the
conditions of the bailouts in return for cash.
The periphery: For simplicity, all periphery countries are assumed to be
identical and utility is linear. Each periphery country provides a local public good,
denoted by g, which yields utility
√
g. Public good provision is financed through
a tax τ on periphery income yp. As a member of the Eurozone, the periphery
country also receives a bailout or transfer T which constitutes a simple cash
payment from the core to the periphery. Finally, each citizen holds a fraction µ of
the country’s total debt and thus benefits from interest and principal repayments,
denoted by R. The latter have been determined in the previous period and are
thus exogenous to the model. In summary, the utility function of an individual
living in the periphery is:
Up = (1− τ)yp +mp
√
g + T + µR, (4.1)
where mp measures how much the representative citizen of the periphery values
public good consumption relative to private consumption. Both public spending
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and debt repayment are financed via income tax so that the peripheral budget
constraint reads:
g = τyp −R. (4.2)
For the periphery, the decision whether to abandon the single currency involves
a trade-off. On the one hand, the Eurozone ceases to provide financial assistance
(T = 0). On the other hand, the periphery country is no longer subject to EU
policies and regains its sovereignty over monetary policy and public spending. As
outlined in the background section, a new Drachma is likely to depreciate quickly,
thereby boosting the country’s competitiveness. This in turn has a positive
impact on income yp and hence on tax revenues τyp which is captured by the
parameter α, where α ≥ 1. Since a depreciation of the new currency also implies
a higher debt burden as public debt is denominated in the old currency, exit is
likely to entail an outright default whose extent is described by the parameter h,
where 0 < h < 1. Creditors consequently suffer a haircut of (1− h)R so that the
representative citizen now receives debt repayments of hR. The country does not
give preferential treatment to domestic creditors so that the haircut is identical
for internal and external investors. To sum up, the periphery’s utility function in
case of Eurozone exit becomes:
Up = α(1− τ)yp +mp
√
g + µhR, (4.3)
and the corresponding budget constraint is given by:
g = ατyp − hR. (4.4)
The model thus assumes that the EU, being concerned about financial contagion,
prevents any coercive debt restructuring while the periphery country is a member
of the monetary union.
The core: Again, all core countries are assumed to be identical. As a member
of the single currency area, a core country benefits from spillovers induced by
public good provision in each of the np periphery countries. The degree of
spillovers is measured by the parameter κ ∈ [0, 1]. This approach follows Alesina
et al. (2005) who assume that membership in an economic union is a necessary
condition for receiving externalities. Unlike their model, this chapter focuses
solely on spillovers from periphery to core as the latter are considered to be
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crucial in the given context.4 While the core does not directly fund g, it might
pay a cash transfer or bailout T which is unrelated to the level of public good
provision. The costs of bailing out the np periphery countries are shared amongst
the nc core countries. Finally, the representative citizen also receives principal
and interest payments by the np periphery countries, where γ refers to the extent
of peripheral debt held by core countries. Note that a fraction ρ of the peripheral
debt is held outside the Eurozone and µ + γ + ρ = 1. To sum up, the utility of
an individual living in the core is:








where mc measures the core’s preference for the public good and consequently
captures the core’s attitude towards the union. If the core does not value the
periphery’s public good highly (mc → 0), core voters are less willing to hold
the European project together. Low values of mc can thus be reinterpreted as
growing Euroscepticism or dwindling European solidarity.
Leaving the Euro Area entails both costs and benefits for the core. While
the core country no longer has to provide financial assistance to the periphery,
it also foregoes the positive spillovers. More importantly, a newly introduced
Deutschmark is likely to appreciate, thereby hurting the core’s export-based
economy. The resulting negative impact is captured by the parameter β < 1 and
income consequently falls to βyc. Moreover, peripheral debt is still denominated
in Euro. If the Deutschmark appreciates, the real value of the core country’s
claims drops. As this effect is comparable to a haircut, it is assumed that the
net effect on peripheral debt holdings is exactly the same as in the case where
the periphery country exits, meaning that creditors in the core country receive
hR. The utility of the representative citizen in the case of autarky consequently
becomes:




The assumption that the losses incurred by creditors are similar irrespective of
which country leaves the union first seems justified in the model’s symmetric
set-up: if a single core country is incentivised to deviate and leave the Euro Area,
the same holds for all other core countries and the monetary union therefore falls
apart. The break-up of the Eurozone is then likely to lead to the default of the
4 The model thus assumes that spillovers from periphery to periphery and from core to periphery
are negligible.
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periphery due to the ensuing depreciation of the peripheral currency and the lack
of financial assistance.5
4.3.2 Periphery’s utility after exit
If a periphery country decides to leave the Euro Area, it can choose its level
of public good provision independently by maximising (4.3) with respect to g
subject to the budget constraint under separation (4.4). Solving the maximisation





Using gS, the periphery’s utility under separation is given by:
USp = αyp +
m2p
4
+ (µ− 1)hR. (4.8)
4.3.3 Institutional set-up
In the pre-crisis setting where the no-bailout clause was binding, the core would
not have provided a bailout whilst enjoying the positive spillovers generated
by public good provision in the periphery. With the implementation of the
temporary rescue fund in May 2010 and the permanent European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) coming into effect in 2012, however, the rules of the game
have changed, turning the previous no-bailout into a “muddling through”
game. Most importantly, recent developments in the periphery have rendered
Eurozone membership less beneficial, thus lowering the periphery’s costs of
abandoning the Euro. Firstly, structural reform programmes have stalled in
many periphery countries, requiring additional bailouts and further austerity
programmes. Secondly, the periphery has been rattled by several government
crises6, with citizens taking to the streets in order to protest against the painful
austerity measures imposed by the creditor countries. In November 2011, the
popular resistance in Greece culminated in the threat by the Greek Prime Minister
to call a referendum on the second European bailout.
5 The model makes no predictions as to whether the core and periphery countries rejoin to form
two separate monetary unions, e.g. a Northern and a Southern Euro, as discussed in the policy
literature, see for example Henkel (2011).
6 Recall the snap elections in Ireland and Portugal, the government crisis in Greece in June 2011
and the implementation of technocratic governments in both Italy and Greece.
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As the costs of leaving the monetary union have fallen, periphery countries can
credibly threaten to exit the Eurozone, thereby strengthening their bargaining
position. This is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the monetary
union votes over public good provision in the periphery. Since nc > np, the core
countries will set g according to their wishes, reflecting the conditionality of the
current bailout programmes. In the second stage of the game, the periphery
countries decide whether to leave the single currency area or not. The model is
solved by backward induction so that the periphery’s choice whether to exit is
considered first.
4.3.4 Results
Even though the periphery countries are in the minority, the fact that they can
credibly threaten to exit the monetary union imposes an additional constraint on
the core countries. In order to prevent a Eurozone break-up, the core must ensure
that the periphery enjoys at least the same utility as under separation, i.e. that








⇔ T ≥ (α− 1)yp + τyp −mp
√




which determines the minimum bailout required to preserve the union in the
status quo, T SQ. In the optimum, this equation holds with equality since the
core wants to minimise costly transfers:
T SQ = (α− 1)yp + g −mp
√




where the periphery’s budget constraint (4.2) was substituted. Using 1−µ = γ+ρ,
the bailout becomes:
T SQ = (α− 1)yp + g −mp
√




Equation (4.9) shows that the core compensates the periphery for the forgone
savings regarding debt obligations, (γ+ρ)(1−h)R, for the foregone income gain,
(α − 1)yp, and the difference in the net utility from public good provision in
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order to render Eurozone membership attractive. Despite the lack of Eurobonds
or any other official scheme of debt socialisation, part of the periphery’s debt is
effectively repaid by the core, as stated by the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. If the periphery country remains within the union, it can partially
externalise the repayment of its external debt onto the core taxpayer. The extent of
debt socialisation amounts to (γ+ρ)(1−h)R and thus depends on both the fraction
of debt held by core and non-Eurozone countries and the size of the haircut in
case of default. The bigger the haircut, i.e. the smaller h, and the higher the
fraction of external debt (γ + ρ), the larger the bailout.
Surprisingly, the “muddling through” scenario already exhibits some features of
a transfer or debt union, a fact that is often neglected by political commentators.
The status quo is thus likely to generate moral hazard since the periphery has an
incentive to overborrow, anticipating that the bill is partly footed by the core.
Taking into account the minimum transfer necessary to avoid dissolution, the
core chooses public good provision so as to maximise its utility (4.5). Solving the








The periphery’s threat to leave the Eurozone consequently induces the core to
internalise the periphery’s interests and vote for the socially optimal level of the
peripheral public good. If the periphery country could not credibly threaten to
exit the Eurozone, by contrast, it would not be able to influence the majority vote
and the core would simply ignore the periphery’s wishes. This result corresponds
with the findings in the seminal paper by Buchanan and Faith (1987) who show
that a secession threat restricts potentially exploitative behaviour of the ruling
coalition, i.e. the core, thereby internalising the interests of the minority.
Finally, given gSQ and T SQ, it remains to be seen whether a core country has an
incentive to stay in the union. This is the case if a core country’s utility of being a
member outweighs the utility of abandoning the Euro, i.e. if ∆c = U
SQ
























Rearranging gives the following condition:
nc
np
(1− β)yc − (α− 1)yp ≥ −
1
4
κmcnc(2mp + κmcnc) + (1− h)ρR, (4.11)
which determines the stability of the monetary union in the status quo. Condition
(4.11) shows that the Euro’s sustainability depends on three factors: the effect
of a break-up on member states’ incomes, member states’ attitude towards the
union as captured by the preference parameters mc and mp and the amount of
peripheral debt held outside the Euro Area. The impact of the periphery’s debt
on the union’s stability is summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. The probability of a Eurozone break-up increases with the
amount of peripheral debt held by foreign creditors. The larger the fraction of debt
held outside the Eurozone, ρ, and the larger the haircut (1− h), the more prone
is the union to dissolution as the stability condition is less likely to be satisfied.
In the extreme case in which peripheral debt is only held within the Eurozone
(ρ = 0), debt obligations do not affect the sustainability of the monetary union.
Although the sheer extent of peripheral debt is often seen as the major threat to
the Euro’s survival, it turns out that solely debt owed to non-Eurozone creditors
destabilises the union. The intuition behind this result is subtle and can be best
understood when comparing the core citizen’s overall net return on lending under
both scenarios. Consider first the situation where the core stays in the union.
Recalling Lemma 4.1, part of the periphery’s external debt is effectively paid off
by the core in order to entice the periphery to continue its membership in the
union. Taking into account the bailout T SQ and focusing on debt obligations, the














The return on peripheral debt held by the core is consequently reduced to np
nc
γhR,
suggesting that the effect is similar to an implicit debt write-off. As the periphery
cannot be worse off within the union than under autarky where default is possible,
the core alleviates the periphery’s debt burden by transferring cash. In a sense,
European leaders’ idea of a voluntary debt restructuring of Greek debt can be
interpreted as an attempt to dissuade Greece from exiting the Euro by relieving
its debt burden. Furthermore, the core supports the periphery in making foreign
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creditors whole by repaying np
nc
(1−h)ρR of the periphery’s external debt, implying
that its overall net return on lending is lowered by this amount.
Now consider the net return in the autarky case. Recalling equation (4.6), core
creditors incur a loss on their debt holdings but no longer have to bail out the
periphery so that the net return on lending is np
nc
γhR. When deciding whether
to exit, the core only considers the difference in net returns under both settings.
Since both scenarios involve a debt write-off, either in explicit or implicit form,
this difference is equal to the amount of foreign debt, np
nc
(1−h)ρR. By leaving the
union, the core can avoid repaying foreign creditors and the incentive to abandon
the single currency is stronger for larger levels of debt owed to non-Eurozone
creditors.7
The term on the LHS of equation (4.11), which describes the impact of a
break-up on income, can be either positive or negative, depending on the relative
sizes of the income effects in core and periphery. The larger the boost to peripheral
income as a result of exit, α, the higher is the probability that the monetary union
dissolves as the LHS is smaller and the stability condition is thus less likely to
be satisfied. The fact that the impact on income is asymmetric (β 6= α) is a
destabilising factor in itself. If the income effect were identical and negative for
both regions, as for example in Bolton and Roland (1997), the LHS would always
be positive and the monetary union would be inherently stable for ρ = 0.
As for the attitude towards the monetary union, the higher the valuation of
the public good as captured by mc, the more stable is the Eurozone. The recent
surge of Euroscepticism can be reinterpreted as mc → 0. This implies that the
Euro Area is now more prone to break-up as the RHS of (4.11) increases for low
values of the preference parameter, meaning that the stability condition is less
likely to be satisfied.
4.3.5 EU welfare
While stability considerations are obviously crucial for any institutional reform, a
revision of institutional rules also needs to take into account the resulting welfare
implications. EU welfare takes the form of a utilitarian welfare function so that
EU welfare is simply the sum of countries’ utilities. Assuming condition (4.11)
7 The result is driven by the assumption that the losses due to the haircut and the losses in case
of the core’s exit are similar as previously discussed.
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holds, EU welfare in the status quo amounts to:








2 − ρnpR, (4.12)
where the solutions for gSQ and T SQ have been substituted. W SQ constitutes
the minimum level of total welfare any institutional reform should provide. Note
that EU welfare is lowered by the amount of peripheral debt obligations owed
to foreigners. Peripheral debt held by Eurozone nationals, by contrast, simply
leads to a redistribution between creditor and debtor countries and thus does not
impact EU welfare as a whole.
In the “muddling through” scenario, the periphery’s utility within the union
is always the same as under separation so that USQp = U
S
p . Assuming condition


















An institutional reform is said to be feasible if both the periphery and the core
are at least as well off after the reform as they are in the status quo.
4.4 The ESM: an orderly default mechanism
In February 2012, Eurozone leaders signed the treaty establishing the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) which now awaits ratification by the parliaments of
all 17 member states. Intended to substitute the temporary crisis management
framework, the ESM initially provided for orderly debt restructuring, meaning
that insolvent countries would be able to default while being a member of the
monetary union.8 In the context of the model, all creditors consequently suffer
haircuts irrespective of a periphery country’s exit. If the periphery remains a
member of the union, its utility function is therefore given by:
Up = (1− τ)yp +mp
√
g + T + µhR, (4.13)
8 As previously mentioned, the requirements for private sector involvement have been watered
down (European Council, 9.12.2011).
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where the corresponding budget constraint (4.2) is changed accordingly to take
into account the haircut. Similar to the status quo, both the periphery and the
core can leave the single currency area if the benefits of doing so outweigh the
costs. The periphery’s utility function and budget constraint in case of exit are
identical to the “muddling through” scenario and given by equations (4.3) and
(4.4) respectively. If the core country stays in the union with the periphery, core
creditors also suffer a haircut and the core’s utility function becomes:








while its utility under autarky is the same as in the status quo and is given by
(4.6).
Deriving the stability condition proceeds similarly to the status quo and only
major results are reported. Anticipating the periphery’s NSC, the minimum
bailout which is required to preserve the union amounts to:






Solving the optimisation problem yields the same level of public good provision
as in the “muddling through” scenario, meaning that gSQ = gESM . From (4.15),
it follows that while the core still needs to compensate the periphery for the
foregone income gain, (α− 1)yp, and the difference in the net utility from public
good provision in order to entice the latter to keep the single currency, the transfer
no longer includes external debt obligations. Although the core taxpayer suffers a
haircut, she also benefits from the ESM, as summarised by the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2. An orderly default mechanism renders it impossible for the
periphery to externalise its external debt obligations onto the core countries. As
a result, the bailout, TESM , is smaller than in the status quo. For ρ > 0, the
reduction in the bailout is larger than the loss incurred by creditors due to the
haircut so that the ESM generates a net benefit for core citizens.
Proof. Recall that, taking into account the bailout T SQ, the net return on lending




(1 − h)ρR. As the bailout TESM does
not include any debt obligations and all creditors suffer a haircut, the net return
on lending under the ESM amounts to np
nc
γhR and is consequently larger. The
ESM consequently benefits core citizens for ρ > 0.
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The sovereign debt restructuring mechanism thus puts an end to the implicit
socialisation of peripheral debt which occurs in the “muddling through” scenario.
Since the core no longer has to assist the periphery in making foreign creditors
whole, the core taxpayer is better off.
Finally, the core is incentivised to continue its membership in the Euro Area if
the following stability condition holds:
nc
np
(1− β)yc − (α− 1)yp ≥ −
1
4
κmcnc(2mp + κmcnc). (4.16)
Unlike in (4.11), payments to creditors outside the Eurozone no longer appear on
the RHS of the stability condition. This means that the stability condition is more
likely to be satisfied under the ESM. The union’s sustainability no longer depends
on the distribution of peripheral debt between Eurozone and non-Eurozone
creditors. Contrary to the widespread view as for example stated by De Grauwe
(2010b), an orderly default mechanism thus stabilises the Eurozone. Intuitively,
allowing a periphery state to default while remaining in the union restricts its
bargaining power by reducing the benefits of Eurozone exit. As a result, the
periphery no longer receives compensation for foregone savings regarding debt
repayments. Since bailing out the periphery has become cheaper and the core
taxpayer is better off, the core is now more likely to support the single currency.
The ESM’s stabilising effect is thus a direct result of the smaller cash transfer
TESM , as described in Lemma 4.2.
Assuming condition (4.16) holds, EU welfare under the ESM is given by:




2 − ρnphR. (4.17)
Compared to the welfare in the status quo as given by (4.12), an institutional
reform that implements an orderly default mechanism is thus welfare-improving.
As the level of public good provision is the same under both scenarios, however,
this increase in EU welfare results from the debt write-off, hR, and thus comes
at the expense of non-Eurozone creditors who have to suffer a haircut. It is
important to note that the ESM and the status quo scenario perform equally well
regarding stability and welfare if peripheral debt is not held outside the Eurozone
(ρ = 0).
The periphery’s utility is identical under both institutional settings, meaning
that it is indifferent as to whether to introduce the ESM. The core, by contrast,
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benefits from an orderly default mechanism, as shown in Lemma 4.2. Its utility
is higher than in the status quo and amounts to:
UESMc = yc −
np
nc












Implementing an orderly default mechanism is consequently feasible as the
institutional reform is supported by the core.
4.5 Political union (PU): economic governance
4.5.1 Institutional set-up
Proposals to reinforce closer co-ordination among member states and to
strengthen the economic governance of the Euro Area were first outlined in
August 2011 and advanced at the European summits in October and December
2011 (European Council, 26.10.2011 and 9.12.2011). Initially, it was thought
that enhanced integration required limited changes to the European Treaties.
Following the UK’s veto at the December summit, however, the so-called Fiscal
Compact was set up as an intergovernmental treaty which was signed by 25
EU member countries in March 2012 and now awaits ratification by national
parliaments.
While the concept of economic governance is yet to be defined by policymakers,
ideas which have been discussed include harmonising corporate tax rates, electing
a Eurozone president and implementing balanced budget rules. The main
element of the Fiscal Compact is the requirement for signatory countries to
adopt balanced budget rules at the national level. Although this has been
hailed as the first step towards a fiscal union, member states effectively maintain
their sovereignty over fiscal policy. Regulations have been drafted, however,
in order to give the European Commission more powers to scrutinise the
budgets of member states which are subject to an excessive deficit procedure
or which receive financial assistance (European Council, 21.2.2012). With
the European Commission being able to comment on draft budgets, monitor
execution and propose amendments, member states’ sovereignty is potentially
restricted (European Council, 26.10.2011). Since neither proposal provides for
a larger federal budget, the economic governance concept resembles a political
rather than a fiscal union.
The model set-up is adapted in order to analyse the potential stability effects
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of such a union. Similar to the status quo, the economic governance initiative
does not pool resources into a common federal budget to finance the peripheral
public good. Unlike the “muddling through” scenario, political co-ordination
assumes the existence of a central planner, e.g. the European Commission,
who maximises EU welfare. Drawing on some important lessons from the fiscal
federalism literature (Oates, 1972), centralised decision-making can be beneficial
since it internalises cross-country spillovers. The downside of centralisation is
that public good provision does not necessarily reflect the wishes of the populace
since acquiring information on local tastes tends to be costly (Ruta, 2005).
Compared to the “muddling through” scenario, the major difference in the
model set-up is that the local preference parameters mp and mc are now replaced
with the preference parameter of the European planner, denoted by me, reflecting
the fact that the planning institution might be ignorant of local tastes.9 Moreover,
the central planner maximises EU welfare. Similar to the status quo, the core
and the periphery can secede from the union and they will do so if their utility
under autarky is higher.
4.5.2 Results




















with respect to g subject to the periphery’s budget constraint (4.2). Solving for







which is equivalent to the socially optimal level in (4.10) if member states are
homogeneous and their preferences are identical to me. The parameter me can be
thought of as representing the tastes of the European Commission, which is likely
to receive more powers in a political union and follows its own political agenda.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the European planner has the same tastes as
9 Standard models examining centralised provision in the context of two local public goods usually
assume uniform provision of the public goods, see for example Besley and Coate (2003). Using
me as the planner’s preference parameter has a similar effect.
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the core countries so that me is set equal to mc in the following. This approach
captures the idea that ‘German-style’ policies might be imposed upon periphery
countries.
Having determined gPU , the question arises whether closer co-ordination in
a political union makes the Euro more sustainable and incentivises both core
and periphery to keep the common currency. A periphery country continues













Rearranging gives the minimum bailout required to prevent the periphery from
leaving the single currency area:











It turns out that the periphery can still externalise part of its external debt
obligations onto the core taxpayer, leading to the following lemma:
Lemma 4.3. Enhanced co-ordination does not eliminate implicit debt
socialisation as the extent of debt borne by each core country, (γ + ρ)(1− h)R, is
identical to the status quo.
If member states are homogeneous in their preferences (mc = mp), the
magnitude of the bailout is the same as in the “muddling through” scenario. For
heterogeneous preferences, however, the bailouts differ in size. In the limit case
where mc → 0, which reflects the recent surge of Euroscepticism in the core, the
transfer to the periphery is indeed larger than in the current setting. The intuition
behind this result is that the periphery has to be compensated for the utility loss
resulting from the imposition of policies which ignore peripheral interests, i.e.
for a very low level of public good provision. Otherwise, the periphery would
be incentivised to leave the Euro Area and set g according to its wishes. For
sufficiently low levels of mc relative to mp, a political union is thus likely to entail
larger bailouts, thereby accelerating the move towards a transfer union.10
10For relatively high levels of mc relative to mp, the results are not as clear-cut. T
PU > TSQ if
the following condition holds: m2p − (2 + 2κnc)mpmc + (1 + 2κnc)m2c > 0.
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Similarly, a core country has an incentive to keep the Euro if the benefits of
doing so outweigh the costs. If the tastes of the planner are identical to those of
the core countries, the bailout determined by the planner is unlikely to exceed
the minimum transfer required to hold the union together, T PU . Inserting T PU
and gPU in the core’s utility function gives the following stability condition:
nc
np
(1− β)yc − (α− 1)yp ≥
1
4
mp(mp − (2 + 2κnc)mc) +
1− (κnc)2
4
m2c + (1− h)ρR.
(4.20)
When comparing this expression to the stability condition of the status quo given
in (4.11), the following lessons can be drawn. Firstly, if all member states exhibit
homogeneous preferences, the institutional setting does not matter since both
scenarios are equally stable. Secondly, in the more relevant case where preferences
are heterogeneous, the political union is indeed more prone to break-up, thus
contradicting claims made in the policy literature. The results are summarised
in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2. For mc = mp, the political union and the status quo are equally
sustainable. If the core and the periphery differ in their tastes (mc 6= mp), the
political union is less stable than the “muddling through” scenario.
Proof. See Appendix.
Rather than meeting its stated objective of making the Euro more sustainable,
the economic governance initiative further destabilises the monetary union. If
preferences are heterogeneous (mc 6= mp), public good provision is distorted and
differs from the socially optimal level. EU welfare is consequently lower than in
the status quo. Taking the effects on welfare and stability into account, European
policymakers should be advised against the implementation of a political union.
Finally, even if the European planner is perfectly informed about local tastes, i.e.
the local preference parameters are not replaced with me, economic governance
yields exactly the same results as the “muddling through” scenario regarding
both the stability and the welfare of the union and therefore does not provide
any advantages over the current institutional set-up.
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4.6 Fiscal union (FU)
In a monetary union cum fiscal union, the peripheral public goods are centrally
provided and funded via union-wide income taxes. The tax rates can be
differentiated with respect to the individual’s place of residence and are denoted
by τc and τp respectively. While public good provision is financed through a
common EU budget, debt and interest repayments still have to be paid for by the
individual periphery country so that there is no official socialisation of debt. The
debt servicing costs, R, are financed with a lump sum tax so that the net effect
of debt holdings and debt repayments in the periphery amounts to (µ−1)R. The
utility function of an individual living in the periphery consequently becomes:
Up = (1− τp)yp +mp
√
g + (µ− 1)R. (4.21)
Replacing the previous cash transfer T with an income tax τc, the core’s utility
function is now given by:






Finally, the common budget constraint in the EU amounts to:
npg = npτpyp + ncτcyc, (4.23)
as there are np peripheral public goods to be funded by the EU. All other
assumptions as well as the utility functions under autarky remain unchanged.
4.6.1 FU with exit clause
First consider a scenario where the treaty establishing the fiscal union includes
an explicit exit clause, thereby making it possible for countries to secede in a
relatively costless and orderly fashion. Similar to the status quo, this institutional
set-up can be described as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the amount of
public good provision is determined by majority vote, i.e. by the core countries.
Then periphery countries decide whether to leave the FU or not. Introducing an
explicit exit clause enhances the periphery’s bargaining power. When choosing g,
the core countries have to make sure that the periphery’s utility as a member of
the FU is at least tantamount to that after exit, i.e. that Up ≥ USp . As a result,
the core maximises its utility (4.22) with respect to g, τp, and τc subject to the
115
















which is equivalent to the socially optimal level in (4.10). As the periphery’s NSC
holds with equality, inserting gFE and solving for the periphery’s tax rate gives:






+ (1− h)(µ− 1)R
yp
.
The core’s tax rate is derived by plugging the values for gFE and τFEp into the









+ (γ + ρ)(1− h)R
)
.
Although Eurobonds do not exist in this scenario and the periphery is officially
responsible for repaying its own obligations, peripheral debt is partly paid off by
the core countries, as stated by the following lemma:
Lemma 4.4. In a fiscal union with an explicit exit clause, implicit debt
socialisation occurs as each periphery country is able to externalise part of its
external debt obligations onto the core taxpayer. The amount of debt borne by
each core citizen, (γ + ρ)(1 − h)R, is the same as in the “muddling through”
scenario.
From a moral hazard point of view, this set-up therefore does not provide any
advantage over the “muddling through” scenario.
When comparing the levels of public good provision and each country’s net
contribution with the status quo, it turns out that both scenarios yield the same
results, leading to the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3. The real variables are unaffected by an institutional reform
which implements a fiscal union with exit clause, and EU welfare is identical to
the “muddling through” scenario.
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Proof. As for g, this follows directly from a comparison of (4.10) and (4.24).
Regarding the core’s net contribution, compare np
nc
T SQ and τFEc yc. As for the
periphery’s net contribution, compare τpyp−T SQ−µR and τFEp yp+(1−µ)R.
Funding the peripheral public good via income taxes rather than via a direct
bailout therefore does not enhance EU welfare. Furthermore, none of the countries
can individually fare better in a fiscal union by shifting their burden of financing
onto the rest of the federation.
Finally, the core has an incentive to remain a member of the Euro Area if the
utility of staying is higher than the utility of leaving, i.e. ∆c = U
FE
c − USc ≥ 0.
Using the solutions for gFE, τFEp and τ
FE




(1− β)yc − (α− 1)yp ≥ −
1
4
κmcnc(2mp + κmcnc) + ρ(1− h)R, (4.25)
which is equivalent to the condition in the status quo, implying that both
institutional settings are also equally stable.
Intuitively, both EU welfare and the Euro’s sustainability depend on the
political bargaining process which is determined by the periphery’s bargaining
power. The latter is driven by the differences in income yp, debt servicing costs
R and net utilities of public good provision between the respective setting and
autarky. If both cash transfers (T ) and income taxes (τp, τc) are non-distortive,
meaning that there is no deadweight loss of raising funds for public good provision,
citizens’ consumption of the public good is the same irrespective of the source of
funding. This implies that income, debt and the utility of the public good are
not affected when switching from cash bailouts to union-wide income taxes, thus
neither weakening nor strengthening the periphery’s bargaining position. As a
result, EU welfare and the Eurozone’s stability are identical to the “muddling
through” scenario. What matters is not so much the source of funding, provided
taxation does not distort citizens’ consumption choices, but the fact that the
periphery can credibly threaten to leave the union.
4.6.2 FU without exit clause
Now consider a fiscal union which is irreversible once the new treaty is signed.
This is modelled by assuming that Eurozone exit involves a large procedural cost
λ for the periphery. Similar to the previous scenarios, the core countries are in
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the majority and can therefore set g according to their wishes. In this setting,
two cases need to be distinguished, depending on the size of the procedural cost.
If λ is sufficiently small so that the benefits of Eurozone exit still outweigh the
total costs, the periphery can credibly threaten to abandon the single currency.
In this case, the policy game yields the same results as in a fiscal union with exit
clause with one minor difference: introducing a procedural cost lowers the gains
of secession as the periphery’s utility under autarky falls by λ, thus weakening its
bargaining position.11 While public good provision is still at its social optimum,
part of the burden of funding g is therefore redistributed to the periphery.
If the procedural costs are sufficiently large to offset any gains from leaving the
union, by contrast, Eurozone exit is inconceivable and the periphery’s secession
threat is no longer credible. As a result, the policy game has no second stage
where periphery countries decide whether to secede. If the fiscal union is unlikely
to dissolve, the core maximises its own utility (4.22) with respect to g subject to








and a potentially infinite tax τp on the periphery countries. Note that while the
core is incentivised to impose the highest possible τp, it faces an upper bound
since an exploitative tax rate renders Eurozone exit attractive for the periphery,
despite the existence of procedural costs. In a fiscal union with large exit costs, the
peripheral public good is underprovided since the core no longer takes into account
the periphery’s interests. Irrespective of the exact level of τp, an institutional
reform which implements a fiscal union excluding an exit option lowers EU welfare
compared to the status quo. Although the core is less likely to leave the Eurozone,
thereby making this setting more stable than the “muddling through” scenario,
the reform would entail a welfare cost for the entire Euro Area. In addition,
introducing this type of fiscal union is not feasible since the electorate in the
periphery, correctly anticipating that it is worse off for low levels of mc, is unlikely
to vote for the reform.
11The previous section on the fiscal union with exit clause can thus be interpreted as the limit
case where λ = 0.
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4.6.3 A note on Eurobonds
Throughout the Eurozone crisis, policymakers and economists have floated the
idea of Eurobonds as a solution to the crisis, meaning that the Eurozone would
jointly guarantee the public debt of other member states.12 The Lisbon Treaty
currently prohibits any joint liability of member states and this interdiction was
recently upheld by a ruling of the German Constitutional Court. If the European
Treaties are to be renegotiated as presently discussed, however, Eurobonds might
become legal. In order to analyse their potential effects within the current model,
the fiscal union with exit clause set-up is extended by assuming that the costs
of debt repayment are officially shared amongst all members states. The utility
functions consequently become:
Up = (1− τp)yp +mp
√
g + µR− np
n
R








where the total peripheral debt obligations npR are divided equally amongst the
n Eurozone countries.13
Surprisingly, introducing Eurobonds makes no difference as the real variables
are unaffected. Public good provision as well as the core’s and periphery’s net
contributions are identical to the status quo and the fiscal union with exit clause.
Consequently, Eurobonds neither improve EU welfare nor do they stabilise the
Eurozone since the stability condition is the same as in equations (4.11) and
(4.25). Recalling Lemmata 4.1 and 4.4, these results can be explained by the fact
that debt socialisation already occurs, albeit implicitly, in the other institutional
settings.
It is important to note that these results are derived under the assumption
that R is exogenous. In a set-up where R is determined by the markets prior
to the first stage of the political game, Eurobonds possibly affect interest rates
and thus the size of the debt obligations. If the joint guarantee lowers R
compared to the status quo, the Eurozone is indeed more stable and Eurobonds
are welfare-improving. There are, however, two caveats to this analysis. Firstly,
the effect of Eurobonds on Eurozone interest rates is a matter of considerable
debate. Secondly, introducing an orderly default mechanism might do the same
12Amongst the most prominent proponents are the former Italian finance minister Giulio Tremonti
and Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the Euro Group.
13Alternatively, the common budget constraint can be changed to include npR.
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trick. Which of the two settings, i.e. ESM or Eurobonds, is more beneficial
depends on the relative size of the debt reduction which is generated by either
haircuts or lower interest rates.
Regardless of the impact of a joint guarantee on R, the following corollary can
be made:
Corollary 4.1. Eurobonds are ineffective in stabilising the monetary union if
peripheral debt is mainly held by member states.
This follows directly from Proposition 4.1.
4.7 Concluding remarks: can a ‘closer union’ save the Euro?
Euro critics and proponents of Mundell’s theory of optimum currency areas
have argued that the European monetary union is doomed to fail unless it is
complemented by a political or a fiscal union, and have consequently called for
closer European integration. Based on a simple political economy approach
where creditor countries are in the majority and determine European policies,
this chapter casts some doubts on their claim that solely a ‘closer union’ can save
the Euro. In particular, the model shows that the current “muddling through”
scenario is surprisingly stable. Intuitively, the recent hardship experienced by
citizens living in the periphery has lowered the costs of exiting the union,
thus rendering the periphery’s secession threat credible and strengthening its
bargaining position. In order to prevent the peripheral countries from leaving,
the core is incentivised to internalise the periphery’s interests and provide the
socially optimal level of the peripheral public good. As shown in Lemma 4.1,
the periphery is also able to externalise part of its debt obligations onto the core
taxpayer so that the current institutional framework constitutes already, albeit
implicitly, a transfer or debt union. Another important insight, summarised in
Proposition 4.1, is that the probability of a Eurozone break-up increases with the
amount of peripheral debt held by creditors outside the Euro Area.
In the policy literature, the pre-crisis setting, in which the no-bailout clause
is binding and transfers do not occur, usually serves as the benchmark for
comparison with alternative institutional set-ups. This chapter departs from this
approach by employing the more relevant “muddling through” scenario as the
reference case against which to judge any institutional reform. When doing so,
it turns out that neither a political union nor a fiscal union make the Euro more
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sustainable compared to the status quo. As shown in Proposition 4.2, if countries
differ in their preferences for the peripheral public good, a political union is even
more prone to break-up. The intuition behind this result is that the periphery has
to be compensated for the policies imposed by the European central planner, e.g.
the European Commission. As a result, bailouts are more costly and Eurozone
exit becomes more attractive for the core.
The stability implications of a fiscal union depend on the concrete institutional
set-up. A fiscal union with explicit exit clause yields exactly the same results as
the status quo and is therefore equally stable. If the fiscal union is irreversible,
by contrast, EU welfare is lower than in the status quo. As the core imposes a
high tax on the periphery, the electorate in the latter is also unlikely to support
this institutional reform. Both arguments imply that introducing a fiscal union
excluding an exit option does not represent a feasible solution to the debt crisis.
Finally, contrary to claims made in the policy literature, introducing Eurobonds
into the model improves neither EU welfare nor the Eurozone’s sustainability.
This result can be explained by the fact that implicit debt socialisation already
occurs in the other institutional settings. An official scheme of debt socialisation
which makes member states jointly liable for peripheral debt therefore does not
make any difference. Interestingly, Eurobonds are ineffective in stabilising the
monetary union if peripheral debt is mainly held by Eurozone creditors.
The Eurobonds scenario does, however, reveal some shortcomings of the
modelling approach. As the sovereign debt market is not explicitly modelled
and debt obligations are exogenous, the model does not take into account the
interdependence between the institutional setting and debt servicing costs. For
example, Eurobonds will have a stabilising effect if they succeed in reducing
peripheral interest rates. Whether they do so and whether any of the other
institutional settings affect interest rates has been a matter of considerable debate.
Although the model holds debt constant, it offers some important insights into the
political bargaining process and its implications for the stability of the monetary
union. Most importantly, the chapter questions the conventional wisdom that
the Euro cannot survive without closer integration.
The model’s main policy recommendation is that implementing an orderly
default mechanism as well as inserting an exit clause into the European Treaties
might prove more effective in preventing a Eurozone break-up than far-reaching
institutional reforms which further transfer sovereignty from the national to the
European level. Allowing countries to default while remaining a member of the
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union restricts the periphery’s bargaining power and mitigates moral hazard as
periphery countries are no longer able to externalise their debts onto the core
taxpayer. As a result, the bailout is smaller and core countries have a stronger
incentive to remain in the union. Given their stabilising effect, policymakers are
urged not to abandon their efforts to implement an orderly default mechanism
as part of the European Stability Mechanism (European Council, 9.12.2011).
While the insight that an explicit exit clause makes the monetary union more
stable seems counterintuitive, this is a well-known result in the fiscal federalism
literature. Granting countries the right to secede protects the minority, i.e.
the periphery, from exploitation by the majority, here the creditor countries.
Facilitating Eurozone exit by introducing an official exit procedure makes sure
that the minority has a voice in the policymaking process. A similar point is
made by Roubini (2011) who argues that comparable to “a broken marriage
that requires a break-up, it is better to have rules that make separation less
costly to both sides”. Interestingly, introducing an orderly default mechanism
and extending the current exit clause would probably require only minor changes
to the European Treaties, which means that these reforms are also easier to
implement than a comprehensive overhaul of the EU’s institutional structure. In
November 2011, Merkel’s conservative CDU party passed a resolution calling for
amendments to the Lisbon Treaty which would allow voluntary Eurozone exit
without giving up EU membership (Boston and Lane, 2011).
Whilst the outlook for the Eurozone remains uncertain and the disintegration
of the monetary union cannot be completely ruled out, the model suggests that
it might be too early to compose the Euro’s obituary. The chapter has shown
that the current piecemeal approach to crisis management is more sustainable
than previously thought and that minor changes to the European Treaties could
improve the stability of the monetary union. The Eurozone is consequently likely
to continue to “bob along” (Bremmer, 2011a). These predictions are echoed
by Buiter and Rahbari (2011) who discard both dissolution and fiscal union as
potential outcomes of the crisis and endorse a third alternative entitled ‘You Break
it, You Own it Europe’. The latter is described as the “minimum institutional,
fiscal and regulatory framework to ensure the long-term survival” of the Euro
Area. It comprises a sufficiently large liquidity facility intended to support illiquid
but solvent sovereigns and banks, an orderly default mechanism for insolvent
member states and a resolution regime for European banks. Recent EU summits
have made some progress in this respect. With European solidarity continuing
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to erode, however, Buiter and Rahbari (2012) have recently raised the estimated
probability of Greek exit from the Euro, dubbed ‘Grexit’, over the next 18 months
from 25 to 50 per cent.
It remains to be seen whether the Fiscal Compact will mark the turning
point in the two-year long sovereign debt crisis, as has been suggested by
policymakers. Gros (2012) argues that the treaty has been oversold and, contrary
to policymakers’ claims, does not represent the first step towards a closer union.
Moreover, national politics might once again derail the Eurozone’s crisis strategy
and endanger the ratification of the treaty. Firstly, the Irish Constitution requires
that the Fiscal Compact is put to a referendum due to be held on May 31.
Secondly, French presidential frontrunner François Hollande announced that he
would seek a renegotiation of the treaty if elected in May. At least in the short
run, the Fiscal Compact is thus likely to create further uncertainty.
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4.A Status quo
The core maximises (4.5) with respect to g subject to the non-separation
constraint. Inserting T SQ into the core’s utility function, the maximisation
problem boils down to:
max
g
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4.B Proof of Proposition 4.2
For the first statement, set mp = mc in equations (4.11) and (4.20) and compare
the resulting stability conditions. The second statement can be derived by
comparing the RHS of equations (4.11) and (4.20) respectively. If the RHS of
(4.20) is larger than the RHS of (4.11), the political union is more prone to


















m2p − 2mcmp +m2c > 0.
The last line can be rewritten in form of the binomial (mp−mc)2 which is always
positive, regardless of the difference in preferences. It follows that the political
union is always less stable than the status quo for mc 6= mp.
4.C FU with exit clause
The core maximises (4.22) with respect to g subject to (4.23) and the
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which results in the following FOCs:
−yc + λ2ncyc = 0 ⇒ λ2 =
1
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4.D FU without exit clause
The core maximises (4.22) with respect to g subject to (4.23). Using a Lagrange
function, the maximisation problem becomes:
max
g,τp,τc





γR + λ(npτpyp + ncτcyc − npg),
which leads to the following FOCs:
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Breuillé, M.-L., Madiès, T., and Taugourdeau, E. (2006). Does tax competition
soften regional budget constraint? Economics Letters, 90(2):230–236.
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